BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

Press, Volume LXXIV, Issue 22507, 15 September 1938, Page 10

BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

How Public Opinion Stands

PEACE, BUT NOT AT ANY PRICE

It is impossible for anyone to summarise fairly and briefly British public opinion on foreign policy. This is not due only to the fact that there are different sections and shades of public opinion, in Britain as everywhere else. It is due even more to the fact that the great mass of British • public opinion—again, no doubt, like public opinion in other countries —is voiceless, except on certain broad and vital issues, and in moments of critical urgency.

British opinion has indeed been in a peculiar state of fluidity during the last two years or so. The difficulties of tha League have left it unsettled, a restless camp, waiting for effective leadership—sufficiently decisive, powerful, and appealing, to constitute a banner under which the main body could march.

Its readiness to accept a clear lead has been unmistakably shown during the last few months by the response to the speeches of Mr Chamberlain and Sir John Simon on slovakia. The dispatches that have been cabled in the last few days make it quite obvious that both in his emphasis on peaceful settlement of the Czech problem, and in his warning against the consequences of aggression. Sir John spoke with the voice of the British people. The British people have had enough of indecision and “sealed lips” within the last few years; their first need now is plain dealing. Principles and* Opinion But the lead that they ask cannot be given by anyone who shouts louder than his fellows. It. must conform with certain broad principles on which public opinion has established itself during the last generation. For public opinion cannot be made in a day, and the state of public opinion in Great Britain at the present moment is a product of many years of growth and education.

Those broad principles are four in number. First in point of logical order, not necessarily first as regards its weight and influence, comes the recognition of material national interests. The greatest interest of any nation is its own preservation, which for Great Britain implies a vita! strategic concern with what happens in at least the neighbouring countries of Europe. The second basic principle is the acceptance of a world-wide responsibility for the maintenance of fair and peaceful dealing between nations. This vital element' in the British tradition is based, partly on the- world-wide sweep cf Great Britain’s own economic and other material interests, partly on the existence of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and partly on the.belief that war anywhere endangers peace everywhere. The third basic principle is the education that British opinion has received since 1918 in the doctrines of the League of .Nations. For the wholeof those 20 years, no rival policy ha? possessed anything like the appeal, nor anything like the same machinery for making its appeal, week in and week out, to the man and woman in the street. The climax of this League education came with the episode of the Peace Ballot, shortly before the ortbreak of the Abyssinian war. • Peace a British Interest To these there must be added a fourth princip*. This is the faith of British people in free institutions, and their determination to protect them against the totalitarian forces by which thry are assailed from Left and Right. The doctrine of the so-called “ideological war” is not accepted by the mass of the British public; but they realise, bv both reason and instinct, that the right of men to govern themselves is a common interest that binds the democracies close together.

Those whose memories carry them to pre-war flays say—and it is undoubtedly true—rthat the nation is more united on fundamentals than it was in 1914. Its response to a dear and distinctively British lead is vibrant in its power and unanimity. It will be everyone’s prayer that the comparison with 1914 does not prove too apt. '

All these four principles can be welded together into a single system. The focal point at which they all come

Mr H. V. Hodson, editor of the “Round Table, discusses in this article the reactions of British public opinion to the British Government’s foreign policy and particularly to us han iOg of the Czech-German dispute. He finds in the reception of Sir John Simon’s recent speech evidence of a growing willingness to accept vigorous leadership. The article is published by arrangement with the “Sydney Morning Herald, m winch it first appeared. [By. H. V. HODSON.]

together is the supreme national interest in the maintenance of world peace. At this point there is a complete union of interests and ideals. World peace is not merely the first objective of the League of Nations system, it is the first of the selfish national interests of Great Britain herself, since all the others depend upon it-. As for Great Britain s world-wide responsibility for the defence, not only of British people, but also of Britisa standards of international conduct, it becomes more onerous with every assault upon peace, even over issues'|hat are not of immediate vital interest'-.to Finally, the development of freedom and free institutions is wrapped up with the maintenance of world peace. Because Great Britain's supreme interest is. peace and because opinions differ about the wisdom and effectiveness of threatening war as a means of maintaining peace, curious dilemmas arise in British policies and British thought We are as familiar with bellicose pacifists as we are with timid jingoes. In the days when the League of Nations was at its strongest these dilemmas, if not resolved, were hidden from view. They have come right to the front now that collective security, instead of providing a sure guarantee against war, for thoso participating in it, may actaally extend their risk of being involved in war, at least on the shorter view.

Dislike of New Risks It is not the purpose of- this article to discuss the merits or demerits of co l lective securitv. But one of the plain facts about British public opinion is a hesitation to atocept fresh risks of war. when war is so grim and immediate a terror for every citizen. From this there derives a reluctance to renew universal and automatic pledges to go to war whenever aggression may occur. This hesitation is not in the least incompatible with a sense of disquiet, rising to disgust, about the share of British statesmen in the responsibility for bringing about the breakdown of the League and the present international dangers. This feeling about the past is. I believe, sometimes misinterpreted by newspapers and politicians, as necessarily implying a desire to resume the old policy under the new circumstances. It would be untrue to say that Britain has abandoned the old policy. Eut its mind is today by a grim but healthy realism, which'repudiates vague formulae and cqusllv repudiates mere bluff. 'We have enough of both. This grim realism expresses itself most clearly in our great rearmament programme, involving as it does heavy sacrifices from all classes.’ In this spirit. British opinion combines a growing unreadi- , l ess to fight other peoples’ battles all ■ over the world with a recognit : on that ' the threats to world peace must be vigorously faced, that indecision is dangerous, and that Great Britain herself may at any moment be called upon to make an obstinate stand. On these points, there is complete agreement.

Fundamental Unity Dominion students of . the. British press and Parliament will doubtless have been impressed by the apparently irreconcilable • differences over r-uch issues as Spain, the AngloTtalian Pact, and so on. These are indeed important matters, especially in British internal political rivalries. But there is no doubt whatever of the unanimity of British opinion on three points: That the nation must be as strong as its resources allow; that it is wise to go to great lengths in conciliation before falling back on the barren concept of inevitable war. and that a firm and uncompromising stand must be made when the limits of concession have been reached.