The Dominion. TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1912. FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1350, 30 January 1912, Page 4

The Dominion. TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 1912. FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN

"Why should Reichstag deputies rage, or Pan-Teutons imagine a vain thing?" Such is the agreeable question to which Mr. Sydney Low addresses himself in the latest Fortnightly lleview. He finds fault with the English Government, as with the dignitaries of the' Wilhelmstrasse, ancl comes to the conclusion that, everything'considered, France has the best of the present bargain. His principal complaint against the British Government is that an excess of secrecy has been to surround the Anglo-French Entente. .He desires information. Ihc Entente is alluded to as an unlimited and undefined liability. What, he also inquires, overlooking her interest in the balance of power, was England's real object in keeping Germany out of Morocco ? The Triple Entente, ov, more correctly, the understanding- between France and Great Britain,- has, of late, been a frequent subject for press and platform in England. Lord Rosebery, in a recent speech, declared that England is now "embraced within the Continental system and committed to vague liabilities and obligations which might lead the country into the greatest war since the days of Napoleon." Further, he "preferred definite alliances to vague Erttmles, inasmuch as an alliance's limit was defined." He declines to criticise; but he, too,_ desires information. The Fortnightly Review article and Lord' Rosebery's speech may be accepted as two distinguished and representative deliverances on the relations at present existing between Great Britain and France. Both, as obviously the outcome of study and of thought, 'arc in striking contrast to the utterances of pertain extremists who apparently care little what may happen so long as they are allowed the privilege of vilifying their own country. Some of the London _ Liberal papers, too, have been .playing the somewhat inglorious part _ of devil's advocate. But in no British speeches or writings, whether superficial or profound, has the suggestion been made that the Triple Entente should be abandoned, or that the friendly relations with France should cease. And. more significant - still, while much has been heard in favour of cultivating Germany's friendship, no proposal has_ been forthcoming that Great Britain should seok any form of alliance with Germany. Those who gird at the British Government, and Sir Edward Grey more especially, bccausc Germany and England mutually view each other with no overpowering degree of cordiality, might with advantage speculate on what probably' would have happened in Europe since 1904 had it not been for the AngloFrench Agreement, prepared that year by Lord Lansdowne and M. Delcasse. That Agreement, later, by its inclusion of Russia, became largely merged into the Triple Entente,i Germany's early efforts were to nullify the Agreement, which, failing, were succeeded by a period of persistent plotting to terminate the _ Entente. Some present-day critics seem to have short memories. The Anglo-French Agreement, among other things, provided that England would not oppose French ambitions in Morocco and that France would acquiesce in England's occupation of Egypt. In April, 1004, France was 1 active in Morocco, and it was obvious to Germany that the British and French Governments had reached some amicable and definite understanding. Six days after the signing of the Agreement Count Reventlow, in the Reichstag, blamed Count Bulow for not creating difficulties between England ana France. The Chancellor replied that no German interests were menaced by France's presence in Morocco and he ridiculed the complaint of the Pan-Germans that "the armed Michael" had again been "left out in the cold." The Entente was still in its embryo stage, the Agreement promising no more than Great Britain's diplomatic support in Morocco. This circumstance gave Germany encouragement, and in March, 1905, came the Kaiser's intervention and the demand that M. Delcasse should no longer remain a member of the French Ministry. Events moved rapidly and M. Delcasse was driven from office. The German agents, Donnersmarck and Schiemann, pronounced, probably the Kaiser's will, that Fra,ncc must become Germany's ally against England or prepare to be destroyed. According to the Paris Jlatin, the Kaiser threatened war, and then England agreed to land 100,000 men in Schleswig and to aid France with her whole fleet. The Entente was thus created, and Germany subsided. In the history of the crisis, afterwards published, it was made evident that, until Britain's promise of diplomatic support had changed into Britain's offer of armed assistance, M. Rouvier, the French Premier, had boon drivnn from tsurrondor to BUXTQudcr by the throats of Germany.

Germany was checkcd and her diplomacy has since then met with a sad scries of disasters. Still, it would appear, the "mandarins of the AVilhelmstrasse" continue unabashed their clumsy and arrogant ways. M. Gaillaux clearly succumbed to the Kaiser and his advisers. But defections like those laid to his chargo have been probably very few in France, While the recent Ministerial changes were being effected the general tone of France was distinctly favourable to England, as it was Strongly antagonistic to Germany. Considering the attitude of Germany towards France as displayed in the episode to which we have briefly alluded, there are sound reasons for fearing that, were France isolated, she would suffer severely at the hands of Germany If France were at the mercy of the Wilhelmstrasse the balance of power in Europe, which Great Britain must uphold, would bo dangerously disturbed. The Standartc in a recent Culmination against Great Britain wrote: "Lngland has always been the mortal enemy of every rising nation which dared to build ships and to ekpand. She has defeated Spain, Holland, and France, and now it is Germany's turn." This attack is completely repelled by Me. J. Ellis Barker, ,the author of several valuable works on Europe's political history. He points out that during the last three centuries all Britain's greatest European wars have been waged ; not for gain, but for the preservation of the balance of power in Europe. Ever since the time of Henry VIII and of Queen Elizabeth, it has been Great Britain's policy to oppose that Power which threatened to overwhelm the Continent of Europe, for Britain has learned by_ bitter experience that a Power which rules the Continent is not likely to tolerate an independent England on its flank. The maintenance of the balance of power in Europe adequately explains the Triple Entente.