“Kennedy’s Stocks Never Higher”

Press, Volume C, Issue 29513, 13 May 1961, Page 11

“Kennedy’s Stocks Never Higher”

(ft.Z Press Association—Copyright) NEW YORK, May 12. President Kennedy, in the midst of one of the worst Presidential blunders in recent history—over Cuba—stood higher in the esteem of his colleagues in Washington than ever before, the “New York Times” chief Washington correspondent said today.

This was a most interesting paradox which the President left behind when he flew to Florida yesterday afternoon, the correspondent, James Reston, said. Part of the reason for this was that his colleagues felt that they misled him on the Cuban adventure. Part of it, too, was that he took responsibility for their bad advice, Reston said. But the main point was that, in the crisis, he did not panic. He did not let the past overwhelm the present or the future. He was not cruel to his advisers. And though he was bone weary before he went away, he did not allow the bad news of the day to overwhelm history. Reston said that this might have troubled the impatient “do-something” set in Washington who wanted him to plunge back into Cuba and Laos with the marines, but it impressed the more thoughtful people in his Administratioon, and it relieved the Western Allies, who were afraid that he was going to avenge his defeat in Cuba by breaking off the nuclear testing talks in Geneva or taking rash action in Cuba and Laos In similar frustrating circumstances, the British and French had plunged into Suez when their pride was affronted, and in the process had divided their countries. "Kennedy, whatever else he did, did not do this, and the history of the American Presidency suggested that he was wise.” Reston said. The great turning point of history now was not Cuba or Laos, important and troubling as they both were, but the control of nuclear armaments and the movement toward unity in this hemisphere, in the Atlantic and in the rest of the free world. Reston said that President Kennedy had been aware of this point. It could be said with some confidence that he

was determined to have a personal talk with the Soviet Prime Minister (Mr Khrushchev* before he reached so crucial a decision. He had, in short, identified the “turning point” of his time—the control of nuclear weapons