AUSTRALIA'S NAVY.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1075, 14 March 1911, Page 5

PLANS FOR TWENTY YEARS FIFTY-TtVO SHIPS TO COST £23,000,003. BRITISH ADMIRAL'S REPORT, Dy Tclecraph-Prrss Associatlan-CoDyriEbt-(Rcc. March 13, 9.10 p.m.) Sydney, March 13. Thfi report of Admiral Sir Reginak: Henderson on the naval defence of Aus tralia has now been issued. It is tho result of exhaustive inquiries which the Admiral has been conducting on behali of tho Commonwealth Government since August Inst. In dealing with the provision of naval bases, Admiral Henderson says that although he confined his attention to the ports of the Commonwealth and its dependencies, yet it has been necessary, when reviewing the whole naval situation in the South Pacific, to give consideration to New Zealand, Fiji, . and other portions of the Empire in the Pacific, and his proposals will admit of any future developments in New Zealand and the Pacific Islands being readily fitted into one complete scheme. After urging the paramount importance of unity of control of all tho naval forces of the Empire, and that tho primary object of Australian policy should bo the immediate support of the rest of tho Empire's'naval forces in their determination to retain the command of the sea, the Admiral proceeds to outline his scheme.for tho Australian Navy. His recommendations include the appointment of a naval board, a thorough system of training officers and men, the protection and equipment of naval bases, and the organisation of a complete system of communication and intelligence. The Admiral suggests that the completed fleet should consist of 52 vessels, made up as follow:— Armoured cruisers 8 Protected cruisers 10 Destroyers 18 Submarines '. 12 Depot ships 3 Repair ship 1 Total , 52 Such a fleet would require, when iully manned, a personnel of about 15,000 officers and men. The building up of the completed fleet, it is suggested, should extend over twenty-two years, consisting of four eras, the first of seven years, and the second, third, and fourth of -five years each. The first era would be occupied in obtaining and manning the fleet unit already ordered, with the addition of a depot vessel, three submarines, and six torpedo destroyers; and also the providing pf harbour training establishments, the erection of naval barracks and a college at Sydney; the erection of wireless telegraphy stations at Sydney, Fremantle, Brisbane, Thursday Island, and Western Port (Victoria); the establishment of depots, and of gunnery and torpedo schools 'at Sydney and Western Port. The report also. urges the necessity of establishing railway communication between Port Darwin, Fremantle, and tho centres of population, as thisiwill bo required for the maintenance of the fleet. Arrangements should bo mado for merchant ships to meet the needs of the navy in war time as fleet auxiliaries. The cost of tho completed fleet is estimated in non-recurring charges at .£23,290,000, of which .£3,500,000 has been already spent or. voted, leaving tho balance to be. spread over twenty years. The recurring charges 1 are set down at £152,000. After 1933 the annual expenditure required to replace worn-out ships would 1)0 £1,242,000. It is also recommended that diiring the twenty years £5,000,000, in addition to tho amounts mentioned, be expended on the replacement of ships. ' The annual cost of the personnel would bo £516,0d0 at the' commencement of the four eras, growing to '£2,226,000' at their determination. It is suggested that for the first seven years £3,000,000 per annum should be voted for naval defence; in the next five years, £4,000,000; in the succeeding five years, £4,500,000; and for the fourth era, £5,000,000 per annum. The report does not cover the confidential recommendations made by the Admiral. INQUIRIES IN ENGLAND. (Rec. March 13, 11.30 p.m.) London, March 13. A commission has been granted to Captain Bertran Chambers, of the Australian Naval Board, to visit on behalf of Australia the dockyard and naval establishments at Portsmouth and the Naval Colleges at .Osborne and Dartmouth. THE FLEET IN THE PACIFIC. INDIA AND IMPERIAL STRATEGY. The ■ extraordinary fatuity of an official statement made some few years ago that a. supreme Navy in Home- waters was tho only necessity of Imperial Defence, since such a Navy could in time reassert the supremacy of our Flag, even though in the meantime one of the Overseas Dominions, say Australia, had been successfully invaded, is not possible to-day—so ivrites "Imperialist" m the "Morning Post" of January 24. When Imperial Defence, as apart from strictly Home Defence, comes to be considered it is seen, io continues, that the vital ocean is the Pacific, and not the Atlantic, and that :he chief danger is a. possible combination >f a European Power or Powers with in Asiatic Power. The writer continues lis argument as follows:— With such an alliance the task assigned :o tho European section of such an allimce would ne to hold tho British Fleet n Home waters whilst the Asiatic secion attacked Australia, New Zealand, [ndia, and, possibly, though not projably, Canada. In all likelihood an at:empt would be made to stir up local rouble in India as a further means of vounding the Empire. We should then io in a position, judged' by the present itanding of our power in the Pacific, rhich would be almost hopeless strategcally, since various units of the Empiro vouid be cut off from one another; would le subjected to attack in detail; and would nffer the gravest evils of defeat and in--asion. Considering the subject from tho joint of view of national sentiment as roll as of strategy, it may be safely said hat the occupation, say, of New Zealand, ven temporarily, by an Asiatic invader rould inflict ■ an nnhealablfi wound on he Imperial cause. The Empire must it any crisis be in a position to guard ill its homes. Our Position in the Pacific. Fortunately, tho position of the Em'pire a the Pacific as regards possessions' and tases is very strong. We are able to make ho Indian Ocean a "British lake," and oing so can, with an advance base at ingaporo, hold command of the whole of ho Western Pacific littoral—i.e., that omprising Asia and Australasia. India 5 the most wealthy of Asiatic countries. Liistralia is the greatest field nf future evclopment of wealth. South Africa ono ay will be no contemptible rival to .ustralia. India, Australia, South Africa -these three are within a triangle, the pex of which is India, and which can o made, on land and sea, a huge British Drtrcss. In addition there are various dvancc posts—Singapore and Hong-Kong, iji and New Zealand—which give minor | ases for action in tho Pacific. Supposing ne military strength of Australia, New ealand, and South Africa to bo fully evcloned (in the case of Australia and ' 'cw Zealand that can be quite safelv ' resumed), Great Britain is at once reeved of ill mililaxv ahsiatr within the !

area -of this groat triangle. Presuming an Indian trouble, troops would he promptly available in South Africa ami Australia. Presuming i>. nativo rising iu 'South Africa, India and ■ Australia could at onco pour in reinforcements. Supposing Australia or New Zealand to be tho point of threatened attack, I heir local strength could bo added to with quick drafts from India and South .Africa. Thus, (hough a most formidable Kiiropean-Asian coalition threatened tho Empire, in the Pacific it could look after itself until the crisis was over. Sea Power in the Pacific. ... But this presumes sea supremacy in tho Pacific. That at present the Empire does not pretend to. Confident in Iho Japanese alliance, Great Britain has very seriously i /educed her naval forco in tho Pacific. The restoration of that force has, how-' '' ever, been determined upon, and is now ;- proceeding on Imperial lines. Australia e and New Zealand each make a, contribuf tion. From Canada and South Africa there is a reasonable prospect of help if tho matter is urged at the coining Conference. But, even so, tho largest and 1 richest Imperial territory in the Pacific - area of influence is omitted—lndia* That 0 omission must be remedied if a sound Imperial defence organisation is to be achieved. With tho co-operation of India • tho task of upholding se.i supremacy in '•- the Pacific will b/> easv. Without that co- - operation the task will be difficult, if not 1 impossible. B India at present is burdened with the , maintenance of a very large British gafri--1 son. That garrison might be materially 1 reduced if there were a certainty that at - short notice white troops could bo poured in from South Africa and Australia. The money thus saved might bo devoted • to the maintenance of a special Imperial Fleet unit, to be known as the Indian - Fleet, and devoted specially to safe--1 guarding Indian interests by maintaining f the Indian Ocean as a British lake. Do- . ing that it w.ould be in a position to act 5 promptly at any. time for the defence of '_ South Africa (one of its bases would be 3 at Cape Town); and just as promptly to sally out into the Pacific to confront any . enemy threateajnj Australia or New Zea- ! land. Indeed, it may be said that with such a fleet in being, its vigilant eye located at Singapore, the possibility of an > Asiatic invasion of the British communi- - ties in the South Pacific would bo once and for all removed. It may be pre- . sumed that the Imperial Fleet, made up t of the contributions of India, Australia, ' New Zealand, and (one may hope) Canada and South Africa, would bo Taised by the British Government to a standard exceeding that of any possible hostile fleet combination in the Pacific. There is probably in the British diplomacy of to-day a frank recognition of the fact that the alliance with Japan is not eternal, and that the position in the Pacific must be calculated on tho Empire's strength alone,