A NEW ZEALAND TOUR. POWERS AND MOROCCO

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1390, 16 March 1912, Page 13

A NEW ZEALAND TOUR.

POWERS AND MOROCCO

Tourists throughout the world have long since heard of tlio oharra and b«autr of our Now Zealand B&cnery. This statement is almost a commonplnce wero it not that tho repetition does not pall—it only serves to bring the vastness, variety, and charm of New Zealand's natural gloriee into greater contrast with those of other countries. In a booklet published bv the Hupp Motor-Car Company, of Detroit, Michigan, U.S.A., entitled "Hound the World in a Hupmobile," we rend the following. After touring in Australia, the writer states, "Messrs. Hanlon anil Joues toured across the North and South Islands of New Zealand—a trip that proved in many ways tho most rematkablo of tho tour." He continues.— "Hills everywhere as far as the eye can see, around and beyond you, abound in North Island." "Hills of all kinds, from short, steep pitches, to lon». steadv climbs, which C. D. Glidden, a worldfamed tourist, declares are tlu> worst in the world." And so tho story goes on, tellhif of (he wonderful triumphs over road difficulties by the "Hupp." A truly marvellous car, you will say. Why not? Tho makers guarantee it; to stand tlio wear ami tear of almost any road—and somo of thosfi hereabouts nr» bad enough. The sturdy little Hupp is fitted with a wonderful engine, which will run 800 miles without relilling the radiator. Its light ridin" qualities, ea=e ot control, and noisere<Miess, make it a perfect touring car Fuller particulars and the aforementioned booklet may bo had from A. flntrick and r 'o.. Ltd., North IMnod Ajtnk. W»tij»ntt(, β-nd asficeiU Town HaOii W&Uiosteß.-AdTt.

A SERIES OF MISTAKES. People hero (wrote the Berlin correspondent of tho "Manchester Gmmlian" on January 27) are beginning to look bade on the events of last autumn in a nioio impartial manner. England is (Mill held to ba the chief offender, but the blame is now being more equally distributed. I quote flic following paragraphs from tho current number of "jlnrz," a Progressive weekly journal published in Munich nnd widely read over the whole of Germany; Franco was aiming at a protectorate in Morocco, lint Hie Act of Algvcirns mid the Declaration of February 9, 1909, mentioned no protectorate—only tho seed of one. If this seed was to grow, the Alge-cii-as Agreement would have to fall to the ground. French statesmen ought to have foreseen this. France should have niodo spontaneous proposnls to Germany on the basis of a protectorate and compensation. This had been tho ndvico of tho "Temps" and the "Debats" for the previous six years. France could not fail to recognise that the consolidation of a secret protectorate through a military expedition was bound to look like trickery, and to raise the strongest ill-feeling in Germany. It is easy to understand that when France mado this mistake of 6ilenco Germany should register its protest. But it wps a mistake for Germany to do this through the occupation of Agadir by tho Panther. A mistake, because tho threat of force that it implied made any surrender on the part of France morp difficult. It made tho Congo concession more bitter for Franco, and modified the success of a peaceful settlement, as well as tho extent of tho concession itself. In tho same way the -moment chosen by Germany, although this coincided with the march on Fez, was unfortunate. On July 1, 1011, M. do Selves had only been Minister of Foreign Affairs for three days. Naturally a new and as yet unpractised Minister could make fewer concessions. The difficulties were increased by Germany announcing (as it had the right to do, and as under other circumstances -woiihl have been wise) that it considered England's co-operation unnecessary. The great mistake of England was to misunderstand nnd to intensify these difficulties. Grey -was put into a bad humour because Berlin wanted to deal with the matter alone. He set tho form above the contends, and tried to show Germany how much she could bo hampered by the refusal of England's co-operation. The speech of Lloyd-George, which Grey instigated and Asquith permitted, was meant to be a lesson to Germany, to strengthen France, and to stiffen public opinion in England. The result went far beyond this. To-day these threo statesmen would have acted very differently. . Out of such mistakes great confusion nnd damage may result. And so indeed it did. The negotiations dra'gged on nnd on. . . . Each side suspected hidden designs on the part of the other, each side prepared itself against the possibility of such design?. This preparation produced further coldness, and the clouds of suspicion threatened to burst in an actual storm. The final horrors of war were avoided. But the imaginations of 150 million men were again accustomed to the possibility of such a disaster. Men reputed clever put down the "strengthening of national feeling" that followed on tho credit side; if they are not utterly frivolous they must put down the strengthening of their neighbour's national feeling on tho debit side, so that the balance remains tho same. The discussions in both Parliaments of the agreement finally reached was unsatisfactory enough. In Germany, and etill nioro in France, there were many politicians, who put an artificially exaggerated anger against the Government before the good of their country. This French "patriotism" deceived us just as little as our own deceived tho French. A great deal of its inner falseness could not help showing through. Secretly, both \ in Germany and in France, almost everybody was in fnvoiir of the treaty, and a responsible secret ballot, independent of home politics, would have* yielded : an enormous majority both in the Reichstag and in the French Chamber. All this unfortunate. noi?e nnd pother about an act that was really approved and that could have been accepted with satisfaction, had it not been for tho many mistakes that had been made! Will the thr-fe countries loarn from this experience? Wo have no right to despair of thcif doing so. In years to como tbn Morocco crisis may bo taken ns a proof that at this time, despito occasional lapses, the souse of responsibility both in nations nnd in their representatives "had irrown to such a point as (o make the outbreak of a general catastronhe harder nnd harder. England bear? a large nr.rt of thi> blame for tho ill-feeling in Europe at the moment. But that should not binder us from recoßnisinp that the English Parliament has found a most worthy form of settling tho affair with its own Government. It lifts been made clenr to its Ministers thnt they have mmlo a mistake, and that public opinion in Encland has beoi quietly changing, This quiet chnnire in nublic opinion will produce an alteration in German feeling only when England makes an actual nnd perceptible revision in its policy of isolating Germany. Whether this will hnnpen I cannot say. Only when the Enclish Liberals return to the wisdom of Gladstone will there be any noticeable change in Germany.