America's Naval Policy.

Press, Volume LXIII, Issue 19177, 7 December 1927, Page 10

America's Naval Policy.

We print this morning a summary of a message from the President of the United States to Congress. It is always difficult to tell whether Mr Coolidge is saying something or just speaking, and at a first reading this utterance seems to, be as politely vacuous as some others that the President has made. Actually it conveys an important announcement of America's future naval policy. Referring to the breakdown of the Three Power naval conference, Mr Coolidge says: " Every- " one knew that had a Three Power " agreement been reached, it would " have left us with the necessity of continuing our building programme. "Failure to agree should not cause us "to build either more or less than we "otherwise should have. Any future "treaty limitation will call on us for "more ships." This can only mean that America is going ahead with her naval building programme irrespective of what other Powers are doing, and it seems to mean that the " Big Navy " party in Congress has overridden those whose slogan is " Coolidge and Econ- " omy." Britain, after the failure of the Geneva conference, made it clear that she had no intention of embarking on a programme of competitive building, but Mir Coolidge makes it quite clear that America will take no cognisance of our good intentions or allow them to influence her .actions. "Lack"ing a definite agreement," he says, "the attitude of any other country is " not permitted to alter our own "policy." America, in short, is going ahead to build a navy second to none, whatever the rest of the world may think or do. Unfortunately the President's claim that America has "put "away the Old World policy of com"petitive armaments" and is actuated solely by a desire for "adequate national defence" is mere pious nonsense. What constitutes "adequate " national defence " obviously depends on how strong other Powers are, so that the distinction between "competitive" and " defensive " building is a distinct tion without a difference. And although we cannot very well condemn America for adopting this new policy, we are well within our rights in asking why, with such a programme up his sleeve, Mr Coolidge called the Geneva naval conference. It is America's own fault if the world suspects that she regarded the conference simply as an opportunity for getting the other Powers to recognise her right to a naval strength she had already decided