THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1979. Iran’s political executions

Press, 11 April 1979, Page 24

THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, APRIL 11, 1979. Iran’s political executions

To say the very least, the political trials and executions being conducted in Iran do not meet the standards of fairness expected in the civilised world. In the Teheran Revolutionary Court the trials are swift and the executions take place soon afterwards. The trials are not meant to be fair. An international group of lawyers touring Iran said that the Ayatollah Khomeiny had said that there was no need to try former top officials in the Shah’s regime, but only to identify them and execute them. The dreadful spectacle seems likely to continue for some time.

In spite of the outrage at the scant justice, and horror about the executions, it is important that some perspective be kept on what is happening. It does not need the result of the vote, in the so-called referendum on whether Iran should become an Islamic Republic or remain a Monarchy, to reveal that what is occurring in Iran is a revolutionary upheaval and is almost bound to be accompanied by grisly behaviour towards the losers. Corruption was rife under the Shah, to an almost unbelievable extent. Millions of dollars — allegedly as much as $55 million in the instance of the former head of Savak. General N. Nassiri — were sent out of the country to private bank accounts.

The Shah ran an authoritarian State, those closest to him sometimes prospered unduly, and those opposed to him might experience the ravages of Savak, the Secret Police. Had Iran passed from a dictatorship to a democracy in the manner of Spain, the change might have been less harrowing to watch. As it is, the leaders of a revolution which has not yet run its full course are themselves ruthlessly exercising dictatorial powers.

The observation of the group of lawyers was that the revolutionary courts flourished because of the lack of central authority in Iran. The Provisional Government headed by Dr Bazargan is in control in theory; but the revolution draws its strength and its authority from the person of the Ayatollah.

Although Dr Bazargan showed hopeful signs of attempting to separate the policies of his Government from the actions of the Ayatollah, he is without any convincing power base. The fact that political trials by revolutionary courts have been made legal, and that the death penalty has been introduced for political crimes is an indication that the Prime Minister sanctioned excesses he could not prevent rather

than an indication of the course he would follow if he were Prime Minister by virtue of his own popularity.

The main conclusion to be taken from the events in Iran is that the country is not yet in a state in which the actions of various factions can be predicted. This makes trade with Iran very difficult. The fact that it is producing oil faster than it has for some months might alleviate a world shortage in the short term, but Iran does not appear to be a good prospect for international business at the moment.

Another important feature of Iran’s revolution is that there has been little support for it from outside. Some small guerrilla movements have been trained by the Palestine Liberation Organisation, but the major powers have not intervened, at least by supplying arms. What many in the West might hope for is that it will stay that way; that even if Iran makes a sorry spectacle at present, it is a mess that the Iranians should be left to sort out for themselves

That attitude, however, will not necessarily serve the best interests of the West, or of the majority of Iranians. Much of the country has come close to political fragmentation, even to anarchy. The collapse of the administration which remains would be welcomed by some of Iran’s neighbours, particularly by the Soviet Union, which would then have an excuse to intervene directly to assist its small, but vigorous band of proteges in Iran.

To avoid that situation the Western Powers should be prepared to give help, if it is sought, to those more moderate Iranians who remain in public life. On them depends the country’s chances of becoming a liberal society. For such an object the movement against the Shah originally launched its campaign. If the moderates also fall victims to revolutionary zeal, Iranians are likely to find they have exchanged the repressions of the Monarchy for the more widespread and thorough repressions of a Leftwing dictatorship.

Support will not easily be supplied to Iran without stirring antagonism elsewhere. It could be supplied only at the obvious request of the Iranian leadership. One response may be to ensure that, in spite of the shocking excesses of the revolution, a return to steady international trade and the restoration of some prosperity in Iran should be fostered as soon as possible. A revival of normality on this level may do something to distract radicals from their repressive course.