The Press THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 1943. The Axis Awaits Invasion

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23970, 10 June 1943, Page 4

The Press THURSDAY, JUNE 10, 1943. The Axis Awaits Invasion

Though it is intended first and foremost to reassure the listener at home, German propaganda such as was reported yesterday, claiming that the Axis is fully prepared and can confidently count on defeating any invasion plan, cannot be dismissed as wholly unsubstantial. Three main points were presented: that the German “ war potential ” has been greatly increased and is still increasing, that industry has been successfully decentralised and reorganised, and that, at any landing point, the invaders would face, no “ comparatively weak ” local forces, but “ a tremendous army, “ comprising millions.” These are interesting points. No doubt the drive for manpower has produced results. The Germans may muster as many divisions, or nearly as many, as when their power was at its height. Against that, efficiency will be lower;, replacement labour, forced or other, will also be less efficient. Morale will be lower. But an achievement qualified in these respects may still be formidable. It is less easy to credit the Germans with a correspondingly effective solution of their material problems. Second, there is very | good evidence that the Germans have worked hard" to spread their industry. Safer location, safer construction, and multiplication of units can do a great deal, and German resource has been applied to them; but it cannot overcome the physical fact that heavy industry must be concentrated near its sources of materials and power and, also, near the main delivery and transport centres, or else colossal transport difficulties arise. The biggest German targets cannot be moved. Third, it is true, again, that invasion will not be met by coastal defence forces only but, in theory, by army groups behind them. It has long been known that the Germans have based their main strength in the west, not along the coast, where it would be .strung out and badly placed for swift concentration, but at convenient centres inland. The theory is that air and sea reconnaissance will give warning of an invasion; that air and sea operations and the coastal defences will delay it; and that the forces swung from their inner bases t the landing point will give the invaders no time to establish their bridgehead and assemble the supplies for an advance from it. When Hitler said that Germany’s enemies might, with luck, cling to the coast for nine hours, he took his time from Dieppe; but he took his argument from calculations such as General Fuller set out in " Machine “ Warfare.” A mechanised force based on Bourges can reach Dieppe, Havre, St. Nazaire, and Bordeaux in two days; Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Marseilles, and Toulon in two days and a half; and Brest and Lorient in three days. And air concentration can be reckoned in hours instead of days. The Dieppe landing tested the coastal defences, with undisclosed results. It may oe taken for granted that they were found tough and efficient. But the real resistance lay further back, and it was not tested at all. It was suggested at the time that this was an error: that an invasion “ re- “ hearsal ” which did not include the systematic pounding of the hinterland and its bases and communications, to isolate the coastal defences, missed its purpose. It is much more probable, however, that nothing of the kind was attempted because the attempt would have disclosed too much without raising the value of the coastal test. To think of the test as a “ rehearsal,” in fact, is to forget its proportions and mistake its aim. ,An invasion cannot be “ rehearsed ” ; it must be planned as a whole but can only be practised in detail. But, unquestionably, when the invasion is launched, the answer to Hitler’s plan, of swift concentration will be air attack, patterned to paralyse the inland anti-invasion bases and their communications. If recent events are significant in this respect, it can be an effective answer. That is not to say, of course, an answer immediately and wholly effective, reducing the problems of invasion to simplicity. But if it makes the difference between impossible or impossibly costly operations and success at a price- within the estimates of its worth, it will be a decisive answer. War-time Price Index The April issue of the Abstract of Statistics contains a brief account of the new War-time Price Index, prepared in furtherance of the stabilisation plan. The description is in general terms, without any illustrative material, and can convey little or nothing even to those few consumers who include the Abstract in their periodical reading. It seems more than unfortunate that the Minister of Supply, who is in charge of stabilisation, has not thought it necessary to help the citizen to understand the index, how it is compiled, how it works, and what he can do to keep it registering safely. Three Ministers have now said that the co-operation of the public is essential, if stabilisation is to succeed. It cannot, therefore, be the official view that there is nothing to be gained by making its working intelligible. It ought not to be the official view that there is no way of making a statistician's device, like a price index, intelligible. If stabilisation fails, it is likely to fail for one of two reasons, or for both together; because it is badly administered, or because it is badly publicised. And, so far as the public and its co-operation are concerned, the second reason is the vital one. Nevertheless, the first quarterly appearance of the new index passed

without official explanation or remark. It was more than a fortnight before the Minister of Supply issued a short statement. Saying very little more to the purpose, he repeated the statistical fact that the index showed a rise of 1.1 per cent, in the cost of living between December 15 and March 15 and found it most gratifying that the rise had been so small. Is the figure really gratifying? If the Minister believes it is, he has forgotten that a rise of 2.5 per cent, will be followed by wage orders, adjusting wages accordingly; and if that happens, the spiral will be started again. The quarter’s rise carried the index more than two-fifths of the way to the unpegging mark. It is not gratifying; it is alarming, and the more so because this rise occurred during the low-price period of the year. Two more such gratifying jumps of the needle, and wages will be on the way to the next inflationary rise. It will be twice as high—s per cent. It will also be twice as easy.