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BATTLE FOR NORTH AFRICA

The Final Stages In Tunisia GENERAL FREYBERG’S REPORT (P.A.) WELLINGTON, June 1. “So ended the battle for North Africa, with a disaster foy the enemy comparable to Stalingrad,” Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard Freyberg, commanding ollicer of the New Zealand Division, stales in a report submitted to the Prime Minister (the Rt. Hon. P. F raser) on the final stages of the North African campaign. “The Tunis bridgehead, which the Germans had boasted £ would be held, was in our hands, and over 200,000 prisoners , and great numbers of guns, tanks, and other weapons and equip, ment of all kinds were captured. “The presence of ships of,the Royal Navy actually in the Gulf of Tunis and the continuous sweeps of Allied bomberssuccessfully discouraged any attempt at evacuation by the Italian navy, which did not put to sea. The whole Axis force in Tunis will be reported in Germany and Italy as killed, wounded, or prisoners of war.”

General Freyberg stated that the short report he was presenting on the campaign was written in Tunis just five weeks after his report sent from Gabes describing the opening phases of the desert advance. On being turned out of the Mareth Line, said General Freyberg, the enemy withdrew to a position on the Wadi Akarit, closely followed by the New Zealand Division and the Ist British Armoured Division. It soon became clear that the enemy would endeavour to hold this line, since any further withdrawal would open the way for the Blh Army to join hands with the American forces advancing from Gafsa. The position was naturally strong, with the sea on one side and impassable salt marshes on the other. A full scale frontal attack was therefore necessary, and three infantry divisions, the British 50th, the Highland 51st, and the Indian 4th were deployed for the assault. At this stage the New Zealand Division was withdrawn into reserve, and with the British Ist Armoured Division was given the role of breaking through once a breach was made. "From a nearby hill I watched the Bth Army concentrate for the attack. Continuous lines of transport were coming up the roads, and over the entire landscape, as far as the eye could see, the tanks, guns, and trucks of a motorised army were assembled. “On April 6 the attack was launched. After heavy infantry fighting, a bridgehead across the wadi was won, and the New Zealand Division, led by the armoured cars of the King’s Dragoon Guards, light tanks of the New Zealand Divisional Cavalry, and the heavy tanks of the British Bth Armoured Brigade, followed through, “As soon as there was room to manoeuvre, we opened out into desert formation and advanced north, harassing the retreating enemy, and cutting off considerable numbers. What remained of the Italian Sahara Corps, with General Mannerini and his complete staff, were amongst the prisoners,, Junction of Allied Forces "On April 7, the British armoured cars on our left met American troops advancing on Maknassi, and the junction of Allied forces from east and west, which the enemy had fought so long to prevent, was effected. “With every hour our grip on the Tunis bridgehead was tightening. Near Sfax, with more room to manoeuvre, we planned another left hook. Thri enemy, however, anticipated this danger, and retreated fast,' leaving valuable installations and stores in the Sfax area intact. Sfax was occupied on April 9, arjd Sousse on April 13. Our advancing forces met with little opposition apart from the usual enemy rearguard artillery, and. sporadic attacks from the Luftwaffe, temporarily able to bpferate more freely because we had advanced beyond the range of our fighter coyer. “The advance continued as fast as ways, could be found through very different country, from the desert to which we were accustomed. This part of our move was memorable. French people greeted our troops with great enthusiasm, throwing flowers to our men as they passed through towns decked with the flags of the Allies, “Advancing north of Sousse, we were faced by a formidable mountain chain which forms a natural rampart protecting Tunis from the south and west. Here the forces of General von Arnim and Marshal Messe (who had succeeded Marshal von Rommel) were preparing lo meet the Allied assault. Heavily reinforced, the enemy held all the important passes and dominated every way of approach to Tunis. “In front of this natural stronghold, the Bth Army deployed, linking up with the other armies under the command of General Alexander, the entire force including the most powerful air forces and the Navy, operating as a single war machine under General Eisenhower. The encircling Allied forces were in four main groups. The American corps, switched from the Gafsa front, was in the north, then the British Ist Army, then General Giraud’s French Army, and last in the south, the Bth Army. The plan was to make the main attack on the Ist Army front, where the ground favoured the use of tanks. The Bth Army’s operations were planned to pin as many enemy troops as possible on the southern sector, and thus help the main thrust in the north. A Night Operation . “ The enemy position opposite us was in great depth. The forward line lay at the base of steep hills, with positions on spurs and peaks rising behind. These highlands, rising out of a plain as fiat as a billiards table, gave the enemy a commanding position, with perfect observation over the country across which we had to attack, Surprise could only be obtained by assembling our attacking troops at night, which entailed bringing our artillery forward to the plain on the night of the attack. The guns had to remain silent until zero hour, and we knew that if we did not gain our objectives they would be overlooked, and would not he able to remain forward in daylight to support the infantry. Further difficulties for the attackers were two deep wadis, an old Roman viaduct, a minefield, and giant cactus hedges, all of which had to be dealt with by sappers and infantry before the vehicles and supporting arms could be got forward. “At midnight on April 19, the Bth Army began the Allied general offensive. which for the next three weeks raged along the whole front. This attack was carried out by the New Zealand Division and the 4th Indian Division. We were on the coastal sector, with the Indian Division on our left. We attacked with the 6th Brigade on the right, under the command of Brigadier Gentry and the sth Brigade on (he left under Brigadier Kippenberger, Our objectives were the Takrouna feature, and a long spur to the east of the point.

met. Many officers became casualties. Every commanding officer in the sth Brigade was wounded. Communica* tions broke down, and it was impossible to get clear reports of the iitu« ation. It was a night of anxiety for everybody. Could the guns be left on the plain? Were the infantry support* ing weapons getting forward? ' “A report came in that the infantry was advancing yard by yard, and even* tually we learnt that a small party .from the Maori Battalion had scaled the cliff and gained a foothold in Tak* rouna village, while the 21st and 23rd Battalions were holding firm on either side of the feature. The 21st Battalion on the left had - almost reached its objectives; but was withdrawn before daylight because its position was untenable with Takrouna untaken. "Throughout the next day, in spite of heavy fire, the flanks held, awhile in the village house-to-house hand-jo. hand fighting went on. Our foothold there vastly improved the artillery position by giving valuable observation over enemy positions, and in spite of heavy artillery fire, which- blasted the top of the rock, our observation post officers remained there all day. to direct the fire of our guns. “During the night of April.2o our line was consolidated, arid .' the Bth Brigade linked up with, the .sorely pressed sth Brigade. All night grinj fighting went on in Takrouna, and next morning an enemy pocket wai ’still holding out obstinately in houses of the village. It was finally Sniped'by a 25-pounder gun. Dower down, on the west of the hill, Takrouna vllliga remained firmly held. This position was battered by artillery all day on April 21, and towards evening parties from the 21st and 28th Maori Battalions stormed the village, taking the remnants of the garrison prisoner. Field guns, 72 machine-guns, jpjny light machine-guns, and 732 prisoners were captured, a clear indication Of the strength of the position. ' - ‘ , Maintaining Pressure ’ “The capture of the Takrouna feature left us firmly established in a-line which constituted an immediate threat to the rest of the enemy's -Enftdavillf line. The Bth Army’s role at. this stags was to maintain pressure all along the front, and keep a large enemy force fully engaged on our-sector. On April 24 and 25 the 6th Brigade, under Bnga. dier Parkinson, with tanks-and the Bth Armoured Brigade in support, carried but two night advances, and captured several more features, which increased still further the dent in the enemy line. The enemy reacted violently.' but despite counter-attacks, and very intense artillery and mortar fire, our salient was firmly held. ' . “Meanwhile, In the rtrirth,’’ the Ist Army attack had been launched on April. 23,, and after extremely heavy fighting on the following days, important heights were captured, and (1)6 enemy’s line beaten back. At the end / i of the first week of our offensive no weakness had been revealed- In th* ! enemy defences on either the IsLfif/ Bth Army fronts, and we had nowhirecaptured the enemy main Uni of re*, sistance. Our losses had been aavar*. and it was obvious that more haavy blows would have to be struck before we could break through. “On the Enfldaville front,, thenatur* of the country made It iipppsfible to gain penetration of more than a few miles in a single successful attack; but on the Ist Army-'front the. topography was more favourable, It was at this stage that the Allied forces were regrouped for an all-out attack ,on the Ist Army sector by two infantry divisions and two armoured divisions, assisted by simultaneous advances in the north and south by American and French forces. The New Zealand Division was relieved from the Tilt* rouna front to support French opera* tions in the direction .of Pont du Jabs. Defence Crumbles “The new attack in the north .could not have been unexpected: but iindw the weight of the combined blow of the infantry and armoured division* of the Ist and Bth Armies, supported by very powerful artillery and air forces, the enemy defence crumbled, and front north to south the Allies advancedThe collapse was so sudden that commanders suspected a trap; but it soon became clear that the enemy had be* come completely disorganised, Ttmll and Bizerte were occupied, and our armoured divisions swept across th* base of the Cape Bon peninsula be* fore the enemy could regroup to f*CO them. “On the southern flank of this at* tack, New Zealand artillery had been very active, supporting the French, and the sth Brigade had made three nigh] advances, capturing prisoners and equipment. “In an enemy counter-attack In this front a company of the 28th Maori Battalion was surrounded, and had to fight its way out. Next morning they coun-ter-attacked, retook the position, and captured 75 prisoners—a characteristic operation to end the New Zealand Division’s part in the battle. • . “Allied success in the north had made the position of a large force of positional infantry on our front most precarious. On May 11 we sent a letter back with a German prisoner to General Graf von Sponeck. commander of the 90th Light Division, pointing out that further resistance was uselessHe refused to surrender unconditionally. but did so the next day, when hi* headquarters was attacked from w* rear by a British armoured division. Commanders Surrender “On May 12 we picked up a wireless message to us from Marshal Mease. Emissaries from both the German ana Italian commanders came in to our lines, and Marshal Messe, complete with staff, surrendered unconditionally to me on May 13. With him came I General Liebenstein. commanding tne I German 164 th Division. ... ", "Resistance now ceased, and wnu® | flags appeared everywhere. M?ny o' -- the prisoners from the enemy nrs arm’ - were collected by British forces sinking south from the Cape Bon peninsula; but another 31,558 were taken on our corps’ front.” General Freyberg concluded! conclusion of this North African campaign, I want to place on record in deep admiration I feel for the munificent qualities and great work done oy a’l ranks under my command. « have been fighting continuously for almost a year, battle after battle, Wltn little respite, on hard rations, and W r supplies of indifferent water. Tbe e durance and courage of all ranks una conditions of great discomfort andP® have been beyond praise, and their* source, good humour, and wisdom made them ideal material for a is moving, hard-hitting force such a “The division has never failed in any of ihe difficult and . ardous missions it has. been se o £ v no one realises as I do how muon m j have achieved. No commander ever been better served."

“Following behind our infantry were the tanks of the British Bth Armoured Brigade, under Brigadier Harvey, ready to go through at first light. “At the appointed hour the infantry went forward behind a heavy artillery barrage from our field and medium artillery, and the guns of other formations under Brigadier Weir. On the right the 6th Brigade made good progress. meeting only slight opposition, and German troops from the 90th Light Division left Enfidaville without fighting. "On the left, however, the sth Brigade met fierce resistance. Takrouna was a rocky crag, surmounted by a village which, from the plain.below, looked like some medieval castle. It had been turned into a fortress, the bastion of the enemy’s Enfidaville line, and as we learnt latfer from prisoners, it was considered by the enemy to bo impregnable. The fighting here was as hard as any experienced in the whole campaign. The most intense fire was

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/CHP19430602.2.27

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23963, 2 June 1943, Page 2

Word count
Tapeke kupu
2,366

BATTLE FOR NORTH AFRICA Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23963, 2 June 1943, Page 2

BATTLE FOR NORTH AFRICA Press, Volume LXXIX, Issue 23963, 2 June 1943, Page 2

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