Precarious Neutrality IS FINLAND SUPPING MORE UNDER THE SWAY OF RUSSIA?

Press, Volume CV, Issue 30979, 8 February 1966, Page 16

Precarious Neutrality IS FINLAND SUPPING MORE UNDER THE SWAY OF RUSSIA?

(Bp a Special Correspondent of “The Times.’? [Reprinted from “The Times.’?

Every time President Kekkonen of Finland goes to Moscow anxious eyes throughout Scandinavia are watching him. Will he compromise Finnish neutrality? At its best, it is a tender plant It is easy to see how it has grown. A small country of only four and a half million people, with less than half a century of independence, nestling against tne soviet Union, cannot take her freedom for granted. Hence her preoccupation with neutrality.

But the brand practised between the wars, of disengagement from all the great powers, did not prevent her involvement in the Second World War. Therefore President Paasiviki, who held office from 1946 to 1956, devised a new doctrine which is enshrined in the 1948 treaty of friendship, cooperation and .mutual assistance with the Soviet Union.

In effect this is an attempt to guarantee Finnish neutrality while at the same time laying special emphasis upon the preservation of good relations with the Soviet Union. Fears Confirmed This is still the Kekkonen version. Whatever its weakness in logic, it is hard to criticise its general outline when seen against the background of the Finnish situation. But it requires the most delicate skill if the original intention is to be preserved. All too easily it could become a policy of “neutral in peace but not in war.” That was how a leading Opposition politician described Finnish foreign policy to me during a recent visit. The fears were confirmed for many people by President Kekkonen’s visit to Moscow last February. There has been controversy as to -the exact phrase he used, but he indicated that if a general war broke out in Europe Finland would not be able to remain neutral.

What is the use, asked his critics, of a neutrality that collapses when put to the test? They went on to complain of his attacks on the mixed - manned nuclear force proposal. This may seem a little strange to those in Britain who are not above the occasional critical comment on the M.L.F., Atlantic Nuclear Force, and all that But what worried President Kekkonen’s critics was the apparent discarding of the principle that Finland does not comment on issues of dispute between the great powers. Small wonder, then, that some people were wondering what new definition of Finnish neutrality might emerge from President Kekkonen's latest visit to Moscow shortly before Christmas. He had preceded the trip with an important speech to the Foreign Policy Youth Society in which he had stressed the basis of Finnish neutrality. The treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assis-

tance committed Finland, he emphasised, only in the event of an attack upon Finland herself or upon the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, "in the event of an attack on the Soviet Union by another route than over Finnish territory we will not, under the Pact, be involved in the war.” Nor would the Pact operate without the mutual agreement of both signatories. Nordic Ties This part of his speech can be regarded as a straightforward attempt to reassure his critics. But he did more. He supported a far-reaching proposal for a neutral FinnoScandia. This would Include not only Sweden and Finland but also Norway and possibly Denmark—both of whom would in that case secede from Nato and establish a special relationship with the United States or Britain similar to Finland’s with Russia. This is another version of the schemes for a neutral Nordic defensive alliance which have been circulating more intensively recently. It can be seen either as a means of bolstering Finnish neutrality, or prising Norway and Denmark away from Nato. Or perhaps a combination of both. It could have been—could still be —the basis for an important diplomatic initiative. Although it would have no immediate chances of success, it would draw upon the instinct towards Nordic solidarity, which is still strong in Norway. Whatever the motives, the Russians would not object. President Kekkonen’s December visit to Moscow passed off uneventfully, but it would be wrong because of this to brush aside his February comments. They may or may not indicate that Finland is “neutral in peace but not in war.” But they certainly are a fair reflection of the extent to which the Russian influence presses upon Finnish political life. Big Brother Examples are numerous. In the autumn of 1958 the new majority Government resigned because of Soviet hostility, expressed particularly by threatening to cut trade with Finland. Russian pressure made Dr. Kekkonen’s reelection as President certain in 1962: their declared opposition caused the withdrawal of Mr Honka, the non-party Chancellor of Justice, who was to have been the candidate of a number of parties. The Social Democrats have not been in the Government since 1959, essentially because of Russian disapproval. At a reception in

the Russian Embassy a Finn, active in political affairs, remarked casually to me that a certain Social Democrat could not hold office because the Russians would not approve. Nor was this unusual. The need for Soviet blessing is widely accepted as a fact of life. There is a continual sense in Finnish politics of looking over the shoulder at Big Brother. Not surprisingly, this breeds a strong resentment in some quarters directed at the Government in general and President Kekkonen in particular. Some of the complaints have to be taken with caution. President Kekkonen is a dominant leader. Foreign Ministry officials refer to themselves as functionaries, carrying out his policies rather than helping to form them. Politicians naturally tend to resent the all-power-ful boss—but there is not necessarily anything sinister in strong leadership. It has the advantage in his case of counteracting the weakness of ephemeral Governments. Both Ways

There is also the other side of Finland. There is the country with a genuinely democratic system in spite of external pressures. The big political question now, for example, is whether the Social Democrats will do well enough at the next elections to assure their return to the Government. There is the country that may have to watch the east, but which looks to the west. The country which does threequarters of its foreign trade with the west, and two-thirds of it with western Europe; which is a member of Efta in all but name—its associate status was taken to satisfy Russia. The country where the standard of English speaking is nearly as good as it is elsewhere in Scandinavia — which is saying a lot. This other side of the picture needs emphasising because it is not a simple matter to get Finland's place in the world in the right perspective. It baffles many Finns. This is a country facing both ways: tremendously proud of its independence, treasuring its freedom, yet over-fearful of losing it. There is a constraint which enters the conversation when the subject of Finnish neutrality is broached with people who are fluent and well informed on the whole range of world affairs. Perhaps this is because there are a number of good judges in Finland who believe that she is slipping more under Russian sway. The Finns are right to keep a wary eye open. It is reasonable that the rest of the world should do so too.