ARMY TRAINING.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1051, 14 February 1911, Page 6

ARMY TRAINING.

LESSONS. OF MANOEUVRES. —-rl:, AN INSTRUCTIVE REPORT. •. A "■ Tho General Staff , at, Headquarters has" received from tko British Army Council an .instructive report' on army training as suggested by tho lessons of Hie field manoeuvres of 1910.. In view of tlio fact that tho training of. the military forces of tho Dominion will adhere as closely as possible to tlio principles and methods accepted by ' tlio j-lmperial General Staff for tho training* of tho Imperial forces, and a rigid,conformity to tho Imperial training manuals insisted upon, this report is of special jntercst to tho New Zealand 6oldicr. fto- publish to-day shch extracts from the" report as havo a local application, so .far as they indicate tho direction in which' further progress should bo sought. Copies of tho report have been distributed to tho omcers commanding tho various miltary districts. Points in Musketry. ' , "So far as can be ascertained," states the memorandum," a considerable advance has been' made'this year in tho 1 execution of, the new' musketry-course, as was anticipated when the objects of the course were raoro generally undersiooa. Tho chief points brought to notice which require further attention are— '.- .. "The 1 careful training of firo'unit commanders in tho indication of targets, and of the men in quickly recognising them from the description given. ' • "Moro efficient firo control by fire unit commanders, and direction of fire in connection with tho principle of mjutual 6up"A'moregeneral use of thd''.standard teste in tho, caso of, trained njen. . • "Moro consideration : to eollectivo firing, and keeping a record of tho remits. I <.'.'A*more /general! nso of_tlio'-numerous musketry appliances now available. .Coast Defenco Manoeuvres. , .."Jgint_naval . and.. military .operations -wenrcarried oht ~in connection with tho coast defence manoeuvres. Tho following points wero clearly brought to notice ."The importance 0f....th0 preliminary :.joiht naval and This 'ShotiWl*)' 'caWied- 'out*,' •if possible, somo'weeks before the' actual landing takes place, so as to enable action to be inljonon the report. In carrying out this reconnaissance full advantage should bo taken of any local knowledgo available. "The l importance of the most intiinato co-operation and collaboration between tho naval and military conimtfudcrs and their staffs previous .' to and., during the operations. It ,is advisable that tho naval and military commanders, should bo ccnveved on the snme ship. 1 : "It is considered that Cull value for tho expenditure incurred is not obtained unless . a forco of nt least an infantry brigade, with somo artillery aud cyclists, is actually disembarked.' -With such a force staff work can be "practised,-eervico Conditions introduced, a cohering forco landed (in tho dark, if ' possible), find a position taken up'to cover'tho landing of the main body. , ■ : Artillery-6amps. ' 'Doubt has aHsen during the past year as to whether tho methods now employed by • tho artillery are .tlio best possible, consistent with our present organisation acd material, for obtaining the most rapid and .effectivo .results .at decisivo fighting rangos. (continues thb.roport). In 'coniidcring .this! .question 'it is,'necessary to boar in mind'one of the most important principles underlyingmodern tnctics. Tlio qbjcct of, firo .in .tho :attack .is to assist tho for'wnrd movement by tho infantry. .This principle applies equally to artillery and .rille firo. In-order-that it should, bo applied successfully, it is necessary-'not only • that: artillery 'should be able to develop long ranges, but also that their'co-operation -with the infantry ..should bo close and constant, and that their, firo should .be. capable.- of rapid, application coupled with great intensity' tnnfl sufficient accuracy to facilitate a fbfward movement or-' to prevent one. If these requirements are .studied by artillery officers, tho necessity, will bo brought homo, to them . of .eliminating from their practice all that is needlessly complicated and difficult in tlie nature of gunnery problems, and - of concentrating their, attention 1 on. developing simplo methods' capablo of appropriate application on the battlefield under servico" conditions. 'In war all things aro very simple, but tho simplest thing is difficult.' This saying of Clausewitz should bo pdtidcreu by artillery officers and thoso responsible for their training at tho present: tirild. ' If our methods become too complicated, they will strain the capacity of tho average battery commander, anu be, unsuited to'the conditions of field service." . '" V ' '

• ' ' \ ' Field Operations, • Y With TPgard to tho '"Extension, of tlie Front," the memorandum says:— • * "Tho t()ridency to extend the front unduly, tho lack of depth in attack formations, nnd tho want of driving power nt the docisivo point have been again noticcnblo this year. Closely allied to overextension is tho "tendency,. ; to undertake wide turning-movements that are out of touch with tho frontal-or holding attack. Thero is frequently a great want of connection between the different portions of a force when a flank attack is intended, which renders tho.forco liable to-defeat in detail.. In somo cases, also, tho desiro to reach tho "enemy's flank-has led to flank" marches. 'being undertaken in dangerous proximiity to' the enemy." Tlio proner handling of an advanced guard, it fs pointed out,' depends on Jbo mutual understanding between tho commander of that guard and tho commander of tho force. If that understaning is complete, thero should be no oxcuso for hesitation on tho part of the advanced guard commander,'.or risk of his comproinising thd'cominahdc'r's initiative by becoming '.engaged superior forces.. v.\,-

Attack, and Defence. , ■ Attack and defenco aro dealt with, in the course; of .which- it is 'stated that "wo aro in danger of .proceeding from the fault, of,'excessive caution, 1 , arid tho fear of casualties , to tho opposite extreme, nrid'on' many'occasions conduct operations in a manner which shows a failure to appreciate tho effect of tho fire-of modern weapons."- • Entrenching .is not sufficiently practised during, manoeuvre training. Now that tho troops,have been,provided with a light entrenching tool, they should make use of it .whenever possible..;:Roynl Engineer field units require' more practice in ' the practical application .' of military 'engineering' to defences:" Dtiriuj? .field ODcrations. full valno should bp giveirto tho details of defence; such as attempts to deceive," tho use of entanglements, and ,the niainy devices which it is tho business of the engineers to suggest and construct. .-. 'i ; ;' :'l iV ... ! March Discipline l and Supplies. The subject'of inarch' diseipl'ino is dealt with as follows:— ','The march, discipline' of second lino transport,: transport and-supply columns, brigade- and divisional • ammunition columns, field ambulances, and''transport and supply parks at the Arm I }*, manoeuvres,left a good, deal to be. desired.' One of tlio majn factors in tho "mobility of a force is. the ability of its trnnspfirt columns to preserve the proper .road spaces on the line of march. At'present the incfßeieiicy of* many of tho drivers, tho lack of training of the horses, and tho want of adequiite supervision by exnerienced ofKccrs and non-commissioned officers, would cause our transport columns to occupy road spaces far in excess of tho normal nt the outset of , n campaign. Our transport columns as.' at present Organised, aro incapable of • movemont. on'any but main roads without risk of,.breakdown. The use of many roads, before it is neccssary to deploy to fight also increases tho. difficulty of replenishing supplies.' It must be recogniscd, therefore, that an unlimited number of roads may, not bo available, and that not ,bnl.v is it ncccssary for a .division .to l;b ablo. to march by one main road and to supply itself without undue strain, ,bnt it may also' bo necessary for another division to follow it.by the samo road without delay. The standard of mobility and efficiency ui our transport services should be that tho least mobile arm. namolv tho infantry, should invariably bo ablo to march the greatest distance of which it is capable without excessive exertion, and receive,its supplies punctually, and with regularity. ■ ': As regards the supply of ammunition to the firing line, .it is observed: "The 1 difficulties inherent in the supply of am-.

munition* to the firing lino are not always appieciated. The experiences of tlio Manchurinn campaign show that replenishment of. ammunition to the nio;t advanced troops must, as a "rule, bo carried out li.y mcifns of reinforcing troops. Ammunition carriers should not bo seen walking about the firing line distributing ammunition to the men firing, as this is quite impracticable on service. The supply of ammunition should bo practised inoro frequently in accordance with the methods laid dawn."

"With the Infantry, • large bodies of troops, halted in.column of route on tlio road or on the; march, in circumstances in which an attack was not unlikely, have failed to make adequate provision for their--.-own, security, trusting, no doubt, to; the protection afforded by the cavalry or tlio gentral .situation. : The general situation often changes with great rapidity, and "Sadies of troops thought to be affording adequato protection are found subsequently to have been diverted to sOnie other.'purpose. The result may be surprise and disaster. Officers charged'with the'direction of field operations shquld thoroughly investigate nil cases in which troops are surprind, and should ibe unsparing, in their censure of thoEe who are found to be to blame."