Western Allies Review Defences

Press, Volume C, Issue 29513, 13 May 1961, Page 10

Western Allies Review Defences

Three important facts emerged from the Oslo meetings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s Ministerial Council. First, the council affirmed that the future of Berlin is still the most critical issue of East-West relations; second, it appears to have shelved the proposal —favoured by the Eisenhower Administration and even more warmly espoused by Dr. Adenauer—to make N.A.T.O. the world’s fifth atomic Power; and it accorded a new priority to economic assistance for the poorer members of the alliance. In addition the meetings were notable because they were the first attended by Dr. Dirk Stikker, of the Netherlands, as Secretary - General of N.A.T.O.—a post formerly filled with distinction by Mr Paul-Henri Spaak, of Belgium.

Before the Oslo meetings much had occurred to preoccupy individual members of the alliance with domestic problems. In the United States, for example, the Kennedy Administration must still prove its capacities. In France General de Gaulle, ruling with despotic powers, is in a crucial phase of negotiations on Algeria. In Turkey General Gursel is still eradicating vestiges of the Menderes regime. Belgium, debilitated by colonial losses and industrial strife, has a new Government.

West Germany is preparing • for elections. In Italy, Denmark. and Canada, political stability has become less assured. Portugal and Dr. Salazar have lost popularity because of Angola. Among the principal N.A.T.O. countries, therefore, Britain, under the Macmillan Government, is best able to concentrate on questions of common security, notwithstanding its admitted handicap of isolation from the European Economic Community. All this is unfortunate for an alliance confronted with issues of great urgency, and already sapped by bickerings among its members. It appears doubtful whether the Oslo meetings have contributed much towards the re-establishment of fundamental unity. In Oslo the United States announced categorically its intention to keep forces

indefinitely in Europe. This! should not be construed as a reversal of the United States’ policy of shed ding its post-war burdens wherever possible upon its European allies. Clearly the reported offer of- American aid for developing the Portuguese territories in Africa is an attempt to reduce tension within the alliance over Portugal’s colonial shortcomings; and it shows that economies elsewhere by the United States will be more necessary than ever if President Kennedy is to attain his “ new “ frontiers ” in international relations. The United States’ assignment of five Polaris missile submarines to the N.A.T.O. area is believed to be subject to the retention of American control over the vessels. This is unlikely to satisfy West Germany and other countries which desire for N.A.T.O. a degree of supranational power over its total armament Because the Geneva negotiations on a nuclear test ban have reached a very delicate stage the Kennedy Administration may be averse to annoying the Russians with a more positive policy on atomic weapons. It is satisfactory, however, that the N.A.T.O. Ministers’ views on Berlin do not seem to have been tempered by a similar consideration for Mr Khrushchev's susceptibilities.