Moscow-Peking Axis NO UNANIMITY ON ATTITUDE TO WEST

Press, Volume C, Issue 29513, 15 May 1961, Page 10

Moscow-Peking Axis NO UNANIMITY ON ATTITUDE TO WEST

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ISAAC DEUTSCHER]

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LONDON. May 2.-The i Moscow conference last November tried to bridge the ideological schism between ; the Chinese and the Russians . by a formula committing the t Communist parties to ret straint from any “export of f revolution” and concurrently . denying the N A TO, powers > the right to "export counter- [ revolution " » This formula implied that J if any of the Western powers ! were to "export counterrevolution” the Soviet bloc . would feel free to retaliate [in kind. In the view of both .Moscow and Peking, the . West, under the cover of the I United Nations has “ex- . ported counter-revolution” to [ the Congo; only the remotejness of • that country has ’I excused the Russian and [ Chinese failure to intervene I effectively on the spot. (Cuba according to the Com--1 munists witnessed the next [ attempt at exporting counter- ' I revolution; but as this was ■ defeated by Dr Castro’s own [ forces, before any need for Soviet and Chinese intervenjtion arose, the policy adopted 'by the Moscow conference [ was not put to a test. ’ Laos has been the first * .important test case: and the . impact of the Cuban crisis , on it has been unmistakeable Change of Context [i Until the fighting in Cuba. Moscow accepted with satis,'faction President Kennedy’s ; declared intention to modify (American policy in Laos and j to encourage the re-establish- > ment of a neutral regime I, there. Moscow was prepared l|t work for the same end. J though not without strengthJening militarily the bargainling position of the Pathet JLao before a cease fire and [ negotiations To all intents [land purposes Peking followed ‘ the Russian lead. However, ’(to make sure that the ; situation in Laos did not get [lout of control, and probably ‘ to forestall any Chinese m’[terference, the Soviet Union ’assumed the main responsibility for the supply of arms to the Pathet Lao and for Communist tactics on the I spot i The Cuban affair changed | the context within which (Peking and Moscow have [been viewing the situation jin Laos. It has provided I them with a justification, if this was needed, for a more aggressive policy not only in [Laos but also in South Vietnam. In his April messages to t President Kennedy, Mr ' Khrushchev said that, if the [ United States felt entitled to [ intervene against “unfriendly in countries b situated on its borders. ; Russia and China might consider themselves free to do ' the same. The temptation tor ‘the Communist Powers to [use the Cuban argument in [ this sense has been all the ’lstronger because in Laos and .[Vietnam they enjoy a deci. ;<sive advantage—popular ; support—that was denied [ the United States in Cuba [ The pro-American elements in Laos and South Vietnam ’ are discredited: the Rightwing regimes are disintegrating: and all that the native Communist forces, allied with the neutralists, need to c*tablish themselves in power is more arms, more effective military direction, and the approval of Moscow. All these could be provided with the maximum of discretion and without direct Russian or Chinese involvement ’"here ean be little doubt that Peking is favouring such a policy, and that Moscow is temporising. Russian Wariness Mr Khrushchev is wary of exploiting to the full the local Communist advantage in Laos because this migh’ provoke American or 15.E.A.T.0. intervention and turn Laos into a new Korea [The Chinese are not afraid of a new Korea. They might even welcome It. The Korean war wa« fought when the Soviet bloc was weak, before the Soviet Union itself had recovered from the Second World Waand before the Chinese Communist regime had been con. solidated. Yet the fighting ended in a stalemate which the United States did not [dare to break by carrying hostilities beyond Korea and using Its overwhelming nuclear superiority. The effect of the Korean stale[mate was to make Ameri. can policy in Asia far less confident than it had been jand to give a fillip to comImunism in Indo-China. Why i then—this, presumably, is i the Chinese argument- : should the Soviet bloc be I afraid of fighting another ; local war after an interval lof nearly a decade, in cir jcumstances so much more (favourable to communism? If the United States—the Chinese continue—did not dare to spread the Korean war in the hey-day of its nuclear superiority, it will certainly not turn a war over Laos into a world conflict now; and the fighting would end not in a stalemate but in an American defeat which would “clear the air over Asia and beyond Asia” and i give a powerful impulse to > communism in all under- , developed countries Fear of Another Korea To Moscow the risk of . such a gamble seems to be E great, in spite of all the ’accession of power from 4 which the Soviet Union has 6 benefited in the meantime. I and in spite of all the local (advantages which communism [enjoys in Lao« and Vietnam ; A new Korea would mark the final failure of Mr : Khrushchev’s policv of dis. engagement It might throw - back the Soviet Union and 7 Eastern Europe into the rigidity of a war economy and bring to a halt the expansion of consumer indus- , tries, with incalculable ’ effects on civilian morale. It would shatter the foundations jof Mr Khrushchev’s policies

and perhaps his own position, too. Mr Khrushchev therefore has weighty reaions tor seeking to avoid any military contest with the West. how. ever localised. Nor has he yet given up the possibility of some future “deal” with Mr Kennedy In parts of his Cuban messages to the President there was more sorrow than anger: he still appeared to view the Cuban affair as a momentary aberration on the part of a young and inexperienced President, burdened with a difficult legacy; and he did not wish to make it more difficult for Mr Kennedy to withdraw from the venture without too much loss of face. True, the strong terms tn which the President has since addressed the Com. munist world have come as a shock to Moscow The question is being asked there whether Mr Kennedy is merely smarting under defeat, but may yet return to the more conciliatory policy foreshadowed in his election campaign. or whether he is really seeing himself as the chosen leader of a new anti Communist crusade. Whatever the Chinese may say about this Mr Khrushchev still prefers to wait and see. The negotiations over Laos offer him. among other things. an opportunity to test American intentions Sign of Tension And so the divergences between Moscow and Peking persist, in spite of the outward show of harmony. A significant sign of the tension between the two Communist capitals could be seen in the outcome of the Russo-Chinese trade nego. tiations concluded on the eve of the Cuban crisis. The negotiations had lasted more than two months; yet the results announced were neghgible. The main point at issue was China's trade deficit which had arisen because of Chinese inability, after the disastrous crop failures of the last two years, to pay for Soviet imports with the export of foodstuffs. The Soviet Government agreed that China should pay the accumulated debt over a period of five years. It seems almost incredible that it should have taken two months of negotiations to arrive at so meagre a result. The talks may have ended in some other agreements which are kept secret; and unconfirmed reports speak about the return to China of the Soviet specialists and technicians who had been recalled at the height of the ideological controversy, Even so it is surprising that, having admitted China's economic plight, the Russians should not have made even a propagandist promise of large-scale aid to their hardpressed ally. The Chinese are certain to contrast this niggardliness with simultaneous Russian promises to increase trade with several other countries, including “revisionist” Jugoslavia. The recent slight improve, ment in Russo-Jugoslav relations is intended as a warning to the Chinese: and it is all too likely that the Russians are using economic pressure in order to tame Chinese “ultra-radicalism” a little further. However, neither the Cuban crisis nor the situation in Laos has helped the Russians, because both in Communist eyes have tended to strengthen the Chinese case. Both Cuba and Laos have also compelled Mr Khrushchev to engage in complex manoeuvres designed to steal something of the Chinese thunder, and yet prevent a further exacerbation of Russo-American re. lations. It goes without saying that the more he succeeds in one of these purposes, the less can he succeed in the other —World Copyright. (Concluded.)