MILITARY NOTES.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1079, 18 March 1911, Page 9

MILITARY NOTES.

.[Edited Br Echelon.] .TRAINING AN ARMY. "LET US NOT DECEIVE OUR-' SELVES." "Everything very simple, in \ v . a J> '"'l' the simplest thing is difficult. ' —Clausowitz. J lie following article by LieutenantColonel Alsagc Pollock in tho London Morning Post," on the general subject of training, very aptly'and most opportunely expresses in language which even "the 'man in tho street" may readily appreciate, the essential principles of military.efficiency. "Every sound solution of a strategical or tactical problem," lie says, by way of preface "seems to be ill' its broad features profoundly simple; for intricate solutions that depend for their success upon the accurate consummation of many and complicated manoeuvres are essentially vicious; yot behind the apparent simplicity there lurks a great mass of highly perplexing details, to each and all of which tho commander, personally or by means of his staff, must devote the most careful attention, if .successful results are to attend the onerations in progress. Theoretically the Strategical problem of training or preparation for war is extremely facile of solution; and the less experienced in war the person', who attempts it the more simple does'- 110 imagine it to be. Actually the iiroduction of a fully-trained individual,- .unit, or army is exceedingly difficult;. partly because military instructors of any real value are, like other successful teachers of whatever science or art, bonis not made, and partly because so few people properly grasp the truth of this elementary fact. Tho resultant-evils of such obtnseness are not confined to military training, but are very general, . and in 110 direction arc they more prevalent than in tin: scholastic profession. The "Valour of lgnoranco." "There arc very many people who' suppose that an intelligent man who is' a good shot, and'willing to do as lie is* told (unless his clover 'initiative' should prompt him otherwise), has sufficient claim to he regarded as a soldier folly capable ol doing .battle for his country. ' Tactics appear to be simple, because' tactical principles .arc indeed simplicity 1 itself, and drill is held to be of' little value except for tho ornamental purposes of the much-despised'yet always' admired ceremonial parades. • That ( discipline depends ujion much more than mer'e goodwill; that smart drill is the most valuable of all means to the allimportant end, real discipline; that tho; tactical principles, which appear so' simple when set forth in text hooks or essays, are not so easv to apply ia\ actual practice; or that a genuinely'' efficient soldier is the product of. long and strenuous preparation in' whir'.i. brick is carefully laid upon brick—such ) elementary facts are very commonly ig-'. noreil or categorically denied, liv persons whose environment- has' endowed' them with the 'valour of ignorance.' "Discipline is not a natural virtue, ' but an acquired habit; a mail-of-'under-standing, blessed with proper- sSlf-res-■pcct, can indeed ."more easily 'afrifiiiro 1 the 'habit of discipline' than-a fool' who, like most fools, is impatient of ( control; but in all .cases time is. needid 1 in order that this habit, the most potentof all courtiers of victory, may be .sue- '• eessfully grafted..,upon tho.j'wild''briar of man's mind. 1 ' Well-trained"t-riiops may often 'remedy tho faults i.f tho j general,' but the most consummate cf great captains is almost powerless if his army neither understands v.,r nor Vvill be content'to 1 render implicit obedience in default of trained initiative. The Icnsl-instniclcd troops arc always tho most insubordinate, for in the blind- . ness of their folly they are . unable to realise the necessity to' be docile. Napoleon choosing between two evils preferred 'an army of stags led.by a Iloll'' to an 'army of lions led. "by a stag.' But the Emperor,'"he" it noted, used the word army; his stags were therefore trained soldiers, not a 1110b, whom tho • lion, their leader, could employ iii accordance with his own hold conceptions, and inspire by his own courageous ox.amplo; whereas a timid, unwarliko leader can render of 110 effect the efforts of tho best and bravest of armies;'.'and. by earning the contempt of his men, thus provokes them to indiscipline.

What is a-"Born Soldier"? , "The British Territorial Force is composed of meii individually quite as com - , agcous as those of tho British or any other Kegular Army; but. an Army which has not been trained is collectively iueflicient (because the strength of a chain is as that of its weakest link), except in the rare cases of 'bonl soldiers,' such as jloevs, up-country colonials, Highland gillies, and the" like, who, in certain conditions favourable to themselves, may 'prove more -than a match for any Kogulars not similarly recruited. 'Horn soldiers' need only sufficient drill ii> enable them to he liiimoeuvrcd in large numbers, and to learn the art of disciplined combination, in order to bo at once formidable to any : enemy. In this case the individual man ; is a ready-made soldier, whereas in that of town-bred rccruits, or those drawn' from any thickly populated .district' in ■which primitive conditions are not even a memory, it is first necessary to train. J the individual man, so as fo make him artificially a soldier, as afterwards to make of tho resulting soldiers an army, composed of units each of which lias been so welded into a single organism, by training and discipline, that it'becomes capable of concerted efforts,'and impervious tu tlio influences, of hardship, fatigue, and losses, under tho ' pressure of which untrained units'"aro too quickly resolved into their own' almost worthless elements. ' '

"The foundations of a fighting force are tho personal rourago and intelligence < ){ % soldiers, the walls are tho training of the individuals and of tho minor units, and tho roof is represented hv the during which .the stability of the structure is I'mallv tested. Our Territorials take part in exercises on a comparatively largo scale, although they have at best no.more than a smattering 'of tho elementary training upon which the value of manoeuvres absolutely depends. At, manoeuvres soldiers are not trained, but their higher leaders' and the staff; all that soldiers and their immediate officers can do at manoeuvres is fo show that- .strategically as marchers' and tactically as fighters they have been made lit to bo handled as an army, knowing' their own business sol Veil that the higher leaders can employ them with confidence. Mr. Haldaue—the British War Minister—has put the cart'before'tlw horse, bidding us sleep peacefully in our beds, confident that our enemy will chivalrously or of necessity refrain - from attacking us until after we have had time to accomplish an eleventh-hour training. If, upoiHhe contrary, we had trained soldiers, properly instructed in tho elements of the profession of arms, it would bo" comparatively easy, 'to niako of them an army in. a. very'short time. But men. who have been deceived into believing themselves already traine<l soldiers will surely talco (if ( 0 reverting to recruit drill, and even if perfectly .willing cannot leairn as they would havo learned in tho first instance* during the most receptive period of their .military lives."