THE MARGIN OF SECURITY.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1073, 11 March 1911, Page 5

THE MARGIN OF SECURITY.

IS IT.BEING MAINTAINED? ' Writing'in the "Daily Mail" on January 20, 11 r. H. XV. Wilson states:' The most striking feature of tho'meinor andum on the risk of invasion drawn up by the present First Sea Lord is its two assumptions—first, that the strength of the British Navy will be maintained on a basis of two keels to one;.aDd, second, that this entire force can be concentrated in British home waters.

. Is eitheriof,these;assumptions!justified? And, if not, 'what is the precis* l value of the memorandum? We must look at facts as they ore—not as we should liko them to be. !No\v, the facts are that, for tho fivo years during which the Liberal party have beeu in power, the British and German naval programmes in tho most, important classes of ships have stood as,follow:— .

Whereas to maintain the standard of strength in home waters which Sir Arthur Wilson postulates wo onght to havo begun 86 armoured ships, 20 small cruisers, and 120 destroyers, we actually only laid down 21 armoured ships, of which one is for service in tho Pacific; 18 cruisers, of which 3 aro for Pacific service; and C 6 destroyers, of which 3 are for tho same ocean. Deducting these, our net strength for European service provided in the five years was 20 armoured ships, All Dreadnoughts, to 18 German, of which 17 wero Dreadnoughts; 15 small cruisers to 10 German cruisers; and 03 destvoycrs to 60 German. Even if we count the four British Dreadnoughts laid down in 1905-6, before the Liberals took office, this is not two keels to one, or anything approaching it. ■ On the other hand, wo had some advantage in torpedo-boats-though these are not sea-going craft—as we laid down 21 to Germany's none;,and in submarines. It is quite clear that if such a proportion of British to German ships is maintained in the British programmes of tho near future, the German navy is going to draw very closo to our own in fighting strength as tho old ships are "scrapped." It is in old ships that we are greatly suoerior to-day. Of battleships other than Dreadnoughts now on the effective list Britain possesses 10 to the German 20, but 20 of the British ships and only 8 of the German are from 10 to 10 years old, and, therefore, on tho eve of "scrapping." But there is another consideration to take into account, even with the assumption that our entire forco of armoured ships, cruisers, and destroyers co.il b8 concentrated in the North Sea. At any givon moment some of our battleships may be laid up by accident or by need for repair. An enemy, haying the initiative, will be able to select his opportunity; and if four of our Dreadnoughts were absent from the fighting line in 1912 or 1913, the British strength in these ships in Home waters would be only equal to the German. Thus tho first assumption of the memorandum drawn up by the First Sea Lord is not justified except for the moment. Unless he obtains an enormous naval programme this year and next year—and rumour speaks of modest proposals—it is out of tho question to assume tnat m powerful modern ships the British wavy will stand to the German as two to one. If wo deduct 6 Dreadnoughts from the British total for North Sea service as the minimum that will bo needed in the Mediterranean in 1914, we aro left with Hie following force of Dreadnought? for Britain and Germany in the North Sea:—

Complete in 1914 (April). British: 25-1 for Pacific-6 for Mediterplus programme of 1911

(unknown). German; 17 plus programme of 1911r21,

If the British programme is 5, as many anticipate, there will be only 23 British Dreadnoughts to the 21 German. Instead of our possessing two Dreadnoughts to one, tiro fleets each of equal strength to tlio German fleet, wo shall have 0115 fleet only very slightly exceeding _ the German force. If there aro mnny British absentees from casualties or refits, the fleet will perhaps bo actually inferior to the German. . But with such a state of affairs all the conditions demanded by Admiral Wilson have passed awav. There is no force double the would-bo invader's strength ready to fall on him; there is 110 second fleet to replace the main forco should it be decoyed away. It follows, then, on the First Sea fiord's reasoning that invasion will be a real and constant menac>) from about 1912 onwards; and that this country, unless it makos at onco and without delay very large additions to its fleet, may have to chooso between disaster In the Mediterranean or disaster in the North Sea.

BRITAIN. Armonrod ships. Cruisers. DestroyoTs 190S 3 0 2 1907 3 1 5 1908 2 6 16 1909 8 G 20 1310 5 ' 5 23 ■ 21 18 66 GBRMANY.; ...... . . 190 3 -2 12 ■ 1907 ;..... : 3' ' 2 '. "12 : 190S i 2 ■ 12 1909 4 2 12 1910 4 2 12 18 10 60