Moscow-Peking Axis SUBTLE STRAINS ON IDEOLOGICAL TRUCE

Press, Volume C, Issue 29513, 13 May 1961, Page 10

Moscow-Peking Axis SUBTLE STRAINS ON IDEOLOGICAL TRUCE

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ISAAC DEUTSCHER]

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London. May 2.—Relations between the Soviet Union and China in recent months have been ’ quite smooth —on the surface. ■ The truce concluded al the ‘ Moscow conference of the 5 Communist parties last No- • vember is still unbroken ' The bitter and only slightly ■ veiled attacks on Russian ' “opportunism” that filled ’ the Chinese press in 1959 and 1960 are not being repeated. ‘ Official Chinese policy has J grown more "moderate.” and ! has ostensibly adjusted itself to Mr Khrushchev’s “cen- ; trist” line. It appears that Mr Mao has even made his apologies ' to Mr Khrushchev and ex- ’ plained the vehemence of ' earlier criticisms by the cirs cums'.ances that "ultra-Left” elements had temporarily j gained the upper hand in 1 Peking's political councils • Mr Mao has given the assur- *■ ance that those elements • have now been curbed, and ’ that the balance has been redressed. If this were true. Chinese ! policy would appear to be ' floundering in a welter of ’ conflicting tendencies and factions on which Mr Mao had ' not always been able to im- ’ pose his will. Even Moscow , is not quite sure whether to ■ take this apology at its face j value. Such is the secrecy • that surrounds the Chinese I Politbureau • and Central ’ Committee that the members • of the Soviet Presidium do

oi tne soviet rresituum ao not know what are the inner .alignments there, and in par- , ticular whether Mr Mao , himself inspired the attacks ; ’ on Soviet policy or whether someone else, probably Mr Liu Shae-chi, did it, in spite jof Mr Mao. i Apology Accepted I Officially, however. Mos--1 cow has accepted the apology and acknowledged that the Chinese party “has made a commendable effort to overcome dogmatism in its midst and to adopt a realistic and responsible attitude." But behind this official acknow- • ledgement. doubt and sus- > picion have remained—and i they have been freshly i aroused by the latest events. • On the other hand, Soviet policy has yielded somewhat ■ to the pressure of Chinese ’ criticism and shifted a little ■ "to the Left.” Mr Khrush- : chev is far less sanguine than ■ formerly about summit diplomacy and the prospects ■ of disarmament and detente. 'He is committed more i strongly to a militant I anti-Western policy in the underdeveloped countries. This mutual Russo-Chinese ■ adjustment has formed the ; basis of the ideological truce. Until the Cuban crisis the truce was also fostered by the relative lull in SovietAmerican diplomatic activity the lull that followed President Kennedy's demand for : a waiting period, and Mr Khrushchev’s acquiescence With discussions on the main ■ issues of East-West diplom- . acy in abeyance, the Rus- , sians had little opportunity to "sin" through the softness and “opportunism" that might have brought upon •them Chinese reprobation. Yet a difference between the Chinese and Russian attitudes towards President Kennedy was all too evident. The Chinese treated Mr Kennedy as an enemy as bad as Mr Eisenhower or even worse; I the Russians gave him the benefit of the doubt, to say the least, and urged the • other Communist parties not ■ •to antagonise unduly the new American Administration before it had shown its hand. Chinese Strength To some extent the Cuban crisis has strengthened the position of the Chinese within the Communist bloc. It has aroused much antiAmerican feeling even in ’ "revisionist” Poland. It has ' placed a large question mark ' over some of Mr Khrushchev's expectations and gestures of goodwill towards the • new President. It has driven Mr Khrushchev into his first public, hostile clash with Mr Kennedy. Nevertheless. Moscow has kept a cool head throughout ' the crisis, and acted with caution. Mr Khrushchev has not gone beyond the expression of moral and political , solidarity with Dr. Castro's regime. He has not repeated his old threat that Soviet i missiles would defend Cuba against American intervention. He hastened to reassure the American Presi- 1 dent that his Government had no intention of establishI ing any military base in Cuba or of using Cuba as an assault base against the United States. He encouraged Dr. Castro to declare, after the collapse of the invasion. Cuban readiness for direct negotiations with Washington over a settlement of the Cuban-American conflict. Moreover, at the height of the crisis Mr Khrushchev made his suggestions for at least a limited SovietAmerican “deal." He argued that “it does not make sense to put out the fires smouldering in some parts of the world if new fires are , kindled elsewhere": and in i effect he told the President that, if the United States desisted from further intervention in Cuba. Russia would be prepared to bring under control the “fires" in Laos ■ > and South Vietnam. Conciliation Opposed • The Chinese applauded the 1 strong pro-Cuban tenor of Mr Khrushchev’s messages to the President; but the conciliatory undertone and the suggestion of a bargain were not to their taste. They saw no need for Moscow to offer such a bargain after the setback the United States had 1 suffered in Cuba. They re- ' peated their conviction that Mr Kennedy was a tougher adversary of the Soviet bloc and of communism than Mr i i Eisenhower. At the end of the Cuban hostilities, official Moscow was still puzzled by Mr

Kennedy's behaviour, and not yet quite ready to deny him the benefit of the doubt. Mr Khrushchev noted that the President had drawn a line between continued American support for the antiCastro emigres and direct American intervention in Cubit. This, in Mr Khrushchev's view, promised Cuba a long period of respite, because the anti-Castro emigres, demoralised by their defeat, would not be able for a long time to launch any new attack. Against this Peking hold that the American Administration will end by intervening directly with its own armed forces against Dr. Castro, and that only a more aggressive Soviet attitude can deter it. Moscow at first dimissed this forecast as groundless—but then it began to wonder. Military Prospects The Chinese remain convinced that the military superiority of the Communist bloc should allow Mr Khrushchev to “treat American imperialism as a paper tiger." but Mr Khrushchev is afraid of over-exploiting Soviet strength and underestimating the Americans' capacity for retaliation. This old difference in the evaluation of the international balance of power was thrown into sharper relief by Major Gagarin's flight into outer space. Paradoxically, as far as the inner Communist alignments wore concerned. this Soviet triumph played into Chinese rather than into Russian hands. The Chinese made the most of the "military consequences of Gagarin." insisting that the United States had no answer to Russia’s new strategic advantage. President Kennedy's statement that in outer space the United States might lag behind the U S S R, for a whole decade gave additional strength to this argument. The conclusion the Chinese drew was that the Communists have no need to pull their punches anywhere in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. if local circumstances favour them; that Cuba should serve them as an example; and that as long as they could count on strong popular support on the spot, they had nothing to fear from American or other intervention, because the N A.T.O. Powers were paralysed by their fear of a head-on collision with the Soviet Union. Thus, in spite of all their mutual tactical adjustments, Moscow and Peking are still separated bv this important difference: Moscow continues to base its policy on the assumption of an equilibrium of nuclear power in the world, while Peking holds that Russian missile technology has destroyed that equilibrium and given the Soviet bloc strategic superiority which international communism should exploit to the utmost in order to advance on a broad front.— World Conyright Reserved. (To Be Concluded)