PILOTS’ EVIDENCE ON PARAPARAUMU CRASH

Press, Volume XC, Issue 27397, 9 July 1954, Page 13

PILOTS’ EVIDENCE ON PARAPARAUMU CRASH

(New Zealand Press Association)

WELLINGTON, July 8. If the DC-3 that crashed near Paraparaumn on May 22 had flown from Hare wood on the fuel from one tank instead of two, then its petrol content indicator gauge had lied, said the pilot, Captain W. B. Pettet, today, to the Court of Inquiry into the crash. Captain Pettet said that z he had been giving the co-pilot, First Officer V. L. «■’ command practice on the ” e complete confidence in first Officer Powell, who was a competent pilot. It would not be unusual for the fuel content gauge to lie, he said. National Airways Corporation pilots were 'authorised to fly an aircraft even though a fuel content gauge was unserviceable, provided they. made. a dip stick check before flight. They would then know how much petrol had been used by the time they had been flying. A gauge could be erratic and unreliable, even though it was not necessarily unusable. In turbulent weather fuel content gauges moved about a good deal and were not entirely accurate. There was also a fuel pressure gauge, but this did not measure amounts. He did not recall checking this in the pre-landing check. Earlier today First Officer Powell also gave evidence. The Court, consisting of Judge Stilwell (chairman), Mr G. B. Bolt, chief engineer of Tasman Empire Airways, Ltd., and Captain R. B. Hamilton, operations manager for Straits Air Freight Express, Ltd., will hear further evidence tomorrow—the fourth day of its inquiry. Mr W. H. Cunningham is appearing for the Minister in charge of Civil Aviation, Mr D. W. Virtue 'for the National Airways Corporation, and Dr. R. G. McElroy for the pilot and copilot. First Officer Powell said he had taken the aircraft to the take-off point at Harewood, Captain Pettet being in the co-pilot’s seat. The witness said he went through all procedures necessary for take-off and took the aeroplane into the air.

He remembered that the left-hand engine was selected to the left-hand main fuel tank, and the right engine to the right main tank. He piloted the flight, during which he reported as regularly required, flying on instrument flight rules. With the consent of Wellington control, he later changed to visual flight rules from Blenheim east.

The aeroplane flew approximately over Mana Island, till when the engines had functioned normally. At no stage before hitting the land had he made any alteration whatsoever to the fuel supply control since the cockpit check made at Harewood, said First Officer Powell. Captain Pettet had gone into the passenger cabin about Kaikoura and returned to the cockpit as the aeroplane passed Cape Terawhiti. The witness said he had no recollection of Captain Pettet returning from “the cabin within a minute of the aeroplane’s crashing, as a passenger witness had said. Captain Pettet had resumed his seat on the right side of the cockpit. The aeroplane was then at about 1500 ft. and came down to about 1200 ft over Mana Island. They would then be about five miles offshore and had permission to come in to land. First Officer Powell said he reduced his cruising speed before lowering the undercarriage about five miles before reaching the coast. “Motors Suddenly Cut’’

“At about 400 ft,” he said, "I throttled back further,, and the motors suddenly cut and the aircraft sank. I called to Captain Pettet thalr we had lost both our motors.

“I. felt his hands on the controls. He said something I could not catch. He did a quick cockpit check and took over the controls. We were on the level of the trees, then a motor, possibly two. started up. and the aircraft was on its side. I saw something green—green grass—and then the next thing I knew I was walking around. It was raining, my right shoe was off, and my uniform was torn. “I had the impression of something burning off to the side. But I didn’t realise what it was. Someone took me by the hand and led me to a doctor’s house.” First Officer Powell said that the landing check made according to company rules included checking on fuel cocks. Captain Pettet did this check before the engines failed. He definitely checked the two main tanks to which the engines were selected. This was after the lowering of the wheels but before the lowering of the flaps. The result of the check of the starboard tank was that there was sufficient fuel for landing. The witness did not know, however, what the indicator readings were for either the starboard or port tank. He said the port motor definitely picked up, but he wds not sure whether the starboard motor also picked up at the same time. If Captain Pettet had switched the port motor to the port tank that would account for its picking up first, but Captain Pettet did not change the selector switch of the port motor. It was already on the port tank. He merely checked it as

being there. w w , There should have been less petrol in the port tank than was afterwards discovered, because the tank was in use all the flight, according to the controls. Witness Cross-Examined Mr Cunningham: If there is evidence that the starboard main tank was practically dry, can you account for this if the fuel controls were where you said they were? , • The witness: The explanation would not be very obvious. \ Can you account for the starboard tank being nearly dry unless both engines had been running off it all the time?—-Unless there was some malfunction of the selector gears then I could not account'for it. “I can’t tell you why the port engine picked up suddenly,” said the witness. “The failure could have been due to lack of fuel, but in that case the engines would more likely have died gradually.” , , Tending drill involved the momentary switching off of the engines’ magnetos one at a time. That h&d been done some time before the engines failed. If there had been an ignition failure it could only have been of very short duration. ~ ~ . To Mr Virtue, the witness said that during starting drill he had not had to alter the fuel selectors before starting the motors, as far as he could remember. He checked them by feel and sight. Knowing there was 110 gallons of petrol in each main tank and that the trip from Harewood would take about 110 gallons between the two motors, he would have made sure that the fuel draw-off from the tanks was evenly distributed. • The witness said he had checked the fuel selectors about four miles out in normal pre-descent drill. Captain Pettet had checked the fuel gauge on the right side of the cockpit immediately afterwards. He actually saw the gauge recording petrol in both front tanks, though he could not say how much at that time. , . If there was some malfunctioning of the petrol selector gear, there would need to be some malfunctioning of the gauge as well, if the starboard tank had very little petrol in it as a result of both motors having drawn from that tank. To Dr. McElroy, the witness said he had made a fuel check in flight just after passing Kaikoura, about 40 minutes from Christchurch. The reading then was about 90 in each main tank. He made the reading to ensure that there was plenty of petrol in the mains in view of bad weather expected between Paraparaumu and Auckland. He was satisfied there was no need to change to auxiliary tanks. Captain Pettet, whose evidence was similar to that given by First Officer Powell, said he was satisfied that when the aircraft took off from Harewood it was in good order and had the necessary amount of fuel. Until about Kaikoura, when he went into the passenger cabin, he had sat in the co-Pilot’s seat, beside First Officer Powell, all the way. He returned to the cockpit at least 15 minutes before landing time. .A passenger who had earlier given evidence of seeing him

return to the cockpit about one minute before the engines stopped was mistaken. Captain Pettet said he had previously made a routine check that would have included all the controls. The 1 fuel controls were ip their proper 1 place, and if they had not been it 1 would have been obvious. Both he 4 and First Officer Powell carried out ’ a pre-landing check on fuel to make J sure there was sufficient. Approaching Paraparaumu at about 500 ft he got the impression that the throttles had been put well back, 1 said Captain Pettet. In the circum- ’ stances, with a fairly strong wind 4 and a somewhat difficult approach to ; the particular runway, as well as a 4 loss of height, lie immediately shouted to First Officer Powell and straight J away grabbed the throttles himself. ■ “I could see he was well aware of ' this and was actually doing the same ! thing, but the power was not there,” ' said Captain Pettet. Check of Instruments He quickly checked the various instruments—including the fuel selectors ■ and pressure gauges—and everything seemed all right. At this stage the ' aircraft must have been below 100 ft, and he took over the controls. The aircraft was badly out of trim and had practically stalled when suddenly a motor came on. He had the impression it was the port motor. f “I dodged what I could, but we were completely stalled by then, and we hit ” said Captain Pettet. “There was nothing unusual about , the approach until this happened, otherwise I would have done something about it earlier.” He told Mr Cunningham tjiat he remembered having a discussion after the crash with the Inspector of Accidents. Mr Cunningham: Did you tell him that you had switched the fuel control for the port engine over? Captain Pettet: I don’t think so. If I had done that I would have switched on the left auxiliary or the right main tank. He added that in checking the controls after the motors had stepped he was not aware of turning the port or starboard fuel control switches. He. would* have expected the fuel consumed on the flight to be between* 120 and 130 gallons—about 65 gallons each engine—as they were on maximum power. This should have left about 50 gallons in each tank. If more than 75 gallons was later taken from the port main tank, that would indicate that there was more in it than could be expected. There could be a variety of reasons for this. Mr Cunningham: If the starboard tank was found almost dry, could it have been because both motors were running from it? Captain Pettet: I cannot see any reason to believe it was almost dry. Captain Pettet said that the proper thing would have been to turn the aircraft left, on to the beach, after the engines stopped, but when it stalled this was almost impossible. He could not ascribe any reason for the sudden loss of power if it was not lack of fuel. It was possible, though unlikely, that there had been carburettor icing or an ignition failure. To Mr Virtue he said there was a new N.A.C. rule that when command practice was being given the pilot and co-pilot must keep in their normal seats. He had not been informed* of this before the crash. Xl _ T ° P r * McElroy, Captain Pettet said that the pressure gauge did not flicker when the engines cut out. If the fuel ! m a tank was exhausted this would cause the pressure to drop off. Fred Brooks, the regional aircraft surveyor in the Civil Aviation Admin- , istration at Harewood, gave evidence of the stripping of the aeroplane’s two Pratt and Whitney engines after the crash, and of discovering indications that no mechanical defects occurred in : flight.

The stripping revealed, he said, that both engines were running at power during and after initial impact which broke off the nose-section of both engines. Passenger’s Evidence Nearing the airport he got the impression that the engines had been throttled back to land, said Alexander James Corrigan, a farmer, of Hawera, who was a passenger in the plane. Over the beach he noticed the engines were revved up very quickly. He saw trees on his right and the plane banked. He thought they were going into the trees, so he braced his feet against the seat in front. The plane hit trees, and settled down quite smoothly without any serious jolt. There was a “blowback” of smoke and acrid fumes, said Mr Corrigan. put a foot through a window to let in air. He made for the cabin door but could not open it. The cabin was practically dark with the smoke. The witness got out through a window. The pilot opened the door from the outside, and other passengers came out of the plane. The witness said he saw the crash fire tender crew in action, and considered they did a wonderful job. A lot of people got there quickly, and some seemed to get in the road. The fire crew did a “marvellous job” with the foam equipment.

Mr Corrigan suggested that there should be some clear instruction in aircraft drawing attention to the emergency windows and their operation. He considered he could have got several persons out of emergency windows if he had known where they were and how to open them. To Mr Virtue, the witness said that although he had been a regular passenger the notice at the emergency windows had never made any real impression on him.