AGADIR INCIDENT.

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1293, 23 November 1911, Page 5

AGADIR INCIDENT.

THE EVENTS REVIEWED. GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT. .VIEWS AND INTENTIONS OE GERMANY. By I'cleeraph—Prcßa Association—Copyri.-tt (Fee. November 23, 0.25 a.m.) Berlin, November 22. An official extract from Hen' von Kidcrlen Wacbter's confidential specob to tho Budget Committee has been puhlishod. Ho declares that in his telegram of Juno 13 he instructed the Ambassadors to inform tho Algecirns Signatories of tho dispatch of tho Panther and the reasou for the stop. The Ambassador in London was additionally instructed to declare that tho Act of AJgeciras becamo illusory and it was necessary to protect German lave? and property until order was restored. An appeal bad been made by a number of well-known firms to protect their lives. As it was doubtful whether France was ablo to revert to the status quo of 1906, Germany was eventually prcparod tx> seek with France a solution in accordance with tho interests of tho Signatories.

Britain was therefore informed of Germany's intentions before tho Tanthor Mas sont to Agadir, because the above communication was mado on July 1. Britain did not inquire in reference thereto, twd it was only on July 21, at Sir Edward Grey's instance, that an interview between Sir Edward Grey and tho German Ambassador occurred. Sir Edward Grey s opinion that Germany's attitude, despite the Ambassador's explanation when tho Panther was dispatched, was again manifested at this interview. Sir Edward Grey's opinion was tho result of charges which the French and a section of the British pross, and indeed, of some officials, which were consistently urged against Germany's policy. Hefr von Kiderlin-Wachter remarks that Sir Edward Grey sought to discuss Morocco unofficially, but had at the outset emphasised Britain's great economic interests, and that Britain must partj. cipate m any settlement of tho Moroccan question. Sir Edward Grey now declared ho had been waiting and hoping for an agreement between franco and Germany, now, howover, that German demands, as he had learned, were so far-reaching that it was obvious tho French were unable to accept, he feared the negotiations would bo resultless, and tho question would again come iuto tho foreground. ""What," he asked, "is Germany doing in tho closed harbour of Agadir and in tho Hinterland?" Ho knew nothing of what was Occurring, and added that Agadir was suited to tho construction of a war port. N'obody knew Germany's intentions with respect to Agadir, and ho must expect questions in Parliament anent thereto. If the present negotiations failed, the Agadir question, which involved British intarcsts, would immediately arise. Sip Edward Grey believed it was now time for Britain to participate in the negotiations, but held aloof whilo thero was reason to hope for an agreement outside of Morocco, inasmuch as Britain was not affected if Franco and Germany, as first suggested, sought agreement by regulation of tho Canicroons Frontier.

The Ambassador replied that ho was not informed of the details'of the negotiations, and was unable to admit that tho German dcniands ;■ woyo pbviously unacceptable, adding that in that case they had not been proposed. The suggestion that Britain should join in negotiations was apparently based on the suggestion that Germany might build a naval station at Agadir. Those wero oppositions whereof he knew nothing. He referred to Britain's compensation in Egypt, and declared that if France desired a predominant position in Morocco sho must ofi'cir Germany an equivalent elsowjiere.

Sir Edward Grey replied that it would be unwise to oppose German expansion in tho heart of Africa, but in tho event of failure to roach an agreement with Franco tho situation would be less acute if they discussed, before further incidents arose, the Agadir question. The foregoing conversation showtd that Sir L. Grey assumed that Germany meant to stay in Morocco. As soon as tho Ambassador's report reached Berlin ho was immediately instructed to assure Sir E. Grey that it was not intended to establish a naval port in Morocco. Germany never did think of 6uch a thing, it was an hallucination, and Germany had no designs on Moroccan territory. Tho negotiations when begun guaranteed tho strictest secrecy, Germany took tho obligation seriously, and did not even inform her allies. Franco supplied tho pres.*, also friends, with incomplete information calculated to cast suspicion on Germany. Tho latter therefore ceased negotiation until secrecy was guaranteed. If the negotiations failed it was intended to insist on tho execution of (ho Algecirns Agreement iu letter and spirit.