GERMANY AND BRITAIN

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1434, 8 May 1912, Page 7

GERMANY AND BRITAIN

A SENSATIONAL STATEMENTGENERAL BERNHARDI GIVES WARNING. I By Teletrraph—Press Association— Copyright Berlin, May 0. General Hemhardi has given a warning regarding the dcfencelessness of the Cier- i man position at 'Shantung. He declared that when tho negotiations between f France and Germany concerning Morocco t wero at a critical' stage, tho British fleet was awaiting orders from London to at- r tack the German settlement at Shantung. Tho present anarchy in China, adds the General, makes tho question one of urgency, in view of a possiblo European scramblo for spheres of interest in that country. GERMANY AND THE NEXT WAR. GENERAL BERNHARDI'S NEW BOOK. 1 General 'Bernhardt was a distinguished cavalry general, and is probably the most influential German writer on current strategical and tactical problems. In Alareli last General liernhardi published a book entitled "Germany and the Next War, in which is given tho most candid expres- ■ sion that has been given in recent years i to the doctrine that Germany must, regardless of tho rights and interest 01 other peoples, fight her way to predominance. General Bernhardi combines a panegyric of war in general and the advocacy of deliberate preparation not only for war, but of war, with confident ( predictions that France will have to uo annihilated, and that England will have to be attacked and beaten in order that J Germany may realiso herself and fulhl the destinies of Providence. In a chapter on "The Duty to War," General lle.rnhardi maintains that ' history shows that wars whcli were pro- ! duced of deliberate intent with states- , manlike insight had tho happiest results. ( Clearly enough if a country is preparing to inalce war for its own "highest purposes, it will have to hide its intention from the country or countries on which it 1 is intending to make war. How, then, are ] statesmen to combine such a policy with tho ordinary requirements of honesty and sincerity? General Bernhardi remarks that so far as he knows no solution has as yet been found for the difficult problem contained in the question, "In how far is it permissible to employ for political ends which are. moral in themselves means which in the life of tho individual must bo regarded as unwarrantable?" After pointing out tho practical advantages of straightforwardness and the complications which ensue from the pursuit of moral ends by unmoral ineans, he writes:— "It has, however, to be considered that tho relations between two States must often be regarded as a suppressed state of war which for the moment is being carried on only in peaceful competition. Such a state of things justifies the use of peaceful means—cunning and deception—just as war itself does, because in such a case both parties are prepared for tho use of such means. On the whole I believo that a confliot between personal and political morality can be avoided by clever and prudent diplomatic behaviour, if one is ■ perfectly clear about the goal which one desires to reach and always remembers that the means which one employs must ultimately correspond with iho moral character of this goal." Tho whole passage mav bo commended to all persons who are shocked at an attitude of suspicion towards German diplomacy when and whero it is influenced by the advocates of war. : Claiming for Germany "not only a placo in tho sun, but a full share in the mastery of the world," General Bernhardi, after some neither generous nor accurate remarks about the colonial and Imperial policy of other Powers, and some criticism of the purely "negative" efficacy of the Triple Alliance, demands that German policy'shall : b£ based'not' only on maintenance of peace, but oil tho possibility or probability of war. _ "We must always keep in view the possibility of rear with England, and take our'political and military measures accordingly, without regard for any peaco manifestations of politicians, publicists, and Utopians." And again, ' Tn on? Wav or another wo have got to settle with France if we desire to obtain elbow room for our world policy. That is the first and most unconditional requirement of a healthy German policy, and, as French hostility cannot bo disposed of once and for all by peaceful means, it must,bo done by force of arms. France must be so completely overthrown that she con never again get in our way. General Bernhardi does not. hesitate to say that Germany must deliberately destroy the balance of power in Europe in order to set up a system of States with Germany at the head. He examines what he conceives to be tho foreign situation, and he examines the domestic situation in order to show that Germany ought not to have too much regard for principles—for example, of finance—but ought to take risks in order to be ready at an early date for a war which vjll decide tho whole future of Germany. There aro several passages about domestic politics and finance which illustrate precisely what has just happened in Germany—the victory of a policy of armaments without revenue over a policy of steady development of armaments according as there is money to nay for it. There are some very curious and interesting passages in the book on the shifting doctrines of German naval intentions. General Bernhardi admits that English people until about the year 1902 never dreamed of a war with Germany. He considers it natural that they should try to recover 'lost ground, but. nevertheless, says: "This fact does not, however, alter anything of the hostile character of their measures, and of the circumstance that the English war preparations have their point almost exclusively directed against Germany." He might find the most effective answer in his own account of the stages of German naval ambitions. As he says, the first great definite naval programme was that of 1900. The evolution of doctrine was as follows-.—"At first the onlv matter was to show the German flag at sea and on the coasts* on which Germany traded." The expenditure required for this provoked, says General Bernhardi. the opposition of these who regarded a. German Navy as superfluous and dangerous, and the German Government fell back on the theory of coast defence. This theory did not endure, and all persons of insight felt "the necessity of meeting the attacking enemv and repelling him on the high seas.' This meant tho construction of armoured shins, but the authorities adopted lmlf measures and "ropeatertlv insisted, that Germany was far from 'desiring .to compete with the groat navies, and, of course, would be content with n navy of the second class. This second stage soon passed, and after unsuccessful effort* to arrive at the goal as cheaply as possible by the. development of torpedo craft and so on, it was recognised that "a country, like the German Emrire. which is dependent on a powerful foreign trade in order to employ and feed its "rowing population, and which on account of its political and economic progress is bo ted everywhere', cannot dispense with strong armaments at sea and on the coasts." That was the third stage —recognition that all possible ononr-s must V beaten nt «ea. As elreadv indicated Genera! n-rnlmrdi and Vs friends nt aiiy rate have ranched the fourth stage—th» definition of England as tho cn'emr who will b»vo In be beaten nt sen. He states his position thus:"The conception of nnr nnvn. . d"ty points directly to Iho fact that it '.s tho Enelish Navy which must give the mr-is-nre of the ext-nt of our armaments for na rM war. War with England is probably the war which we shall first, lmc to fight out. The possibility of victoriously repelling an English attack must therefore guide our war preparations, and, it the English continue to increase their nary, «'0 cannot ave.-d following .them even beyond the limits of our existing Navy Law."