THE EUROPEAN WAR.

Cromwell Argus, Volume 1, Issue 50, 26 October 1870, Page 7

THE EUROPEAN WAR.

Germany and Europe. —o — Review, August 13.) The success with which Germany has opened the campaign has naturally given rise to speculations and suggestions of every possible kind as to the consequences, remote or immediate, of Germany establishing an incontestible superiority over France. The French Journal Officiel has even gone so far as to publish a manifesto, addressed to all the nations of Europe, showing how very dangerous to each might be the triumph of so unscrupulous and rapacious a power as Germany. While there is yet time to give aid, the Journal Officiel entreats the countries now neutral to stand by France, the champion of European independence! What is asked is, in plain language, that Western Europe should form a coalition, not against France, but in ner favour. Perhaps no effect of the reverses the French army has sustained is more curious than this. Here is the organ of the French Government, within a month of a war undertaken .in lightness of heart to teach the Prussians manners, and to show the world the prowess of the French army, crying out in a hopeless panic to the'world that these Prussians are too great and strong for any one power to contend against, and that all who want to be safe from them must unite to put them down. The Germans inspire the officials of the Third Napoleon with something of the same terror with which the vast ambition and colossal strength of the First Napoleon inspired the courts and peoples in his neighborhood. A vision is conjured up of the German lake. The expression which the French have on their own behalf delighted so much to apply to the Mediterranean is to be applied by the Germans, in their horrible presumption, to the sea that washes their northern shores. But this would never content the Emperor of Germany, for the French mind perceives that this would be the new title of the King of Prussia ; and while it is the most harmless and natural thing in the world that France should have an Emperor, it reveals an almost superhuman insolence in the Germans that they also should have have an Emperor to rule over them. The tone of the Journal Officiel in this respect is perfectly artless and sincere, and is thoroughly French. That France should domineer over neighbours is quite in keeping with the proper order of things, and can give offence to no one. But that Germany should talk as France has been in the habit of talking, and should act as France has boasted of wishing and intending to act, is truly awful. There is no end to the dreadful fancies that such a thought suggests. The Emneror of Germany will want Holland, he will want Venice, he will want Trieste. He will bargain with Russia, anil, in return for ample compensation, will plant the Czar at Constantinoijle. He will, in fact, play the part which Napoleon phvel with so much relish at Tilsit. To prevent such a catastrophe France asks for aid from thosj win") would most suffer at the hands of a ton triumphant Germany ; and it may perhaps he worth while for the neutral nations to ask themselves how far these fears "*re imaginary, and whether, if the Germans succeeded in inflicting further defeats on France, the interests of European peace would be seriously endangered.

It is impossible for us in Eigland to regard Em-one from the same point of view in which the French regard it. To us the strength and power of Germany have a value which the French, against whom we wish they should be in some measure directed, canuot be expected to appreciate. It is for the great good of Europe, and, as we believe, to the real advantage of France itself, that there should be a neighbour of France strong enough and resolute enough to ease France of something of its restlass ambition, its tall talk, and its tendency to relieve the weariness of its home politics by interfering with evervone outside its borders. A nation that is a prey to revolutions, to adventurers, and to military despotism, anil that avowedly looks on war as a last stake which its gamblers throw when they are hard pressed, is a constant source of peril to Europe. It is not wholesome for Europe that there should be in it a countrv the Prime Minister of which rushes into a totally unjustifiable war with lightness of heart. When we have said thus much we have said all that we have to say against France. That France should be really humiliated, crippled, and powerless, would be a state of things in every way deplorable and very unwelcome to England. The French have forced on the war, and they must take the chances of the war tliev have provoked ; but France bleeding and prostrate is a spectacle which Englishmen will regard with the most unfeigned reluctance. All that is wanted is that France should learn the lesson it so much needed, that it must leave Germany alone. Bat will the Germans be content to be left alone, or will they use their victories, if they continue to win them, in a spirit of arrogance and insolence, and so as to menace Europe ? The French say that they will, and they have, it appears, not only said this in a general way, but they have pressed some neutral states, and more particularly Austria, Italy, and Denmark, with the argument that to join France promptly and openly is their last chance of independence. Would a wise Austrian or Italian admit the force of this argument or not ? Is the success of Germany a danger to Europe ? Of all the political questions of the day, this is perhaps the one that it is most desirable to answer aright. No prudent person would give other t>an a guarded answer. Success quickly corUpts the heart of man, and no one can speak positively as to the effect on Germany of finding itself quickly and indisputably victorious. But, so far as it is possible to form an opinion now, it maybe said that the Journal Officiel is wrong, and that its error consists in speaking of Germans as if they were Frenchmen; Everything tends to show that all the Germans want is Germany for the Germans. They do not want to dictate to their neighbours, or to' take the territory of their neighbours, or to take incorporate aliens such as Belgians and Dutchmen into Germany. They only aak that Germans may be left altogether alone, to manage thtdr own concerns, and to bind together its several parts in that degree and kind of unity which may best suit them.

No one can speak confidently as to the effects of military success on a people ; but there 13, at

any rate, a very strong presumption against the notion that Germany ■will become an aggressive power. That Count Bismarck has often talked as if he would readily consent to see small states like Belgium sacrificed in order to cairy out the projects of great powers like France and Prussia is doubtless true. But it must be remembered that none of the projects of Count Bismarck, with regard to foreign nations, have ever attained anything; like detiniteness, nor have they ever received the sanction of the King The difference between France and Germany in this respect is very striking. It is the head of Prance who for years has been striving to tear up old treaties, and to propagate new ideas, very often to the great advantage of the world, [t is not in his hour of misfortune that we ought to forget that Italy owes its very existence to the Emperor of the French. But still he lias been plotting against the established order of things for twenty years, and his people have looked very kindly on his plotting. The Journal Officiel makes the fundamental mistake, in our opinion, of looking on Germans as if they were Frenchmen. The reply to its arguments is to be found in the experience of any one accustomed to mix with the natives of the two countries. Even the most temperate and modest Frenchmen are imbued with the ideas of territorial aggrandisement and foreign conquest. They are actuated unconsciously by memories of the old Napoleon days, and speak as if they had been robbed of all the territory which Napoleon won and failed to keep. Such a spirit is unknown in Germany. The Germans want all Germany to be united, but they want nothing more. A war of spoliation would be totally abhorrent to German feeling. The moral sentiment of the Germans is against wronging and bullying and preying on adjacent nations. The war with Denmark may be thought a proof to the contrary; but the Germans at least believed they were thoroughly in the right, that the duchies were German, and had been illtreated by a foreigner, and that they were only reclaiming their own when they took away the duchies from Denmark. But, in any case, isolated acts may mislead us. What we rest upon is the character of the German people, which is orderly, and honest, and sober, and averse to military despotism, and the fatigues and dangers of unnecessary war. The German army is admirably organised, and, as has just been shown, can strike swift and strong blows outside German territory. But it is essentially a defensive army, and those who compose it will not readily undertake war unless to protect themselves. It was with the utmost reluctance that the Hermans went into the present war, and their only object at present seems to be to show that they are not to be invaded with impunity. The Germans may, of course, besome intoxicated with success, but there is no symptom whatever at present that this will be the case, and they deserve fully that their past history and their national character should at least do this much for them—that neutral nations should look on their success without jealousy or alarm.