DIVORCE CASE.

Press, Volume LVIII, Issue 17471, 3 June 1922, Page 2

DIVORCE CASE.

"GUILTY PARTY" PETITION. In the Supreme Court, in divorce, yesterday, before Mr Justice Adams, Alexander Reid (Mr C. S. Thomas), petitioned for the dissolution of his marriage with Barbara Reid, on the ground that the parties had been judicially separated for the time prescribed by Section 4 of the 1920 Act (as modified by Section 2 of the 1922 Act. Mr L. A. Charles appeared for respondent on the question of alimony. Respondent had filed an answer to the petition, but now withdrew it and raised no opposition to tne granting ot J a decree. Petitioner, in his evidence, put in a ' certified copv of the order making absolute the decree of judicial separation. His Honour said that the grounds for the decree of judicial separation was the adultery of the respondent (the petitioner in tne matter now before the Court) who now petitioned for the dissolution of the marriage on the ground that the decree of judicial separation existed and continued in force. The Court was asked to divorce the wife because that decree of judicial separation had been pronounced. In effect that meant that in every case where a man had committed adultery and his wife obtained a decree for judicial separation and no further fr.cts were shown, the person guilty of adultery could come to the Court, at the end of three years, and ask for a divorce on his adultery. His Honour said that he was not at all clear that, under the discretion granted t'>o Court under Section 4 of the 1920 Act, such a result should be brought about, Section 2 of the 1922 Act (quoted by his Honour)' put a limitation on the discretion granted under the 1920 Act, though it did not limit the discretion granted to refuse on other grounds. Was counsel prepared to satisfy the Court that in the circumstances of the present petition relief should be granted to the adulterous party? Mr Thomas: I am prepared to do that.

His Honour: What grounds do you adduce? Is it in the public interest to grant a divorce in these circumstances P Mr Thomas submitted that Section 2 of the 1922 Act gave the respondent in the present petition power to come be. fore the Court and say why she considered the divorce should not be granted His Honour remarked that she had power prior to the passing of the 1922 _\ c t—that was shown in Mason v. -Mason » •

Mr Thomas admitted that he could not find the distinction which gave the wrong-doer the right to obtain a divorce ; yet where parties had been separated on the ground of cruelty, the guilty party had succeeded in a petition iOr diwnlution of marriage. His Honour remarked that the present petition raised the question in its strongest form. Mr Thomas said that there was only one group of persons to be considered — the wife and children—and- they had the right to come to Court and show that the guilty party ought not to succeed. But the question remained: Why should these people live together—why keep a man and woman held if they were at arm's length?. His Honour said that the ground of public interest was that it was not in ihe public interest that spouses who had become estranged should be kept together in matrimony. , The question was whether the public interest'was-con-cerned in practically rewarding an adulterous husband.

Mr Thomas said that he knew that in the present case the respondent was tired of the business, and if the petitioner did not succeed, the respondent would petition. His Honour: Well, surely, that would have been the better course to bring the matter before- the Court by the innocent party. There is always a certain amount of opportunity for the suggestion of discredit when a woman is said to be divorced —that is divorced by a decree fought by lier husband. That is a matter, I suppose, that doesn't concern me. I want to consider the matter fully before deciding one way or another. The better course would haive been to have conformed to the decencies of life and that the divorce should be given to the innocent wife rather than the guilty husband. Mr Charles said that he had been instructed in the matter by Mr Olliyer and was not entirely conversant with the facts. The reason an answer was filed was to bring the question of alimony to a head and the petitioner was now prepared to pay £250 further alimony; that being so, the respondent, apparently, had decided not to go on with her answer. . His Honour reserved his decision.