CLOSING OF STOPS Engineer Said To Have Made ‘Bad Blue’

Press, Volume CV, Issue 30976, 4 February 1966, Page 3

CLOSING OF STOPS Engineer Said To Have Made ‘Bad Blue’

fN’ew Zealand Press Association)

AUCKLAND, February 3. An engineer officer in H.M.N.Z.S. Royalist made a “bad blue” in closing down the main stops on one of the boilers, a witness told a Navy Court Martial at Auckland today.

The witness, Petty Officer Engineer Mechanic J. E. Walker, said the closing of the stops had the effect of cutting off all steam to the main engines. He said the officer, Lieutenant T. M. O’Brien, ordered all four stops to be closed then realised his mistake and had two of them reopened.

Before the Court is Henry Rogerson Simmonds, a commander, who is charged with negligent performance of duty in failing to prevent the spread of contamination in the propulsion machinery of the Royalist in the Solomon Islands while engineer officer on November 1.

The court consists of Captain L. B. Carey (president). Captain M. J. McDowell, Commander J. E. Washbourne, Commander W. R. Williams, and Commander G. A. Lawrence.

Commander M. A. Lawson and Lieutenant-Commander D. L. Brooker are prosecuting. Lieutenant E. D. Deane is officiating deputyjudge advocate. Accused, who has pleaded not guilty, is represented by Mr D S. Beattie. Q.C., with him Mr J. H. Wallace and Commander E. R. Ellison. Before convening for the third day of the hearing today, the court visited the cruiser at Devonport. During yesterday’s hearing Engineer Mechanic Terence Hikaka said he saw an engineer officer, Lieutenant T. Arthurs, turn a valve in the boiler-room, and later turn it off again and lash it with a rope. Before leaving the boiler-room, the lieutenant had given him to understand he was to forget the incident, he alleged. Re-enactment The president of the Court asked Hikaka to re-enact the movement of Lieutenant Arthurs on the afternoon of November 1. After the engineer mechanic had moved to the valve and demonstrated how the officer first turned it anticlockwise and later clockwise, the Court’s guide for the inspection, Sub-Lieutenant C. Dixon told the Court the valve was the extraction pump cross-connexion discharge valve.

At the request of the Court president, the sub-lieutenant later pointed out another valve a few feet away which he described as the levelling valve.

The Court resumed in the Naval Stores Board room at Shoal Bay at 10.15 a.m. Re-examined by the prosecution, Engineer Mechanic Hikaka said that when Lieutenant Arthurs first entered the engine-room he did not see anyone else, although he knew there was another vratch-keeper there. He said he was standing watching Lieutenant Arthurs at the valve on the first occasion “long enough to know the valve was being opened.

Sub-Lieutenant B. A. Savage, watch-keeping engineer officer, said he took over the afternoon watch from Lieutenant T. O’Brien in the aft engine-room. He learned there was advanced contamination in the feed system aft. He observed tests taken on feed water in the aft unit by Lieutenant O’Brien and his chief of watch. Sub-Lieutenant Savage said he was relieved by Lieutenant Arthurs about 5 p.m.

In Error

To the defence he said he must have been in error w hen he stated at the board of inquiry that he h-d been relieved by Lieutenant Arthurs at 4.30 p.m.

Tested Tanks

He remembered he was relieved about the time of the black-out. Asked if this meant he agreed he was relieved at about 5.20 p.m., the time the black-out was recorded in the ship’s records, he said he agreed he was relieved about the time of the blackout but did not agree on the time.

Witness said he was the officer who had transmitted the order to stop the starboard engine to the bridge and agreed with the recorded time of 4.20 p.m. Lieutenant Arthurs had been in the engine-room with him from 4.40 p.m. but Lieutenant Arthurs would be wrong in telling the board of inquiry that it was 5.30 p.m. when he took over the watch. He handed over the watch to Lieutenant Arthurs at 5 p.m., which was before he was due to do so, because Lieutenant Arthurs said this was an instruction from Commander Simmonds. Asked further if he agreed that if his timing of events was different to everyone else’s he could be wrong, the witness said: “Possibly, but I can’t help my own convictions on this.’’ After handing over the watch to Lieutenant Arthurs, he was given an instruction by the senior engineer to stand by the turbo-generators and to keep power in the ship. He had difficulty in restarting one of the generators which had tripped during the black-out. The trouble was caused by priming, he said. Not Reported He did not report the priming because he assumed it would have been noticed elsewhere beforehand. Pressed, he said he did not shut down the generator because his last direct order was to keep power in the ship. He realised priming was an indication of possible damage to the machinery. He had seen priming before in the Black Prince.

Asked if there was anyone with him at the time of the priming, who could have gone to report it tn a superior, Sub-Lieutenant Savage said: “There was only one very frightened engineer mechanic.” Chief Engine-room Artificer Bernard William Baker said that he assisted Chief Engineroom Artificer Hunt in trying to isolate the starboard condenser on the afternoon of the breakdown. He should have relieved Chief Hunt as chief of the watch at 4 p.m., but the watch was not handed over. Instead, from the time he arrived at 3.50 p.m., he as-

sisted Chief Hunt in the attempt to contain the contamination indicated by the red warning light of the salinometer.

A valve, previously thought closed, was allowing water from the main feed tank into the condenser, hampering the operation, he said. The condenser was eventually isolated between 4.45 and 5 p.m. To the defence, he said he pumped water from the starboard condenser to the main feed tank. Asked if he knew the water was contaminated, he said that it was thought at that stage that either the starboard or port condenser were contaminated, but he did not know which. Losing Water To the Court, he said he pumped water to the main feed tank because that tank was rapidly losing water. He said that on inspecting the turbo-generator referred to by Sub-Lieutenant Savage earlier, about two days after the breakdown, he found a “vast amount” of salt on the valve admitting steam to the generator. Engine-room Artificer B. L, Bainbridge said he began port throttle watch in the aft en-gine-room at about 3.55 p.m. He was told about high salinity and suspected condenseritis (salt contamination of condensers). After outlining further events, witness told the defence how his engine was closed down. He said Chief Hunt ordered him to close down the throttle, but before he could do this Lieutenant Arthurs brushed past him and did it. He was unable to say why Lieutenant Arthurs did this. The lieutenant was in a hurry to do it.

Witness said “quite a lot” of steam was escaping from joints nearby. Petty Officer Engineer Mechanic J. E. Walker, chief of the watch in “B” boilerroom, said he took over about 3.55 and was informed of contamination in the feed system.

He tested both reserve feed tanks just before 4 p.m. and was taking a boiler test when the commander (E) came down about 20 minutes later. The commander told him it was a waste of time doing a silver nitrate test on the boiler because it was bound to be cloudy. Witness said glands in the boiler-room were blowing steam and water and lagging on a water tank on B2 boiler was smouldering. Further tests were made on the reserve tanks at 4.20 p.m. and witness found them to be cloudy. He made a broadcast to the engine-room and within a few minutes was told to shut down B2 boiler. Witness said Lieutenant O’Brien and Chief Mechanician Curry came in as he was doing this and witness reported to the engine-room that the boiler had been shut down. Witness said Lieutenant O’Brien ordered four boiler stops to be shut on 81, which had been steaming on main and auxiliary, between 4.25 and 4.30.

To Mr Beattie, witness said Chief Mechanician Curry would be suffering from a lapse of memory if he said he did not enter the boiler-room until 5.5 p.m. It was definitely Lieutenant O’Brien who ordered the boiler stops to be shut. This had the effect of shutting off all steam to the main engines. Black-outs The commander (E.) came down just after witness came on watch. It would not have been at 5.30 or 5.35. Witness said there were a number of lighting black-outs that day. He could not remember when these had occurred. He considered Lieutenant O’Brien “made a blue” in closing the main stops on Bl boiler. The lieutenant first ordered four stops to be shut then quickly ordered two to be re-opened. The other boiler, 82, was being shut at the same time.

The senior engineer, Lieutenant-Commander F. J. Ralton, identified a register in which changes of boiler states were recorded.

He said the entry “2000 both boilers shut down,” entered for that day, meant that the physical act of shutting down the boilers had taken place at that time. Witness said he could not identify the handwriting or the signature of the person making the entry. Petty Officer Engineer Mechanic J. C. Christie said the water level kept changing in Bl boiler. It went down to about one or two inches in the gauges glass.

Witness said Lieutenant Arthurs ordered him to bring up the water level to half a glass and witness considered the officer had panicked. The B2 boiler was shut down between 4.20 and 4.25. It remained that way during the remainder of his watch. The Court will resume tomorrow. The hearing is expected to last at least two more days.