OUR POLICY-WHAT?

Dominion, Volume 6, Issue 1639, 4 January 1913, Page 2

OUR POLICY-WHAT?

TOWARDS THE FLEET? IN THESE DAYS OF DANGER. '.' (Contributed.) "War is the continuation of policy by other means."—ClauscwiW. [NO. lU.] Grave Enough—North Sea Plus Pacific. In tho previous parts of this article we have seen that Germany has obtained by a great effort a fleet that seriously rivals the British' fleet. Britain's superiority in battleships over Germany is now about 50 per cent., but Mr. Churchill has pointed out'that if Germany wero to attack the English fleet (wo do not here raise the question of the probability or improbability of her doing so) it would bo when tho ordinary vicissitudes of peace, tho need for docking, absence of ships in distant waters, had weakened'our North Sea licet to its, minimum strength, while her own fleet would have been brought to its maximum strength for action. This process'would, according to' tho First: Lord of the Admiralty, reduce our superiority by 30 per cent., our margin of superiority in the circumstances would have been 'decreased to the extent contemplated by the preamble of the German Naval Law'of 1900, and the German navy would bo of "such strength" that a war, even against the" mightiest naval power, would'.involve risks threatening the'su-; premacy of that Power." But, in addition to the dangers, which threaten the 'heart of tho British Dominions, there are problems facing us of equal moment in the Pacific, which, if neglected,. rimy imperil, as homes of tho white race, Australia and New Zealand, the two countries which are as yet' the freest in the world from racial and, social problems, and whose people have a mag : nincent opportunity to work for a better organisation of Society than has so far been attained. The security of cither of-' these countries against Asiatic invasion is gone when the "other, is.invaded. At' tho conclusion of the last article it was pointed out that Japan possesses a navy as powerful as that of France, and that Baron Saito, Minister'for Marine, is credited in Japan with having stated last February, before a secret session of the Budget Commission, that the irreducible minimum'of Japan's naval expansion. was tho construction by 1920 of 16 superDreadnoughts. " It is interesting to compare Japan's present battleship fleet with that of other Powers in the Pacific—Russia arid tho United States. As before, ships more than twelve years old are not included, .' and pro-Dreadnought battleships aro only counted as of value onehalf in tho "total strength": ■■.' ■'. '-, '. Battleships 1913. Russia. Japan. U.S.A. Battleships ..........:.' 8 11 ,18 Dreadnoughts *; uor 7 10^

Total strength ~... 8 12 18 ■ Authorities: "Navy. League ■ Annual".' and "Statesman's Year Book." •-.■ ." The Russian fleet is divided between the Black Sea arid the"Baltic, and-recently most of the United Statcß :ship3 were m the.Atlantic- Tho British. Chinese, and South American fleets in tho Pacific,are insignificant compared -to. that of Japan. The Purposp of the Japanese. Fleet. It is a matter of moment to Now Zealand and Australia to know why Japan after two recent and - exhausting wars makes tho sacrifices necessary to maintain a somewhat more powerful navy than such a country as France, whose possessions and trade aro greater aud moro world-wide. '-.''.'..'■ . ~ ■ In finding an answer to this question we may examine our own' motives for maintaining, a navy. They havo been (1) to give to our scattered Empire security, against aggression, and (2) to guard. our .• trade routes/especially thoso upon which : England' 13 dependent for her food. The ; only other purposo for which a navy can | bo intended is the invasion of other States, . the function, of. the na'vy ( ' being to guard.,! tho arniy transports. ~' ;■' ' ■•/■■'■ .-.'! Is. it to; Resist Invasion? ■ 'I For which,,of .these purposea tho, Japanese na\-y is intended will now be con-, sidered.' It is true that Japan, is made up of many islands, and Formosa is about 1000 niiles from Tokio. But Japan, denFely; populated as it is, with, its ,50,0(»,000 people,. can scarcely fear" invavsion. :, At worst that form of attack could only come'from China, or Russia, the former having no navy is impotent for such, a purpose. That Japan fears any danger in the near future from-Russia'is itnbe--licvable. Russia weakened by revolution and inferior in naval power, .'will wait long before she ventures to attack Japan lit ■ sea, and risk again tho overwhelming, disaster that previously befell that' undertaking. The possibility of invasion of Japan by-. Russia 1 or any other.Power is not worth seriouii consideration. No adequate motivo can. be found, no probability'of success awaits the undertaking It is not the densely populatejl Asiatic States which need fear invasion, but the, thinly populated-ones in tho temperate zone'..'

Is It to Protect Trade? . Is the purpose of the < Japanese naTy, then, to guard Japan's trade routes and shipping? What shipping and trndo has sho to protect? Who are her possible enemies in this respect? ■ ' /'•';; In the following table Japan's trade and shipping is compared with that of New Zealand and Australia, and Great Britain:— . . , ■ . ' . Trade and Shipping, 1910. . Great Japan. Australasia. Britain. £" ■..£■ ■ •£ Imports and ; exports per . annum. 92,000,000 171,000,000 1,100,000,000 Tons of chips owned ' 1,600,000 " 660,000 12,000,000 ; Japan's navy is. quite disproportionate in strength to the trado and shipping it has to protect. Further her two chief cuiitoniers are the British Empire and tho United States,'the world's first and third naTal Powers, who also carry most of Japan's imports and exports. Tho greatest difficulty in assuming that Japans navy, exists for tho protection of her commerce is to find any possible enemy, to find any naTal Power that will wish to injure her sea-borno commerce. Eussia is the only conceivable power. Japan's fleet is needlessly strong to prevent such injury.. If her fleet exists neither to. resist invasion," nor ito protect trade only ono possibility remains and that is it exists for purposes of aggression. That conclusion is in harmony with Japan's history, which records her haTing' fought two successful wars' in eighteen years, and her need for territory to take her surplus population. ' Her "population is increasing by'about 000,000 people; per year. When a nation increases at' that rate and its own lands are crowded, only two alternatives arc open to it other than starvation. Its pe.iplo either emigrate or they possess themselves of the waste lands' of thc'globo by peaceful'colonisation or by conquest.: But, as will now 1)0 shown, tho Japanese have failed to find land suitable for colonisation, and their emigration is restricted by (ho. British States.torderng On" the' Pacific. If the Japanese surplus people remain in Japan they appear as a nation to 1m faced with more poverty; if they wish to colonise or emigrate to lands in the temperate zone bordering on the Pacific, then'-it will bo only possible by force of arms.

Japan's Surplus Population. The "Round Table" for May, 1911, contains an ablo articlo on tho "Emigration Question in Japan," where the following passages will bo found:— "When tho Japanese undertook to oheck tho wulUward advance of Russia in Manchuria they did so primarily, no doubt in order to prevent Russia esta)>lishing herself in so secure a strategical position that she might dictate to China and to Jnpen alike. . . . There was (also) tho conviction in the minds of the Jnpancso statesmen, that the rapid growth of tho Japanese population . must result either'in the extension of tho boundaries of Japan or in tho flight of tho Japanese to other countries. Korea was not overcrowded. Not only, therefore, did it occupy the position of a buffer state . . . hut it also offered a field for colonisation. So also Manchuria offered similar prospects. Formosa had been ncquired by Japan after tho Chino-Japanese War in 1895, partly to prevent the island falling into the hands of a European Power, but also becauso it offered a field for colonisation. For the problem of overcrowding is becoming nctile. I- "Tim Japanese are excellent farmers, I and their frugality is beyond ouostion*

but the area of cultivable land is not great enough to support so numerous a population. Japan has now available tor colonisation Korea, tho Liao-tung peninsula, and ono half of tho Island of Sakhalicn, together with such portions of Manchuria in tho vicinity of the South Mnhchuria railway as she may bo ablo to colonise without actually possessing." Tho writer goes on to show that: "The plain fact is that up till tbo present time Japan has been unable to induce any considerable number of her people to settle in the Liao-tung peninsula, or elsewhere, in Manchuria or Sakhalien. . . . Tho Chinese and the Koreans, their competitors in these regions, work and thrivo on wage! which tha Japanese canot accept without towering, or. at least, altering, their mode of life. , . . In short, for tho Japanese farmer,.as for the Japaneso labourer, there is nothing to induce him to.go to Manohuria. . ; . All the above considerations' apply a fortiori to the southern half of tho Island 01 Sakhalien. .'. . The experience of the Japanese in colonising Formosa has not been favourable.

"These considerations aro so patent to any intelligent observer that it would be idle to suppose that the Japanese Government and its export advisers have, been blind to them. Taken in connection with tho - rapid increase of population in Japan, they constituto the current, problem 'of that country. Japan must' restrict its rate- of' increase, must find an outlet, must greatly develop tho manufacturing industry; or'must permit its'population to sink, through increasing subdivision of tho cultivable land, into tho hopeless poverty of the Chinese. If they, migrate, where aro tho Japanese to go?' Not northwards, for we. have seen the obstacles which lie in tho way; not into the tropics, not westwards, for- .China .is already full to overflowing; must thoy not migrate across the oceans of the world, eastwards on their own latitude or southwards beyond the equator' tb'.the-south tempornte zone? At. present the problem' is not acute, for Japan wants soldiers', and,taxpayers to pay them, in order that she may maintain her, military position and her national. independence, which would be "challenged at once either by Russia or ; China," or by' both, if occasion arise. , Tho Government ofiJapan has, .therefore,..shown itself to be quite disposed at present to limit emigration to regions other than those selected on grounds ;of i'policy. But, sooner or later, in the absence of a sufficient' gradual stream of emigration, the mere growth of numbers is; bound to bring the problem to an' acute stage." The. Anglo-Japanese. Alliance. . In view of tho situation traced above, the, question:." Why did; the United Kingdom enter''into the Anglo-Ja'paneso Alhanco in 1902, and! renew it in strengthened form in 1.1905?" is of - considerable ' interest. "The Round Table" for February, 1911, asks and answers this question. ."Let us look at the actual terms of tho agreements. The earlier alliance was entered into on January 30, 1902, for a period of five years. Its object as set : forth, 'in tho preamble' was to 'maintain ■ the status quo-arid general peace' in tho 'extreme' East,' -to preservo 'the ■ inde- .- 'pendenco and- territorial integrity': of China and Korea, and to secure .'equal opi portuuities in those---countries for the • commerce and'industry of all nations.'" ' Artilo II provides that'if either' Power . becomes involved in war 'with another I Power'in. defeuco .'of'its respectivein- , terests (i.e., iu Korea or China), the ether will "maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts' to'prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against 1 its " ally." According to Article; 111 if either ally is attacked by moro than one P.owei in"defonca of its-special interest as afore- " said, the other must como to its assist _ anco and conduct the war and inak< ' peace "in commoii."' -'. Tho chief objects of '■ Great Britain, w entering the 'alliance, were .to prevenl . tho war, which it, was quito'obvious thai \ Japan and Russia were . rapidly driftint I into; frbni growing into a general inter ' national. Armageddon'.'as' a rcsnlti o: ' Knropoan intervention, and to savo.Chiiu 1 i I'r.iiii tiie dismemberment' which Willi ;'p.robii.fiiy follow that intervoWtion. Tin - 1 ' i<irpii«themnj' of-;- this alliance 'by Grca' 'j -Britain in 1305 was no doubt due to tin ■>! >ro\vth of theClrmaii Navy.' "In faci j of the 'increasing development of tlw :. German Navy, tlio British Govcrnmeu | had-'no option'but to concentrato in. th- >-' North Sea a force sufficient lo ensure tlv i-'safety of tho British Isles." And eo th e '■ battleships of tho Pacific Fleet were al it (withdrawn to tho'North Sea shortly aftc !- i the completion of tho treaty. ■.' ■ . 0 I Tho ulliauco can be ended by eithc t party, on -August ■ 12, -■;. 1915}" but.aftc y August 12, 1914,-. only a years notice o r intention to denouueo the agreement } a necessary fi-om-ei,t-her of the parties toil :r One of England's reasons: for makin 3-- it will bo diminished as the Australia n Fleet grows in.power. The protection c it tlio-Empire's interests in : tho Facih it obviously, shouklbotn the • hands, otth s-, British Dominions bordering on it, an r- not in the hands of-'an .'Asiatic-Powci if In the event, of Japan;, denouncing vth is treaty by 1915,thc need for Bntisli.batth b- ships in' tho Pacifio becomes greater ;tha 1- it was'before ' tho treaty of- 1905, an [t almost as great as the, need for-a lle< :s in ■ the Mediterranean or North bca.

Restriction of Asiatic Emloratlon. ' ; 'Tho great Dominions of : tho . Bnipiro have placed restrictions on tho ontry ot Asiatics. Victoria, in 1855, as a result: oftho anti-Chiuesa riots in ,tlio Boldfields, passed a law which served as : a model for all subsequent legislation up till 1897. this law limited tho number of .Asiatic lmunrrants that a ship might carry, ami imposed a poll-tax. It was. adopted with small variations, in subsequent ycars_ by all tho Australian colonies, by New Zealand, and by Ccnada. In-MW-Natal pass; ed. an Act, known as the Natal Act, which prescribed the writing out at dictation a passage, of fifty, words in pean' language." This is now Uio law. of all the Dominions except Canada, iihich imposes a poll-tax of .£IOO on all Chinese. This exclusion policy exists not because Asia has not systems of high civilisation but because they aro different to ours. It has been well expressed by tho Sydney Morning Herald": .. • c "They (Asiatics) are representative of a civilisation older than ; our own, and the centuries of heredity'whioh tins implies have evolved thoughts which aro not our thoughts,'and waju which aro not our ways. And henco.we, as being in a greater degree than' any other Western country under tho shadow-of Asia, havo to choose between exclusion or extinction of our own type of civilisation. And m this wo havo tho White Australia doctrine.,.

Japan's Changs of Policy, It would bo a most serious mistake for New Zealand and Australia to. suppoijo that Japou will submit willingly in the future to tho exclusion of her people. Her attitude is becoming increasingly stiff in this matter. No iiriiuediato\danger. threatens'her near at home, she is recovering her strength lost in the war with Russia, Britain as wo have seen wilLbo lncreas-: ingly preoccupied in the North feea. At any tinio" Japan may demand that her peoplo should bo treated in tho samo way a 3 Europeans. .'. — '' '. . Both Australia and Canada have learnt what her attitude is. Australia endeavoured to negotiate' a commercial treaty with Japan, and though" such a treaty. exists with Britain, Japan refused a treaty so long as Australia claims the right to exclude the Japanese.' '; ; - .' ' ' The British commercial treaty was made in ISM. Owing to the 'restrictions placed bv the Dominions on Japanese iinmijrants negotiations with Japan failed to" effectively extend it to the Dominions. ' Japan in 1890 was prepared to allow her labourers and artisans to bo excluded. In 1908 the Canadian Government asked tho British Government to endeavour that Canada should become a party to the 1894 treaty. This was accomplished by tho Canadian- Parliament agreeing apparently that iio restriction wns to be placed by Canada on the immigration of Japanese Labour troubles breaking out in Hawaii, 10,000 Japanese entered British Columbia 1 . Everyono remembers tho -anti-Japanese riots which followed. Japan protested; the situation became serious; a Canadian Minister was sent to Tokio. A letter records tin agreement. According to it Japan will no longer allow Canada to exclude, nny class of her pcopo. , (To 1m continued.)

PROVINCIAL CENTRES. (From Onr Bsaolal OorretuondoutM