Confrontation’s End? SARAWAK WILL BE THE MAIN TESTING GROUND

Press, Volume CVI, Issue 31082, 10 June 1966, Page 10

Confrontation’s End? SARAWAK WILL BE THE MAIN TESTING GROUND

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I AN WARD,

writing to the "Daily Telegraph”, London. from Kuching >

'Reprinted from the "Dailp Telegraph bp arrangement ,

Malaysia’s Borneo State of Sarawak, for three years the chief arena for Indonesia’s policy of confrontation, is destined to become tne main testing ground of Jakarta’s pledges for peace. More than that. Future developments in this sparsely populated slab of jungle threaten to exert far greater pressures on Malaysian cohesiveness than Indonesia’s bungling militancy ever did.

So conditions tn Sarawak—an unprepossessing territory, poor in natural resources, backward and with obviously limited prospects of advancement—could largely determine British military policy east of Suez.

The features which made Sarawak such a choice target for Indonesian subversion three years ago—scattered population, many of them primitives, lacking firm lines of Government control, with the added attraction of a clandestine Communist movement within the 300,000 Chinese minority—persist as dangers. However, the British military build-up brought immediate evidence of a Government presence to previously isolated areas. Troops constructed bridges and roads, and embarked on invaluable “hearts and minds” operations bringing medical attention to the outlying Iban and Dyak tribespeople.

Military Success Some 9000 Chinese have been resettled, along Malayan emergency lines, on the Serian Road, and at least one other resettlement project has been prepared. Overall the Allied military effort has been a notable success. In its prime aim. which was to repel Indonesian land and sea incursions, it produced almost copybook applications of anti-guerrilla warfare techniques. The cold battle statistics for the period of the antiIndonesian campaign speak for themselves: Killed Wounded British .. 22 60 Gurkhas .. 39 60 Australian and New Zealand ..5 5 Malaysian (including police) .. 46 51 Civilians .. 36 53 Total 148 229 This compared with confirmed Indonesian casualty figures of 580 killed, 220 wounded and 751 captured.

| The political picture tells a decidedly different story. Three years has been insufficient time to undermine to any appreciable extent the Sarawak Chinese Communist machine.

In spite of protestations to the contrary by the Alliance Government under Dato Stephen Ningkan, antipathy towards the Malaysia idea has grown during the confronta|tion period. High-handedness by Federal Government officials posted to Sarawak has added to the resentment locals have long had for the Malays, Evidence of Anxiety Recent visits to the region by the Federal Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, and his Deputy, Tun Abdul Razak, bear witness to the anxiety in top circles about the political drift in Sarawak. What makes the situation even more alarming is that the Malaysians remain utterly convinced that Singapore’s Chinese-dominated People’s Action party lurks in the shadows waiting for the opportunity to interfere. Moreover, there is obvious envy in Sarawak for Singapore’s position outside the Federation, and sneaking admiration for the Singapore Administration's achievements. Against this background has suddenly come the promise of peace, The question is what Indonesia means by “peace.” Kuala Lumpur politicians, and to a large extent their British counterparts 8000 miles away in Whitehall, appear to accept the latest Jakarta mouthings as expressions of a genuine change of heart. How much this is influenced by desires to relieve the financial burdens that the defence commitment has meant these past three years is, at this stage, impossible to gauge.

Service officers on the spot tend to place more emphasis on the well substantiated Indonesian reputation for

! treachery and deviousness, and the possibility that military confrontation might well slide to a political version of the same policy. Guerrilla Training Hundreds of Sarawak Communist Chinese fled across the border to Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) just before the birth of Malaysia to undergo guerrilla training. The main body is known to be still in Indonesia. Being Communist they are doubtless an embarrassment to the Indonesian Army. Observers believe Jakarta’s handling of this problem might provide an interesting insight into her real intentions. Indonesian motives will be clear if the Chinese are found trickling back as agents. The hard reality is that, throughout most of Sarawak, troops—be they British, Gurkha or Malaysian—represent the only tangible sign of a Government An effort to balance Budgets by reducing these forces could clearly have drastic repercussions on the territory’s stability. Thus it is for a combination of significant reasons that senior military officers, both Malaysian and British, are urging their respective Governments to lower the guards slowly.