A UNITED STATES VIEW IS THE S.E.A.T.O. A DAM THAT IS WORTH SAVING?

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31093, 23 June 1966, Page 12

A UNITED STATES VIEW IS THE S.E.A.T.O. A DAM THAT IS WORTH SAVING?

(By

DAVID K. WILLS

S, staff correspondent of the “Christian Science Monitor** writing from

Washington* (Reprinted bv arrangement/

“The dam is holding. True, it has sprung a leak. But that’s no reason to tear the whole dam down!” Thus a well-placed American official describes, the controversial South-East Asia Treaty Organisation as viewed through Government eyes in Wasliington.

S.E.A.T.O. itself is the dam. The leak is the Communist doctrine of “wars of liberation,” now spilling all over South Vietnam. The comment indicates that officials have a very different concept of S.E.A.T.O. than the critics w’ho let hardly a day go by without blasting the alliance as outmoded and ineffectual.

They see S.E.A.T.O.— fashioned 12 years ago to form a section of the John Fbster Dulles ‘‘picket fence” around the Communist perimeter—as highly flexible, and still surprisingly worth while.

They -credit It with stopping overt—as distinct from guerrilla—aggression in the area. Its value is largely psychological, symbolising the determination of eight nations to stand against Communist expansion. But they see no good reason why it should be disbanded or ignored. State Department officials even now are preparing position papers for the next annual ministerial meetings to be held in Canberra on June 27 to 29.

Critics charge that S.E.A.T.O. has been swept aside by the realities of the Vietnam war. Vietnam, they say, shows that S.E.A.T.O. members ignore the alliance whenever it suits them. Morse’s Criticism Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon shakes his fist at Secretary of State Dean Rusk at Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings and says S.E.A.T.O. has never formally considered a motion to help Saigon. He calls official efforts to use the famous Article 4, Section 1 of the treaty as a legal basis for the American presence in South Vietnam a newly found stratagem which violates international law.

As he speaks, the committee chairman, Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas, listens attentively, appearing by no means unimpressed. Mr Morse is clearly in a minority, but other critics, too, hammer away at S.E.A.T.O. Look at France and Pakistan, they say. Both nations have lost interest in S.E.A.T.O. and its headquarters in Bangkok. S.E.A.T.O. has never taken, collective action in its history, they add, saying: The alliance is little more than a loose agreement among eight nations to take ill-defined steps if Communists should attack in open war—and without American firepower it would mean even less. All it really does is protect Thailand from its neighbours.

Officials in Washington who follow S.E.A.T.O. affairs closely grant that S.E.A.T.O. does not automatically trigger its members into armed reprisals against an attacker in the way the North Atlantic Treaty (N.A.T.0.) does.

Article 4, Section 1 states that each member agrees to “act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes” in the face of “aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area.” The then Secretary of State, Mr John Foster Dulles, preferred this wording in 1954 because he wanted to avoid the fuss the Senate raised when it ratified the

N.A.T.O. treaty in 1949. Many senators felt it was unconstitutional for a treaty like N.A.T.O. automatically to draw the United States into war; under the Constitution, Congress alone has the right to declare war. Weak or Flexible? Mr Dulles felt the looser wording of the section would meet Senate objections. He assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time, however, that the obligation of the United States to defend its allies remained the same under S.E.A.T.O. as it was under N.A.T.O. Critics now say the wording makes the section too weak to be effective; officials reply that “flexibility” is a valuable commodity, and that at least the President is able to sit back and have a logical reason not to take action if he does not think it wise.

“The whole point about S.E.A.T.O. is that its members are left free to act individually, if they so prefer,” said one official. “This was clearly stated on March 6, 1962, in a joint statement by Mr Rusk and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand.” In the statement Mr Rusk reaffirmed American willingness to defend Thailand adding that this did not “depend on the prior agreement of all other parties to the treaty, since this treaty obligation is individual as well as collective.”

True, officials say, S.E.A.T.O. as a whole has never taken joint action. But in 1962, four members acting individually responded to an appeal for troops from Thailand. And each member now is engaged in the Vietnam war in one way or another. Critics of President Johnson in Washington snort derisively at Thailand’s few pilots and aircraft in Vietnam, at the limited Philippine commitment, at Pakistan’s small amounts of flood relief.On the other hand, officials in Washington point to Australia’s commitment of 4500 men, New Zealand's artillery battery, Thailand’s recent action in stepping up its support; the expected arrival of Philippine troops, and Britain’s moral support. Mr Rusk has said many times that it is not accurate to accuse him of recently finding in S.E.A.T.O. an excuse to be in Vietnam. “1 have always treated the S.E.A.T.O. treaty—which the Senate approved with only one dissenting vote —as an important part of our commitment to defend South Vietnam,” he has said. Senatorial Ire Senatorial ire was Aroused when the President included the phrase “obligations under the South-east Asia Treaty Organisation” in the joint congressional resolution passed in August, 1964, supporting his actions in Vietnam. Senators Fulbright, Morse, and others now feel the President is using the resolution—passed by 504 votes to 2—to broaden the war dangerously. Senator Morse believes the United States should have asked S.E.A.T.O. itself to take action in Vietnam. He says Washington should have invoked Article 4, Section 2, which provides for immediate consultation of the members in the face of aggression. Officials reply that South Vietnam has never formally asked for help from S.E.A.T.O. but has preferred to deal with members individually. They also say the United States has indeed consulted with other members: annual S.E.A.T.O. meetings have discussed Vietnam at length, and many, other meetings, formal and informal, have been held in Bangkok.

Privately, they admit that bringing Vietnam to S.E.A.T.O. would achieve little. Unanimous consent, required for joint action, would doubtless be blocked by France, who has withdrawn from S.E.A.T.O. military planning, and totally objects to American policies in Southeast Asia. Officials hasten to add that Franca still takes part in

S.E.A.T.O. political councils, and pays its dues promptly each year. Pakistan is the other S.E.A.T.O. member to drift away from active participation. In part, this is due to the “flexibility” that officials in Washington are so keen about.

Attached to the S.E.A.T.O. treaty is a provision stating that the United States will give effect to Article 4, Section 1, only in cases of Communist aggression. All other types of aggression fall under Section 2—consultation. Thus Washington has not responded to Pakistani appeals for S.E.A.T.O. help against India. Commonwealth Problems Again, the British Commonwealth members of S.E.A.T.O. —the United Kingdom, Pakistan, Australia, and New Zealand, agreed from the first not to use the alliance to settle Commonwealth problems. Other machinery exists for that. Hence Pakistan was blocked In yet another way from using S.E.A.T.O. against India. At one stage last year, Pakistan decided to withdraw its military representatives from Bangkok, but later changed its I mind and left them there when the 22-day Kashmir war with India ended. S.E.A.T.O. has no permanent armed forces but conducts regular military exercises (without France). On the non-milltary side. S.E.A.T.O.’s main contribution is a graduate school of engineering in Bangkok, established in 1959 and supposedly supported by all members. In fact, Washington gives the major share. Lately, however, the school has run into trouble. In June, observers say, it will remove itself from the S.E.A.T.O. aegis to continue on its own. The reason: nations like Cambodia, Laos, and Burma would like to send students—but will not as long as the school is connected in any way with S.E.A.T.O. Unit by Separation Officials w'ill say only that the whole matter is “under discussion.” One informed source commented: “The paradox is that if the school is to act as a unifying force in the area, it will have to strike out on its own. It can best advance S.E.A.T.O. objectives by leaving 5.E.A.T.0.” Currently, some 115 students are enrolled, studying hydraulic, structural, transIport, public health, and soil i engineering. The graduate class last March 24 numbered 34. It is generally expected that S.E.A.T.O. will lose the school, suffering at least some loss of prestige in the process.

S.E.A.T.O. also maintains i medical research laboratories at Dacca and Bangkok, and :finances a cultural exchange 'programme.

| “S.E.A.T.O.’s value.” says one official in Washington '“lies in its eight-member defiance of aggression. With all the criticisms against it. that value still stands today.’’

In the United Statei critics are asking whether the main alliances abroad, which were hammered out in the 1950 s to meet the needs of the day, still fit American needs. The following article on how policy-makers in Washington view the SouthEast Asia Treaty Organisation (5.E.A.T.0.) was written by a staff correspondent of the “Christian Science Monitor.” The S.E.A.T.O. ministerial council, on which the Prime Minister (Mr Holyoake) represents New Zealand, will meet in Canberra this month.