NAVAL POLICY.

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1768, 5 June 1913, Page 6

NAVAL POLICY.

PERIL OF THE ORIENT,

A NEW PROPOSAL.

AMERICAN ALLIANCE SUGGESTED. ' A most interesting debate was held under tho auspices of the Victoria College Debating Society last evening, tho subjoct being tho naval policy of New Zealand, Sir John Findlay advocated tho formation of ft Pacific Fleet, provided and controlled by tho United States, Canada, Australia, and Now Zealand to resist the common enemy, Japan, and Professor Laby urged tho estaolistoncnt of a much smaller navy to be maintained by Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Mr. T. M. Wilford was to havo supported tho Navy Leaguo policy, "One Flag, 0110 Fleet," but he was unable to bo present. Tho debate took place in tho college gymnasium in the presenco of about 301) people. Tho Hon. 'A. L. Herdman pre- , sided. Apologies for absence wero received from Mr. T. M. Wilford, Colonel Chaytor, tho Mayor (Mr. J. P. Lnke), and Mr. H. H. Ostler (chairman of tho Collego Council). - The chairman said the meeting was tho outcome of a suggestion mado by tho Right Hon. James Bryco that tho various university colleges should take a.keenor interest in largo political and Imperial questions. The subject of naval defenco was certainly the most important that could havo been selected, aud its supreme importance was at length being realised. A Big Fleet the Essential, Sir John Findlay said that in determining what policy a country like New Zealand should .adopt, the first important consideration was what perils confronted us. and what was thoir source. In his opinion we were not in danger of conquest by any European power, owing to tho existence of the British Fleet in Homo waters, and our distance from tho base of any European fleet. But -we woro confronted, and would in the future Ik even more menaced, by peril from tho Orient. This peril was real not only for New Zealand, but for every country having a Pacific littoral. In the languago of diplomacy, Japan was our faithful ally, but tho language of diplomacy was tho last thill® that should bo relied upon when determining a policy 011 which our existence was to depend. Our policy must bo that policy which was the best for the defence of-tlis'Pacific as a whole. t In tho Inst twenty l years Japan had risen Minerva like, and become the supreme power of tho Pacific. A growing nation, full of vitality, she was ambitious, and her ambition must be the hegemony of the Pacific. She had-suffered much, by tho contumely of Western nations, and it was but natural that she should be determined' to show that she was not only not the inferior of those nations who had despised her, but that she was able to subdue, and perhaps govern them. Two-thirds of the lands of tho world were washed by the Pacific Ocean, and tho overlordship of that ocean opened up for the nationwho could gain it, limitless bounds within which.to satisfy her ambition. _ Japan was overcrowded. Her population was. ■323 to the square mile, but she could look across a narrow strip of sea, and find Australia with an area of three million square miles, and a density of population of less than two to tho square mile. Similarly, there were rich islands in the Ocean, and on the American coasts other rich territories, sparsely peopled. | Force the Only Arbiter. At present we were friendly with Japan, but he was not ono of those who placed much reliance upon treaties when the life of a nation was at stake. The only sanction behind treaties was the sanction of might. Thero ''was no Supremo Court among nations, and the filial arbitrament must be that of force. His opinion was that America and Japan must fight, and that very soon, and so soin as hostilities' commenced tho Hawaiian Islands would beconw at once a Japanese possession, and from a strategic point of view the Hawaiian Islani.B were the eyes of tho Pacifio. Ono might ask how we would be affected by a war between America and Japan. He should not Tie affected immediately, but could wo stand bv unconcerned while Japan annexed the Philippines, the Hawaiian Islands, and Pango Pango, as sho was determined to do? Our interests wero really bound up with thoso of the people on ihe west coast of America-. The ambition of Japan was based on, a ground hard to assail. She did not come as a conqueror to wrest our lands from us. Her attitude was simply this: that sho opened her ports and her country freely to people of eve™ nation,, while restrictions were placed upon her own emigrants seeking to live in white men's countries. She wished to secure for- her own people the rights sue freely gave to other countries. In the Old Land the danger of an Oriental invasion was nought, and the British peoplo I did not realise the peril of Australia and | N T ew Zealand. Ho had heard men in high places in England say, 'Ton ought to be very glad of tho protection of Japan, ihe people in England could not appreciate the dread the peoplo of Australia had of an Eastern invasion. America, Canada, Australia, and Now Zealand, tho oountiies with common interests, must _<lxaw together to defend the they had inherited from possible destruction by the Eastern civilisation with li-liich it was incompatible. Only by a lleet in theso waters larger; than that of Japan \itse\i co\M seemed from Japanese invasion. We had a population of fourteen millions in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and we could not create a fleet fit to give battle to the Japanese Navy. And the tendency of the Mother Country was to draw her own navy closer round her own shores. wo could not rily upon the British Navy. 1o whom, then, must wo look? We must look to those who had the samo interests as ourselves, opposed to those of Japan. America, the nation inheriting our own civilisation and traditions, had already half extended her hand. We had a population of fourteen millions, and America had 100 millions. Taxation of 10s. per head over that population would quickly provide a fleet fit to give battle to the Japanese Navy at any time. The American nation, was determined to keep her Taee free from Eastern fusion, and tho Australian Premier had said, and nobly said, that race purity was ono of the things that lie would never agree to submit to arbitration. He honed tho white peoples of tin Pacific would act. and act soon, to save thoir .institutions, and their race from destruction. (Loud applause.)

Objections to Alliance. Professor Laby said ho was to some extent in agreement with Sir John Eindlay a= to tho necessity of meeting tho menace of the East, but lie did not agree with his proposals for meeting it. Would America join us? Might' such an alliance lead to entanglements? These wero important nmstions, for the time had pashed when the American nation was wholly or even mainly British. ' Surveying tho international situation, he spoke of the Anglo-German rivalry, which took its beginning when Germans discovered at the time of tho Boer War that she was powerless without a strong fleet to take advantage of Britain's entanglements in order to extend her Empire. Germany had then learned the last, lesson of Napoleon's career—that it was impossible to extend warlike operations b?yon<l Europe without ?«n power. Success in this rivalry between. Britain and Germany must rest with the nation having most resources m men, and monev. Germany had an advantage because of her more Tamil increase o. nomilotion, and her expenditure on naval armament was heavy and increasing rapidly. But as a result of tire BalVan War "ml the increased power of the Southern Slavs, Germany had had to increase her armv. thus diminishing to an extent her resources for Hi© purpose of qion. In Europe now we liad tho rnpio Alliance opposed to the Triple Entente. _ Our alliance with Japan would t«rminnte ill 1915. The object of that alliance in the first instance was to confine the war between Russia and Japan to those two nations. But for what niirnose <licl Japan now keep lier ereat fleet, seeing th*t she had vanquished Russia? Her fleet was 5(1 per cent stronger than that of Russia and 50 ner cent weaker than that of America, but neither the Russian nor tho American fleet was placed in the Pacific. A navy could be used to repel invasion, or to protect trade routes, but Japan needed no such huge navy as she kept to repel any threatening in-,.

vasion, and 6he needed no nnvy nearly so largo to protect lior trade. Most of her sea-borne commerce was enrried in British and American bottoms, and Britain and America were tho first aiul the third naval Powers of Ihe world, who could therefore protect Japan's commerce for themselves. This compelled tho conclusion that Japan kept her navy to extend her realm beyond tho narrow limits of her own islands, which woro not rich in natural resources. She kept her fleet to prevent other nations from excluding Asiatics from their territories. What Exclusion Moar.s. 'Australia and Now Zealand must therefore considei' whether they would longer continue tho policy of- tho exclusion of Asiatics 1 , and consider it in tho light of the certain knowledge that they could maintain that policy only by force of arms. To have a navy without a foreign policy was for a country an extravagance, and to have a policy without' a navy was a futility. No very direct lead is to what tho lwlicy of the Dominions in naval defence should be had been given by the British Admiralty. Two alternatives seemed to bo possible—to contribute a subsidy, and to keep a local navy./ If we were to contribute a subsidy we should pay an annual subsidy of at least a million, if wo were to sharo tho burden of Umpire equally with tho people of Great Britain. Tho objection ,to the payment of the subsidy was that rlio amount was subject to reduction in times of stress here, and on tho other hand open to be used to decrease tho burden of tho Mother Country. England was now able and willing to pay for all ships that could bo built in her dockyards, but she had difficulty in finding men and officers for her ships. He believed that the Dominions should help with personal service, and in order to do that they should keep their own navies, provided always that the local navies were such that they could, in a moment of danger, be merged with tho Imperial fleet. Then thero must be central and not local control. He thought the Dominions should accept the invitation if it wero offered to join tho Imperial Council of Defence. (Applause.)

An anonymous contribution, favouring a single Imperial Navy, manned and maintained by tho Mother Country and also by the .Dominions, was read by Mr. G. G. S. Watson. Tho debate was carried by several other speakers and the principals replied. Votes of thanks were accorded to the principal speakers and to tho chairman.