THE BALKAN WAR.

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1684, 26 February 1913, Page 8

THE BALKAN WAR.

LECTURE BY MR. SPENSER WILKINSON. POPULAR FERVOUR AND NATIONAL POWER.

Mr Spenser Wilkinson, Chiclielo Professor of Military History at Oxford, gavo an address on January 10 to the Historical Association at tho Imperial Institute on "Somo Lessons of the War in tho Balkans." Professor A. F. IJollard, who presided, mentioned that M. Geshoff, tlift Prima Minister of Bulgaria, and Mr. Spenser Wilkinson were at ono time fellow-stu-denfs at Owens College, Manchester, and that the prize for German was on one occasion divided between them. Mr. Wilkinson, speaking after the lecture, added that 'll© and M. Geshoff also divided "-the prize for English, which he said was a much more remarkable fact. Mr. Wilkinson described himself as "a harmless naturalist studying ■ tliosp peculiar organisms called States and nations, and especially -observing tho habit they have of fighting with ono another." This; ho said, was a laborious business, especially when ; ono had to work with dead stuffed specimens. Tho military .historian's business was to reconstruct armies and navies that no longer existed, and to explain their anatomy and psychology. '. It would bo interesting to take a live war, he said, instead of a dead one, and it happened .to-day that they had a real war before them. Unfortunately it was hardly, possible to study it thoroughly.. The actual course of the war-in, Turkoy. was still obscure, although the results were known. What tho armies ' wero, how. they moved, how they, fought their tactics,. tho features of tho battleswere, broadly,, speaking, still unknown. None of the nowspaper war correspondents had been 1 allowed to accompany the' Bulgarian and Servian army dn the field. There had been no time as yet'for the publication of accounts by officers who took part in tho campaign, although ho believed that in a few days an account would. be published which gavo a trustwofthy outline of the operations of the Greek forces. Such narratives as. lidd been published had been prepared at. a distance from the front, and > the only accounts he had seen by eye-witnesses represented .'distant views 'of scraps of two .battles, and did'not enable them to form a clear idea of cither of them. Somo battles which had figured considerably in' the telegrams wero : probably altogether apocryphal. :. Motive and Power. : His intention was therefore to call attention to one gnfafc main feature of war which was exemplified by this, war, tho principle of the relation between motive and effort, .which was the most important chapter of tho, natural history of tho war. . Wars were the working out by violonee.of quarrels between States, and in order to understand them they must understand that. a State was a living creature, not a. machine. War was the conscious , activity of the State, involving tho energies of its life or 6oul, and they could* not explain the actions of a nation,. either in war or in peace, on merely mechanical principles. .Tho community of men was capablo of responding to tho stimulus of an idea in a/way which no mechanics could explain. A general idea put into a.community of human, beings might transfer that community as completely as earthquakes could transform a country. War was , /essentially an activity of the spirit, and tho most, potent forces at work in it were spiritual; The energy developed by a nation in war was -proportionate' to tho degree in which the idea associated with tho war, the motive of the war, appealed to, interested, and took possession of the people. If a' State were a machino a statesman could do what he liked with it. ' Ho could decree that every able-bodied man should bo trained as n perfect soldier and every educated man traiped as a perfect officer.' At the moment which suited his calculations ho could declare war against : a neighbouring State, and set- his mili- : tary machine to bring into action-all.tho power of tho State.' A ; great many people thought that was tho nature''of the Stato and of war,. but natural history did not ondoreo their vicwi because communities of men were not mechanical arrangements to lie controlled by turning a tan or pressing a'button. " . T' lß Worth of-a Causa. Every man wanted to mako tho most of his lite. Every man in his heart of hearts wanted to live a good life, the best that was possibio to him. How, then, could a leader of men find a multitude of his fellow-creatures willing to mako themselves stoppers of bullets and to part with Ins itself in obedience to a word of command. Itwas not possible, except under, tho iniluonco of somo idea'which cculd transform itself into a duty, a call to self-' sacrifice which not'to obey , was . to loso that dignity and self-respect without which, lite was not worth living. In order to call a whole people to arms they iuust be able to put before them a cause appealing to their highest thoughts arid deepest emotions. That was so well known that, when a statesman thought a war to bo necessary ho took great pains to convince himself,-his countrymen, and tho rest of the, world both of the excellence or the cause and the need for action, and happy was the statesman who was not mistaken and the, people who wero not deceived. But the activities of. war required a long and arduous previous preparation. The first condition of. avoiding a .disastrous war was harmony 4)0tween policy and naval and military preparations, and'it was a fundamental principle that the energy of a nation in warwas proportionate to the degreo to which the motive Or cause had taken hold of the whole community. From that point ■ of view neither the effort of tho Boers nor of the Japanese against Russia was more : remarkable than the movement by which the four kingdoms, now in conflict witli Turkey had put into the fields armies con-, taining a large proportion'of their able-, bodied population. Such an effort was explicable' only by thoso' movements of! men's spirits of which- action in war was the expression. . Sclf.Hejp in tho Balkans, In tho course of a discussion on the causes of war, Mr. Wilkinson explained how the national movement among' tho Taces in Turkey had taken the form of a struggle for fi;epdom from' the oppression which had proved to be stronger than the will of "the Powers, wlibso jealousies had long prevented effective action towards the bringing about, of a -better stato of things. But tho evidence that the Great Powers would do nothing to help theso populations and tho conviction that the ynall States must rely upon themselves had brought about unity among the small kingdoms, arid had led to. a' practical policy for liberation. Tho war between Turkey and Italy, with its proof of the helplessness of tho Turkish navy, and the .failure of the attempt of tho Turk's to' subjugate Albania had showed the small States that Turkey was not so strong as she used to be. Mr. Wilkinson showed how tSo speculations as, to the strength and preparedness of the opposing armies had been falsified by events; and he drew -attentiop to the remarkable facj that each of tlie three. kingdoms found its supply of willing and trained n' liers far in excess of tho numbers that been anticipated No war had given a better example of the rapidity with which tho decisive blows of a war could be struck. Tho actual operations of tho war lasted little more than a month. Nowadavs States did not fight in a vacuum. The.v wero surrounded by other States, which ntyvays meddled if they hod a motive for doing so. Modern statesmen who contemplated a war of tho Napoleonic type for tho purpose of striking down an adversary and making terms miist bo prepared first to crush the enemy's army, then to occupy his capital, and -in tho moment of success to defeat such helpers as might como to the side of the, beaten 'foo. Danger of Complications, In the present war for the Allies to have taken Constantinople would''have been to strike'.Turkey such a bloiv that ht-r recovery would havo been doubtful. The Powers would have had to consider tho future of Turkey < in Asia and perhaps its partition, which would have been unwelcome, and'there would also prolwbl.v hare been a change in tho attitude of Russia towards tho Allies. These were probably among the reasons which led tlie Allies to prefer n truce to an attack upon Turkey's last position, which would have liajl little weaning unless' it had ken,,

carried to tho Bosphorus. Other difficulties of the Allies were the attitude of Austria and tho desire of Rumania to exert her influence. Russian national sentiment was deeply attached to the prosperity of Bulgaria and Servia. An Austrian attack upon. Servia and- probably a Rumanian attack . upon Bulgaria would make it almost impossible for any Russian Government not to take action in defence cf tho Balkan.States. In that ease Germany would feet called upon to coino to tho assistance of Austria, and Franco could not refuse to co-opernto with her Russian ally. The problem of, British statesmanship was whether in that eventuality, which was now seen to be a possibility, Great; Britain could remain neutral consistently with her own self-respect and tho position sho had hitherto hold as a Ettropenn Power. For that reason it was desirable that all Englishmen should make up their minds'.while there,was time as to tlieir country's duty in Europo and concerning tho necessity of national organisation/for war, A vote of thanks was passed to Mr. Wilkinson on tho proposal of Professor Tout, of Manchester, seconded by Professor Firth,- of Oxford.