CLOSE-UP PICTURE OF CHETNIK AND PARTISAN

Press, Volume LXXXII, Issue 24903, 17 June 1946, Page 4

CLOSE-UP PICTURE OF CHETNIK AND PARTISAN

[By COLIN BINGHAM. Staff Correspondent .in London ot the “Sydney MortUe, * (Published by Arrangement.)

While General Drazha Mikhailovic is being tried for his life in Belgrade this week, a little book is being widely read in Britain which will probably satisfy more people on the question of how far the Chetnik leader collaborated with the enemy than any evidence presented by Marshal Broz’s Government. The author is Major Jasper Rootham, who was a member of the, British Military Mission to Mikhailovic m DM3-1944. In “Miss Fire” (Chatto and Windus, London) he writes quietly but convincingly of his experiences in a zone of eastern Serbia commanded by one of Mikhailovic’s lieutenants. Major Rootham makes some depressing references to the British Government’s failure or inability to give Mikhailovic concrete support at a time when the 8.8. C. was successfully building him up as a great hero ef the Allied cause, and part of the explanation of the Chetnik leader’s later tragic policy is to be found in the doubt and disillusion that replaced his initial enthusiasm for the British. None of the British liaison officers with the Chetniks says straight out that Mikhailovic himself openly “collaborated,” but undoubtedly some of his commanders did, and thus the full responsibility has fallen upon the Com-mander-in-Chief, although his hold on many of his subordinates was quite tenuous. By the middle of 1943 the Chetniks and Broz’s Partisans were involved in a struggle for power in Jugoslavia, but the Partisans nevertheless threw themselves wholeheartedly into the task of killing Germans not only because they hated the Germans, but because they wanted to convince the Allies that theirs was the horse to back t thus securing for themselves the power necessary to dominate the internal situation in Jugoslavia when the Germans were defeated. Killing off permanil Mikhailovic had the same opportunity as the Partisans to demonstrate that killing Germans and also the militiamen of the collaborationist, General Nedic, was his overwhelming concern, and thus hold the favour of the Allies—or at least share it with Broz. But more and more the dominating consideration of the Chetnik movement became the avoidance of wholesale slaughter and the destruction of property among those Jugoslavs who supported the cause for which Mikhailovic stood. Consequently, the Chetniks’ purpose was to do as little as possible in the way of action likely to lead to German reprisals—without actually sacrificing Allied support—and in the meantime to prepare for a hypothetical D-Day in the Balkans, so that the punch, when it come, would be a knock-out. With Mikhailovic holding to »uch a policy—Rootham gives a number of instances of the Chetniks failure to seize opportunities to inflict losses and damage upon the Germans—it was only a question of time before the Allies switched their support to Broz’s Partisans. who with amazing skill and toughness eventually absorbed the attention of 15 German divisions. One of the most significant differences between the policy of the Chetniks and that of the Partisans was in their attitude to General Nedic’s militia. The Partisans regarded Nedic’s men as enemies without qualification. On the contrary. Rootham points out, Mikhailovic’s men and Nedic’s men regarded one another as essentially on

the same side —the side of King Peter against both the German occupier* awS " the Partisans. Officers and meh of Nedic’s militia were actually on Mikhailovic’s strenrH, for mobilisation and would report fcS duty when called up. It was understood that when Mik hailovic —on the hypothetical D-Day.2 gave the order for the “great risinow Nedic’s troops, with the exception of a few high officers who were Comoro mised by personal attachment to Nedic. should go over en bloc to the Chetniks. Meanwhile, the Partisans, without waiting for the hypothetical D-Dav went on killing Germans—and ChJ* niks. Conclusions Major Rootham is satisfied: (1) the Germans in 1943-1944 did not interfere with the movements of MikhaL lovic’s troops and wounded. (2) That the Chetniks were not under the direction of the German command, but Nedic’s troops were, and they made a part of their German arms and amnia, nition available to Mikhailovic'* troops. (3) Some of Mikhailovic’! commanders through their contact* with Nedic’s forces had a good idea of the Germans’ tactical plans. From the German viewpoint, th* Chetniks' were doing useful work. The German game was this:— They themselves garrisoned the town* and communication centres and covered important road and river cross. • ings with artillery and mortars. Meanwhile, they kept mobile patrol* circulating on the roads. “They thus shepherded the Partisans into mountainous country, and by allowing the Chetniks much freer movement they permitted the Jugoslavs, in savage fighting with no quarter, to kill one another in comparatively large numbers.” The Chetniks believed they were fending their traditions, homes, and liberties against the Communiit menace. The Partisans believed when engaging the Chetniks that they were fight? ing'a gang of Fascist reactionaries. And the Germans laughed themselves sick. Tired, Worried Man Major Rootham first met Mikhailovic in a peasant cottage. “A slight, somewhat stooping figure, wearing British battledress without badges of rank of any kind, a dark-blue shirt buttoned up at the collar with no tie, and thick peasant socks pulled over the ends of his trousers, he stepped forward and greeted us in a curiously soft, pleasant, almost caressing, voice. “The round head covered with * thatch of greyish hair was the head of a Serb peasant. The grizzled beard did not conceal the sharp lines of the face nor the hollows under the cheekbones, “From behind strong glasses looked out a pair of deceptively ,mild paleblue eyes.” Mikhailovic, when he cared to use it, had extraordinary personal charm, but he was “a desperately tired and worried man.” , Every intelligent Chetnik knew what the withdrawal of the British mission meant, but from Mikhailovic down to the humblest subordinate they tried to ensure that every British officer and man should depart in safety and without hard words. Major Rootham’s book contains many tributes to the qualities of the Serb& but none more touching than his comment: “We, as representatives of a large nation, were given by the representatives of a small nation a lesson m manners and on how to conduct oneself with dignity in adversity.”