The Press Wednesday, June 10, 1925. Waimakariri River Trust.

Press, Volume LXI, Issue 18404, 10 June 1925, Page 8

The Press Wednesday, June 10, 1925. Waimakariri River Trust.

Tho election of a member of the WaiEiver Trust to-day to fill a vacancy in the southern representation will serve to recall the present position —almost plight—of the City in the matter of flood insurance in comparison with what it was until two or three years ago, when the old South Waimakariri Eiver BoaTd suffered extinction and a now controlling body, the present Trust, was created. For over half a century the defenco of the City from [ Waimakariri flood incursions over the I south banks • was conducted with outstanding efficiency and with an economy which the general body of City ratepayers perhaps never realised until the boon had gone. It was only in the early days of the old Eiver Board 4hat a rato was imposed over the area lying to tho southward of the river, including the City, to meet the cost of the protoctivo works established along the southern bank. Thereafter, the income from reserves, provided originally by the Provincial Council for the purpose, proved sufficient...to construct that chain of fortifications which upheld the iflood waters and allowed the pcoplo of Christchurch to sleep in peace. The very success: of the operations of the old Eiver Board was really the cause of its ultimate immolation. It was claimed by the people. of tho north bank districts that the river, by reason of the works established along the south bank, was being, thrown in all its flood fury against the very lightly protected northern bank; that many. acres of land fringing the northern bank had fallen into the stream by the sconring forces at work; and that,by reason of the/dislodgment of so vast a quantity of shingle the bed of the river was being raised to a level higher than that of its northern banks, and a calamitous break through might occur at any time. All this gave rise to the idea of creating an authority to control both banks of the river, and tho .> inspections, conferences, and negotiations which marked the course of tho development of that idea became finalised in the Act which effected the change. By the terms'of i that Act the southern district, and the City in particular, parted with much moro than would seem to be, equitable, yet no voice of,complaint waß heard until the first rate levy startled everybody. Nobody can blame the north bank people for getting all they could out of the change, but the Eiver Board of that period which conducted tho negotiations for tho southern district and the City shdwed no inclination to take the public or the City Council into its confidence when developments were taking so unfavourable a turn, and when a properly conducted agitation would have affected materially the whole tenor of the Bill. Still more surprising was it that ihe City members of Parliament accepted, apparently without protest, a measure imposing so heavy an additional burden on their own constituencies., By the Act one large combined rating district was constituted, north and south in place of two independent districts, each to look after its own bank" of the river, such as was certainly proposed during the course of the negotiations. Tho result was that on a total rating' of £20,000,' no less than v £ 18,729 had to be provided by the southern districts, which had already established and paid for their own protective works. That allocation in collecting the rate levies will continuo to operate until the Act is amended, notwithstanding the fact that tho bulk of the money will have to be spent to fortify tho northern bank—across the river from the City. ,The constitution of the Trust itself conferred no favour on tho City or tho southern district, and at present it rests with the chairman, a Government official, to say whether or not the district which contributes £18,729 from a total rate levy of £20,465 should exercise a dominance. Until the Act can be amended in the direction of giving the southern district, and especially the City (which provides £14,947 out of the £18,729 contributed by the southern district), a measure of representation more in harmony with its obligations, the southern ratepayers should certainly elect as their representatives the men who are the most likely to fight for equity for their district. In the selection of a candidate to-day that important phase should not be overlooked. A movement to amend the present constitution, and if necessary the present powers of the Trust, can be3t Tae inaugurated from within the Trust itself, and if the movement is so to start from within there must be tho men there with the necessary enterprise and capacity. We will pay the northern district this compliment: that what they now enjoy in the matter of river protection at small cost to themselves they owe almost entirely to the enterprise and capacity of tfceir own representatives.

The Struggle for North Africa. It must havo been clear to all who have read the cable news critically that the French so far have had the worst of the fighting in Morocco. To-day's news indeed suggests that the case is a good deal worse than that, though we must allow for the fact that modern generals have to fight on a home and a foreign front simultaneously.* The French Government is in a worse corner even than the French army, and the thought that he might be refused reinforcements—if not ordered to withdraw altogether—is bound to colour the communiques of the "Moroccan Commander. The fact remains, however, that "the pressure is increasing at "various points" weeks after the world had been assured that the tribesmen were about to be taught the folly of crossing tho French line, and that in itself must ha%'c started hopes in Abdu'l Karim which he would not have entertained a month ago. It is the French and the French only now who stand in Abdu'l's way, and it docs not require any knowledge of him or of them, of the spirit of Islam or of the methods or aini3 of French colonisation, to know that getting tho French out of the way is the purpose, concealed or revealed, of the whole Eiffian host. What is not so easily settled is the correct attitude for our own nation. We are friends both of France and of Islam, but it is not always the case that wo are anxious to see our friends gain too much power. If the French not only hold their ground, but in the end scatter the tribesmen to the four winds, the result' must be the substitution of French for Spanish control in what is now the Spanish zone. And that zone theoretically at least controls the Strait of Gibraltar: in the event of a war between Britain and France it could be so fortified, and its harbours used with such effect by submarines, that Gibraltar itself would be useless. If on the other hand tho French yield to the pressure of tho tribesmen, and do not again recover the initiative, we shall havo an independent Moslem State, created by force of arai3 and in fiat defiance of Christendom, to bo a standing cause of unrest throughout the whole Moslem world. Perhaps the biggest danger in the situation is that vaguely hinted at in one of to-day's cable- messages, viz., that Abdu'l Karim may bo content with a good deal less than he is now believed to be working for. If he declares a general war on Western civilisation the challenge will b6 accepted. If he is content with terms, demanding no more than the independence of his own people, the result may be far more serious in the end than a sharp campaign to a finish would be now. It is a fact as someone has pointed out that if the tribesmen provoke the French too far, Britain will,not bo able to help them, while they will be doing great injury to her. • /