OUR POLICY-WHAT?

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1654, 22 January 1913, Page 8

OUR POLICY-WHAT?

TOWARDS THE FLEET.

IN THESE DAYS OF DANGEB. [Contributed,] [No. 5.1 Summary of Present Position. Britain tannol, unaided, carry on tho struggle for naval supremacy against ,C 5 million Germany rapidly increasing in wealth and numbers. \\ o must elect in I tiio Dominions cither to come to her uid, and take our full share of tho burden ot j defence, or wo may witness at no very distant timo the Mother Country aim > cradlu of our raco vanquished at sea, po&ibly invatbd and 'stripped of some of her possessions. '...■■>' • No nation in the history of the world has pursued such a- generous and cnligbtcnad policy .in., relation to its daughter and dependant Slates as Britain has. The Dominions have had complete selfgovernment, and tho protection necessary to enable them to develop their institutions and natural' raourocs, undisturbed until recently by. questions of defoncc. A system of government lias 1.-een developed by tho different parts of the Empire' unrivalled for its freedom and purity, each State having: reacted on tho rest to tho benefit of the whole. Britain's supremncy at sea has been essential to this truly great development; of which wo may bo justly proud. ' But, unfortunately, wo.have not merely to maintain a local supremacy in the North S->a, but tho Empire must protect ■i 1.3( trade routes, and possess adequate naval protection in any part of the world where tho British Dominions aro specially exposed to attack. As-we have seen New Zealand, Australia, and Briiish Columbia have a serious' problem .of. their own in the Pacific. v In Japan wc'imve a progressive, warlike, and successful p?o----u.o, multiplying rapidly, and in need of lands to colonise, or at lens't to emigrate to.' Their colonies in Jsia afford no relief, and the Japanese aro practically excluded from even settling in Australia, New Zealand, British Columbia, and other lands bordering on the Pacific. They would bo justified by European precedents in demanding the removal of this restriction, and when Britain is unable to move her ilcot from tho North Fea they Will have the naval power necessary to compel us to allow them to settle, in tho lands in' question, or even to effect a permanent occupation. New Zealarid would bo as attractive to them as Australia, but thoso who think otherwise must not-believe they can. allow Australia to bo invaded, or even to' abandon at the threat of war'the AVhito Australia policy. Once-the latter occurs the dismemberment' of tho Empiro is not far off. Nor aro the restrictions tin the immigration of the Japanese the only slight wo cast on a proud and powerful people, .Quito, recently the. owners of a Japanese ship, learning that the waterside workers would probably rof use- to work tho ship if it traded between Australia and New, Zealand, abandoned a voyage for that purpose. The object of. the waterside workers is, of course, to nrevent Asiatic crows competing 1 with the higher paid crews of tho intercolonial boats. ]t amounts to a partial exclusion of tho Japanese from certain trade in the Pacific.

Attempts have been made to effect this exclusion by shipping laws, but the clauses intended to effect it did not receive, the Royal ast-ent.- Both Ghina and Japan refused to allow Europeans .to compote in their trade, and at first attempted to exclude them from the Orient, but England, by wars with China, and demonstrations against Japan, compelled both these nations to allow her to trade with them—a concession 1 whichi Australasia now shares in the enjoyment Wo must clearly recognise,that the exclusion of the Japanese' from* settling-in .NewZealand and ■ Australia, or from sharing in.thi slipping trade, are policies which, though lit present accepted without ,re-monst'-nnce by Japan, may at any time compel us'to accept cither of two altenia> tivos: to either • ignominiously reverse them at Japan's dictation, or to support them with, force. .'■■'-. ~- '.. In other words, if either of these policies is essential to our welfare, and wo believe the restriction of Asiatic imrairrrntion is essential to our form of civilisation, then they imply, naval preparations to -maintain them by force in the last resort. '' . .' .'■' Our Naval Policy. 1 ; It is essential then that New Zealand's naval policy must contribute as for as our resources will/, reasonably allow towards. • -•.„;„ ~-..', (1) The. maintenance of Great Britain s supremacy in the North Sea. (2) The protection of New : Zealand and Australia against Asiatic immigration. (3) The protection of tlio trade routes of the Empire. Any naval preparation which fails to at-' tain all' these three ends can be regarded as suitable for New Zealand. , So far as we are aware, only three ways have been suggested by which wo may sharo in tlio naval preparations of the Empire. They aro:— (1) A repetition of the gift of battleship to England. . /' ' (2) An annual contribution to the Admiralty. . • .' '.- • , (3) To combine with Australia in building an Australasian Navy.

The Gift of a Battleship. To repeat the gift of a Dreadnought is '■open to objection on niany grounds.. At the samo time it must not be thought that tho gift.of the Now Zealand, is open to the snmo criticism. There can ,be no doubt that. New Zealand's prompt action has. ' considerably influenced Canadian opinion, and has turned the thoughts of the whole Empire to the question- of united action in naval preparation. Those who are concerned with safeguarding, tho integrity of the Empire—and that is"_para'mount' above all other considerationsmust examine this gift, now that it is accomplished, not on the real (or supposed) motives of the Prime Minister who niado it, or its constitutionality, but from a wider point of view. To repeat the gift raises different issues. What is heeded in the present situatiori is not a series.of irregular, spurts'in navy building, but the quiet adherence to a fixed and adequate programme. But that will bo impossible if various parts of tho Empire are to contribute. to the navy by gifts. Such gifts are sure to bo' made after a scaro'(<md so will tend to* create scares), and become effective too lato to bo of help. Tho British Government would bo ignorant of the strength, of the Navy at any future time, and our own 'Treasury of. tho expenditure required for defence. Further, this policy makes no provision for the protection of tfado routes, or to meet the special dangers wo are exposed to in the Pacific, which we have seon are essential to our safety. A Direct Contribution, A direct contribution to tho Admiralty would, we believe, receive much' support in New Zealand. And if it wero adequate in amount, and regularly paid, there can bo no doubt it would, from a purely, naval point of view, bo the best policy, as it would enable tho largest additions to bo made to the British Navy for a (riven expenditure of money. We must bo prepared—whatever policy wo adopt—to pay our full sluvw of the cost of naval defence of tho Empire. Wo can bear our share with 'greater ease than can tho people of Britain, and, if wo do not pay our full share, wo enjoy a protection at the cost of the poorer peoplo of England. At present Britain, with 45,500,000 people, spends' JC46.000.000 per year on the Kavy, or nbout. £1 per head, with the same per capita chafeo our contribution would be J81,000,000 per year. If our Parliament is asked to vote such a largo amount as this,, it must have some voice, or at least somo knowledge of how it is spent. A suggestion of tho First Lord of the Admiralty ; has made this possible. Mr. Churchill has invited tho Dominions to send n representative to the Imperial Dcfenco Committee, and it. is to bo Imped that all the Dominions, will nt least accept tho invitation, and that each will send a Minister to represent them on that committee, in order that the Dominion Governments (and Parliaments sofar as is practical) may receive some of the first-hand information - which, w .»■ essential to the proper understanding of the problems of Imperial defence, and also in order that Hid Defence Committee may not attach too little importance to local problems', such as we have in the Pacific. But a closer consideration of a direct . contribution shows, we think, it to b« un-

sound in several particulars. , In tho first place, a contribution of X 1,000,000 psr year will involvo-very-considerable sacrifices. Even if a particular Government nml Parliament, could, bo found to vote kucli a sum, thtro. would bo a grnvo danger that in; Mine- time of financial stress the vote would'be reduced. •If a. smaller contribution were made- in the first instance, there-would be no likelihood of it being increased to our full share: There.- would be no' means bv which the community -. could bs made to realise - its responsibilities. Further, if we'made a contribution of only jCt,Oofl,ooo -per. year, (largo as that would bo for us)'we could' not ask the Admiralty to strengthen, its Pacific fleet, for the whole amount of our contribution would be inadequate' to make anv appropriate increase in that fleet, and' so that if any increase-.of•'•real value were made it would entail a''decrease'in the moncv availablo for the North Sea' licet, ill | short, our contribution' would not enablo both Hie North Sea and Pacific: liens to bo .increased. ■' ; - :'■•' ' . ~-,■!

A contribution from-New Zealand then is < unsound, beoaiW it does not -afford a.iy means by-which'we as u coiiimuhiiv, or our Parliament and'(j'ovcrnaioni; canlearn the real' problem's of naval preparation, and fully"realise- our responsibilities; nor-docs it enable' us' to support—it 'l.tctssary by force—at times wlic-n the British Navy cannot 'bo-moved from the North Sea, our exclusion ■'of-Asiatics. To permanently exclude ircmlNcw Zealand requires their'exclusion from any part of Auslralasia./and-for'.that purpose a citizen army would be very ineffective without a navy. For instance, a single hostila battleship could prevent the two islands' of New Kealnn'd Irani'acting together., • An Australasian Navy.,' ■; ~'•-'. It cannot be denied that there is a'good deal of indifference,-if not opposition','to cur co-operating' with Australia. This arises from considerations' which cannot be allowed to/ enter into 'such vital matters as we are considering. . Many New Zoalanders fear'that,Australia-wishes to weaken tho.'British .connection; They find support for this view in such actions ns the eviction of-tho Governor-General from tvovernment •Htnisc, Sydney, in- tho refusal of the\ Commonwealth Government to ;ssnd a Minister, to the Imperial IJofonce Committee, and-in tho fact that the .embryo ~ Australian Navy does not. pass automatically, under .the control of-the Admiralty in time of war. The eviction of tho Governor-Gen-eral is the action-of the New South Wales Ministry, and'is clearly..; extraneous to naval questions.. ~ . ,;

If New Zealand co-operates with Australia to. build a joint navv, then wo should make our assistance' conditional on Australia agreeing, to—(1) the representation of both Governments bv Ministers on the Imperial- Defence .Committee, and, (2) to tho joint navy- being transferred automatically to'the British .Admiralty in time of war. , In this way New Zca'lnnd can render' again, as great- a service to Imperial unity as sho did. in;her gift of the' 1 Dreadnought. ,; Though 'a small community, sho has tho opportunity to play an important and decisive part. It is to bo hoped that the :Government .and 'Parliament will not .fail to. rise to tho occasion. Canada, too, should- bo invited to' assist in the creation.-.of. a-.Pacific fleet in proportion to her; jnterests'jn that ocean. ' Australia and New .Zealand, in co-opera-tion, could bring into'existence a Pacific licet.and naval works' larger, but of tho character Admiral Henderson'recommend, cd. We belibvo' this polipy. would .fulfil in the course of some yeari tho three con : ditions laid down earlier in' this article. It obviously protects' New Zealand and Australia, andoiir trade routes'in the Pacific and' Indian Ocean.' l:\irtlicr, it enables Britain.to concentrate her' resources to a greater. extent', in' '■ the', N6rth Sea, for f although, after the conclusion of the AngloJapanese alliance,, air the, British battleships' were withdrawn, to tho North Sen, a number of cruisers remaimon tho- China and Australian stations. These could be withdrawn as tho Australian-New Zealand fleet was built, and'so relieve Britain of the expense' of; maintaining' them.' Further, tho Pacific'fleet in'the course of a few years Would become, a very valuable reserve in any great emergency of the Empire.. Finally, it may be "pointed out that co-operation with Australia has been recommended by.iAdmirnlvKing-Jial], and Mr. Churchill has suggested that Britain's daughter States should assume the responsibility for the naval defence of the outlying seas.' This policy,'then.'is in agreement with England's desires. ; '" '.•