TSU-SHIMA-A STUDY.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1140, 30 May 1911, Page 6

TSU-SHIMA-A STUDY.

FIRST HALF-HOUR. THE STORY OF A STUNNING MOVE (By Gyro.). Saturday and Sunday constituted the sixth anniversary of Tsu-shima. Such fragments of the official report as were supplied to the presß agbneies at tho timo of the battle merely stated that it was practically all over in the first half hour.' It is believed by numbers of naval officers in all countries that the method of approach" selected by tho Japanese admiral. was one of tho smartest, and swiftest things over done in naval war, but, even at this lapse of time, details are lacking. The. only nrst-class evidence are the accounts of Captain Semenoff (Russian), who Eays very littlo about the approach, and the Japanese report, the essential portions of which are still kept secret. There is also a Eussian book by Captain Klado, who, however, was not present at tho engagement. No war correspondents whatever saw the' battle. The following is an attempt to construct a definite story of tho first half hour from such data as we have.

AH accounts agree that the fleets first saw each other about 1.40 p.m. on the afternoon of May 27-1910. They also agree that the estimated range, when the fog lifted and disclosed each to tho other, was about 18,000 yards-a very suitable distance for manoeuvre, if that manoeuvre were swift. We also know that the meeting of the fleets was no surprise to either admiral. The Russians had been taking in the Japanese wireless messages all the night before, whilo Togo states that ho

"was able to picture them (the Russians) many tens of miles away." .No,doubt he had his informatioa from his cruisers. An ugly sea was running in the Strait, and the Russian ships especially were rolling very hard.

It may perhaps be necessary, to explain that the duty of an admiral is no way concerned with the details of that stage of a sea fight which is known as "the melee." He leaves all that to his subordinate's. What he has to do is to select the method of approach so as tocome into fire. on. an advantageous bearing. - The problem for Togo, at tho moment, tho ileets sighted each other was: What course to steer? What speed to order ?" We know definitely that, when he opened fire, he was able to bring 63 cannon to bear, while the Russians could only "bear" nine or ten. Now, how did he manage that?

The common .way of explaining it is that the Eussian admiral was an incompetent, and that any sort of approach would have settled him. This is not true. He w-as an exceedingly able man, and his 'work in the Russian Navy had long before attracted the attention and admiration of such a hard critic as the German Emperor. But he was a good deal tired of his own Government's imbecility, and his second-in-command had died a day or two previously, and was, even then, "lying in state" on the battleship Osliabia. Other harassing things of a liko nature havo been sufficiently disclosed by tho letters of his wife (Madame Rojdestvensky), which were published a year or two ago. But, even if he had been at his best, it is very doubtful if he, could have mot the move which Togo imposed on him in the first 20 minutes.

To imagine what this position was we must assume that, at the moment that thofleets sighted each other, the Japanese were steering due west in single line ahead. That the Russians were steering N.E. in double' column is known, but all that we really know about Togo is that, in order to come into action, ho "altered course twice to port—«ight points each time." There is.only one way.of fitting theso details together, and that is the way shown in the diagram. It must be remembered that the fleets were approach-

ing each other at a joint speed of about 30 miles an hour, and anything that was done had to be done very quick-

liy. I assume that Togo made his first turn toportatthe'pointA. He would then be running down on a S.W. course from A to B, which, would be a very dangerous manoeuvre for the four Russian ships, led by the Osliabia, which formed their port column. The corresponding manocuvo on their /part would have been to straighten out their order of steaming into single line ahead by tucking in their port column between tho other two divisions which formed the starboard column. They apparently did this later in the afternoon, but, by that time, all tho mischief had happened. As the Japanese were running down from A to B the Russians opened fire on Ihem. The range was then 8000 yards. To this the Japanese did not reply, beyond firing a few trial shots from light guns, in order to find the range. This device,, by the way, is the genesis of the fire-eoritro.l system which, since Tsushima, has been adopted by all navies. It was when tho leading Japanese ship reached B that the crash came. Somewhere about 2 o'clock the Japanese Admiral made his second turn to port, aud straightened out on the line due east from B to C', right across the bows of the mesmerised Eussrians. For them, it was a paralysing ' change of course. As soon as D was reached (six of the Japanese ships being then on the f now course) the command to "give fire" was passed, the range being then 6800 yards, and always shortening at the rate of 50 yards a minute. What followed is sufficiently indicated, perhaps, by stating what befell the Osliabia, which was leading the Russian port column. Tho first of the big shots— "portmanteaus," tho Russians called them—opened twelve or fifteen feet of her bow plates, and let in several hundred tons of water. The ship had a longitudinal bulkhead, which prevented this water from spreading to the starboard side. And the watertight doors were at once closed to prevent it from flowing aft. All the same, the battleship took such a list to port that it was soon impossible to work the turret guns, as the maximum elevation allowed by tho hoods would not even bring them up to horizontal. The captain, who seems to havo been a resourceful man, nt once opened the sea connections, and voluntarily let in a corresponding amount of water on the starboard side, which device brought the Osliabia on an even keel again. Unfortunately, however, this put her down by the head, and up by the Btcrn, and one of the succeeding "portmanteaus" paralysed her rudder. She could, in consequence, no longer keep her place in the line, and, being deprived of her power to manoeuvre, became merely- a target. The Japanese holed her steadily until she turned over slowly aud I sank. Like all the other Russian ships

of French design, her metacentric height, had been none too good at any time, and this trouble had been accentuated by tho enormous quantities of deck coal with which the Russian Admiral had been obliged to cumber his ships. How tho other Russian ships went down under the blizzard of shell is another story, and does not come inside the occurrences of the first half-hour. But, even for them, that stunning half-hour had done its work.

It must have been a great manoeuvre— this device of crossing tho Russian bows, and tho more one looks at it the more wonderful.it seems. There has probably never been such a swift and effective naval manoeuvre in the world's history. Yet, if we had been standing by the quartermaster who was steering the Japanese flagship, and had he "listened lo the. orders of tho navigating officer, we should probably havo heard only two words all tho time: —

First, "Sagen," which is "port ship." And then "Sagen," which is port ship once more.