LAW REPORTS.

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1772, 10 June 1913, Page 3

LAW REPORTS.

SUPREME COURT, j PRIVATE BARS & BARMAIDS. READING OF THE ACT. STRANGE POSITION DISCLOSED. Unregistered barmaids and private bars vero matters referred to principally in an nteresting judgment delivered in the Supreme Court yesterday morning by Mr. rustic© Sim. Tho caso was that in which Fohn Charles Mason, licensee of the Panama Hotel, Wellington', appealed from i> magisterial decision convicting him of i breach of the Licensing Act in connecnon with the employment of a barmaid, vho was not registered. At the hearing of the appeal last week, tfr. T. 31. Wilford and Mr. E. A. Singer, if Auckland, appeared for the appellant, vhilo Mr. P. S. K. Macassoy represented ;he Crown. Nature of the Licensee's Appeal. The appellant (J. C. Mason) was convictid on an information which alleged that on lanuary 10, 1913, he employed an unregis;ered barmaid in a privato bar at a time ifhen it was open for the sale of liquor, [t was proved or admitted at the hearing ;hat, on the date in question, Robina Japtrill, a young woman, who was not ;hen registered as a barmaid, was serving iquor in a room in the Panama Hotel. Tile room was one to which the public had icoess, but it did not open immediately in to a street. It was contended on belalf of the licensee that this room was not a private bar within the moaning of Section 3G of the Licensing Act, 1910, as mended by Section 2 of the Barmaids' Registration Act, 1912. The magistrate Dr. M'Arthur), however, hold that the room was a private bar. The licensee then appealed to the Supreme Court on ; ho ground that the decision was erronejus in point of law. Decision of Supreme Court. In giving judgment yesterday, his Honour stated that it was iflear that in the popular sense of the term the room was a private bar. The question to be determined! was whether the term "private bar" ought to be construed in its popular sense in the Barmaids' Registration Act, 1912, or whether it must be held to mean a bar as defined in the interpretation clause, of the Licensing Act, 1908. If the latter view were adopted, hia Honour pointed out that the amendment made by the Barmaids' Registration Act would not liavo made any change in the law, and the Legislature would be held to have spoken in vain. After consid'erimg the circumstances set forth in the case on appeal, however, his Honour held that the magistrate was light in holding that the room in question was a private bar within the meaning of the Act of 1912. "It appears, -howervor," continued his Honour, "that the offence for which the appellant (Mason) hag been convicted is mot that creatcd by the statute. . . . Tho offence created by Sub-Section 1 ol Section 36 of the Act of 1910 was that of employing a female (unregistered) in the bar of tho. licensed premises, while such bar ttos open for tfie sale of liquor. It may be surmised ; that When tho amendment was modo in 191-, tho Legislature intended to create as an additional off&neo, tho employment of a female in a privato bar, while such private bar was open for the sale of liquor. That, however, is not what tho Legislature has said in the language used in the statute. The additional, oifence created by the amendment i 4 that of employing a female in or about a privato bar white the 'bar* —that is to say 'bar' as defined by the Licensing Act-is open for the sale of liquor. That is the plaim -meaning of tho language used, and the Court is not entitled to rend into it any further words so as to mako it cover cases that may be supposed to bo within tho mischief intended to be remedied by the Legislature. . . . The position, therefore, is that the appellant has nqt been found guilty of any offence created by the statute. The question now is. what course should bo adopted in the circumstances. If the question had been raised before the magistrate, he would have had power to convict Mason of the offence created by the statute if tho evidence justified that course. . . . The conviction, of tho appellant of the offence 6et out in the information is reversed and the case is remitted to the magistrate for a rehearing. The Court is of opinion that the magistrate was right ih holding that the room was a private bar within the meaning of the Barmaids' Registration Act, 1912, and is of opinion, further, that in order to constitute the offence in connection with a privato bar, created by tho Licensing Amendment Act, 1910, as amended by the last-mentioned Act, there must have been in the licensed premises at the date of the alleged offence, a bar, as defined by the Licensing Act, 1208, ahd the employment of a female in the privato bar must have taken place at a time when the bar, as defined by the Licensing Act, was open for thesal9 of liquor. Unless these conditions exist, then the employment of a female in a private bar is not an offence, There will tie no order is to the costs o( the appeal."

THE ART UNION. PHASE OP CARTERTON CASE. A Carterton case, Hut ray v. Reid and Bowe, was decidcd in the Supremo Court yesterday by Mr. Justice Sim. It arosq out of a magisterial decision delivered at Carterton, some weeks back, and camo on in the Supreme Court at Wellington last week. At the hearing Mr. P. S. E. Macassey, of the Crown Law Offico, appeared for the plaintiff, while Mr A. A. S. Mente&th appeared for the defendants. The action in the Supreme Court was a motion for tho issue of a writ, of mandamus in connection with a case which arose at Carterton a little while 'ago. An art union was held at Carterton, and the article to be disposed of was an oil painting of a horse, but the jxjlice suggested that the thing really disposed of was a live horse. The police, accordingly prosecuted Miss Bowe with a breach of Section 41 of the Gaming Act, 1908. When the case was called on before Mr. L. G. Reid, S.M., oounsal for Miss Bowo raised tho point that the magistrate' had no power to hear the information because the prosecutor had not given the defendant one month's notice in writing under Section 74 of the Gaming Act. The magistrate upheld the point Taised, and, the decision entered in the was: "Dismissed for want of notice.' . The question before his Honour was whether or not tho magistrate could bo compelled to hear tho case. . Opposition to tho motion was raised by tho defendants, it being contended that wrong: proceedings had been taken, and that the action should have been by way of an appeal. In delivering judgment yesterday his Honour said it was clear that tho decision of the magistrate was wrong. Tho only question was whether, it was an erroneous decision on the merits, or amounted in effect to a refusal to hear and determine the case. If the decision was on tho merits, then, however wrong it may have been, it could not bo reviewed by process of mandamus. In tho present rase his Honour held that the decision of the magistrate was plainly an adjudication on the merits and not ft refusal to adjudicate. The plaintiff s proper remedy therefore, was by appeal. Tho motion for mandamus was dismissed, but defendants were not allowed coste. MAORI LAND CASE. Proceedings woro abandoned in the Supremo Court yesterday morning in which tho plaintiff was Daniel Hannan, the younger, farmer, of Levin, and tho defendants the Ikftroa District Maori Land Board, and Lindsay Banks Barron, farmer, of Levin. When tho case was called Mr. A. Fair appeared for the plaintiff, Mr. P. S. K. Macasscy for tho Ikaroa Land Board, and Mr. M. Myors for the defendant, Barr°ln February last an action between tho samo parties had been heard, the plaintiff applying for tho issuo of a writ of mandamus directed to tho Ikaroa District Maori Land Board commanding the board to hear an application for transfer, agd

to. ondorso a certificate of confirmation on the same. A. lengthy statement o facts was laid before tho Court and on March 5 Mr. Justico Sim de'iy?™ l 'l * reserved judgment. He held that to board had rightly refused to grant the transfer and gave judgment for oelena

It was mentioned at that time that a second action would probably bo >ro\ - erncd by this decision. The second action, however, was fixed for hearing last week, and-Mr. Fair had obtained ail adjournment for a week. Yesterday no applied for a further adjournment to cnablo Daniel Hannan, senior, to hie fttnUaiits, evidence being given as to tlio latter's illness. . Mr. Myers strongly opposed any Wither adjournment as his client was anxious to place the matter before the lkaloa District Maori Land Board which meets to-day. . . , His Honour was of opinion that no case had been made out by plaintiff lot an adjournment to enable Hannan, sen., to file affidavits. No one could show thai lie could give any evidence of value ir the case. Tho hearing would have U go. oil, but he would allow plaintiff until the afternoon to prepare. Mr. Fair said he was not prepared t< go on, but he would not press the qucstior of adjournment further. The proceedings were accordingly tioan doned and judgment was entered for th< defendants with costs.