WAR SCARE.

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1333, 10 January 1912, Page 6

WAR SCARE.

. »_ WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED. Lieutenant Alfred Dewar, R.N., discusses in tho "Pall Mall Gazette" what might have happened during the recent war scare, wlien it was alleged that the British Navy was not in a position to deal effectively with the situation. He writes:—The German fleet consisted of four Dreadnoughts and eleven pre-Dread-nougkts. Their position was probably known within certain determinable limits: but let it be supposed it was unknown. The First Division of the Homo Fleet consisting of eleven Dreadnoughts, was at Cromarty, more than a • match for the opposing fleet in strength and homogeneity. But at Queensferry was the Second Division, consisting of eight prc-Dread-noiights. ■ Quoensferrry is 160 miles from Croraarty—that is, aba squadron speed of eighteen knots, nine hours away. Tho question rises swift to one's mind—could a hostile fleet have fallen on the Second Division ? Now, first of all, Queensferry is a protected harbour approached by. a, for largo ships, narrow channel, eight milos long. This channel was, wo may piesumc— though, perhaps, too many presumptions are dangerous—patrolled by destroyers and commanded at its entrance by the guns on Inchkeith and on the of rife. ...

These guns are neither over-riunierous tor over-powerful, but still llioy count for something, and certainly for a margin of tiine, if—another, assumption—we assume (hem manned night and day. Those who talk of a fleet falling suddenly upon another must TQmember this long channel of the Forth. To neglect it would be analogous to neglecting some such factor as friction in the sphere of physical science. The practical thinker musl take these things into account. Let us reduce the whole now to an expression of time. The enemy would have been sighted at least twenty miles off the Forth—that is at eighteen knots, 1.2 hour*. To silence Inchkeith would require at least an hour, if it were possible at nil. For the ascent of the channel another hour must be allowed. The Second Division is presumably not going to acquiesce tamely in this business, and in conjunction with the destroyers and ,the batteries would probably damage and disable several ships. This phase would swallow another hour at least. Four hours have elapsed. Steaming much more slowly back, the- enr-my would take two hour.i at least to draw off, and would not be off May Island till about the seventh houij. Now, to consider the consequent movements of the First Division. And first it must bo remembered that.the German fleet never aoproaohed the Scottish coast. Had it doneso, or if its position were at anytime indeterminate, it was clearly the business of the First Division to get to sea, and tho position it should have assumed is clearly dependent on that of the Second Division.

Reducing a. very obvious principle of applied strategy to the circumstances of the occasion, the First Division ought to have been within such distance of tho Second that a hostile fleet could not approach the Forth, silence tho batteries end ascend the channel, without getting tho First Division on its back. It may, perhaps, be contended that tho result of the First Division putting to sea would have been to draw into sharper and sharper prominence the flickering tongues of mutual antagonism. This is to indulge in an excess of stategical refinement. .But lot us suppose the First Division still at anchor in Croniarty, and receiving news of tho enemy approaching the Forth. From Croniarty to tho Forth is 160 miles, or about nine .hours at eighteen knots. This interval is too great to permit it reaching the spot in'time to render actual assistance to the Second Division, but, hearing of tho enemy at tho sixth hour, descending tho channel, the First Diviision would keep to the eastward, and the fleets would probably meet somo thirty to forty miles enst of May Island about the ninth hour from the initiation of the critical phase. It must bo confessed, however, that such strategy, while probably resulting in tho enemy's complete defeat, would ho open fe be within such a distance as will permit of a simultaneity of attack and supnort—that is, not more than four hours apart.