The Press TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 1943. Soviet Air Power

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23974, 15 June 1943, Page 4

The Press TUESDAY, JUNE 15, 1943. Soviet Air Power

It is a fact of considerable importance that for weeks past the reports from the Russian front have chiefly chronicled bomber attacks on German bases and communications. Figures were at first rarely given. Latterly, the number of machines used and the weight of bombs dropped have been cited often enough to suggest that the attack is being sustained on a full offensive scale; and it is possible that German preparations have been seriously delayed and disorganised. The reports suggest also that the Russians are either slightly or ineffectually opposed; and evidence that the Luftwaffe is overburdened is at least as encouraging as evidence that the Russian Air Force has plenty of striking power. If the balance of air power on the Russian front has tilted against the Germans —the air battles of the late winter were evenly contested—the outlook for the summer’s campaigns, whatever form they take, is accordingly the more favourable to the Russians. Every great German offensive so far has been heavily airarmed. Without this advantage, or even if it can only be gained and held briefly, the risks of a new German offensive must be desperate. Nevertheless, that does not lessen its likelihood. The whole character of a German bid for final victory in the east this summer must be that of a last and desperate effort.

The strength of the Russian air force and in particular its present strength relative to the Luftwaffe can only be roughly assessed. That it has emerged x rom a long and costly struggle certainly in a better position than the enemy is due to a number of causes. First, the demands of North Africa and of Western Europe, increased by the Allied offensives, have greatly increased the strain on the Luftwaffe and taken it off the Russians. Second, the Russians themselves have inflicted heavier losses than they have suffered. In one period of six weeks, for- example, they claimed to have destroyed 2000 German machines for the loss of 700. Half that loss to the Luftwaffe would have seriously reduced its frontline strength. Third, British and American aircraft Hurricanes, Kittyhawks, Bostons, Mitchells, and Marauders—have been delivered in great numbers. Fourth, it seems more than likely that the Russians stiffly economised in aircraft during the last stages of the summer and autumn campaigns, so as to establish an operational reserve for their winter offensive. Fifth, having begun the war with an alltypes force of about 8000 machines, the Russians have been able to stand large losses; and, finally, although production was badly set back by the destruction or capture of various aircraft works, expansion has much more than caught up. Two of the largest works are near Moscow—one reason why the Germans drove so furiously to the capital. New works beyond the Urals have long been in production. One of them is producing the new fourmotor heavy bomber. Over all, production is probably between 1500 and 2000 machines a month: ample to maintain and expand an operational strength of 3000. A recent estimate set that as the front-line figure. Although a quarter or a fifth may be supposed to be stationed in the Far East, the remainder would exceed the Luftwaffe’s available resources in Russia.