Why Russia Went Into Czechosiovakia

Chronicle (Levin), 11 May 1949, Page 5

Why Russia Went Into Czechosiovakia

C N.Z.P.A. -

-Reuter,

Copyright)

Received Tuesday 7 p.m. WASHINGTON, May 9. The State Department today issue i documents disclosing tliat the Soviet. Armv's advance into Czechosiovakia in 1043 was a military and not a political deeision between the High Oommaiidof the Western Allies and Russia. The disclosure was made in recognition of the fourth anniversarv of liberation of Czechosiovakia, Ijy issuiug paraphrased cexfs of the eorrespondence between the Hupreme Allied Connnander, General Eisenhowev, and the Soviet Hiph Command, The State Department said the documents were issued because of "numerous iwpiiries and many false sfatements aml interpretations that had been published in regard to the matter. ' ' Explaining why Allied troops in Czechosiovakia halted along the Karls-bad-Pilsen-Budweis line on Mav 6, 1.945, instead of advancing to Prague, the Department said the decisions aird actions of the Allied Command in this conneotion were purelv operational withoni anv political implications. "No prior political arrangenifjnts or eommitments had been made with respect to Czechosiovakia and the Allied Command made perfeetly clear its willingness to complete the destruetion of the enemy in Czechosiovakia as well as in other arbas. It was only at the specific request of the >Soviet High Command and after assnrances were received that the Soviet Anny was already in a position to destrov the enemy in the Vltava Valley where Prague is situated, that the advance beyond the Pilsen line was halted.