The Conscientious Objector.

Press, Volume LIV, Issue 16256, 5 July 1918, Page 6

The Conscientious Objector.

In the course of his address to the Synod at Wellington on Tuesday the Bishop of Wellington dealt at some length with the problem of the conscientious objcctor, and although ho has not solved the problem to his own satisfaction —seoing, indeed, "no wholly "satisfactory way out of the great, "dilemma"—he uncovered some truths which it is well that the community, and especially the conscientious objectors themselves, should bo required to recognise. Dr. Sprott opens his lucid and penetrating analysis by stating the problem, and hero ho corrects the inaccurate statement that the conflict is between "the conscience of the indi"vidual" and "the force of the State." For "State" should be substituted "community," and for "force" should be substituted "conscience." There can bo in a community a general unanimity of moral Convictions, which is to say, a conscience, of the community, and it must be admitted that with the community the waging of the present war can be, and in fact Is, a matter of conscience. The problem must, bo amended to run—tho conscience of the individual versus the conscience of tho community. This does not make the solution of the problem any easier, but when the real nature of the issue is thus understood, appeals to prejudice on behalf of tho conscientious objector will cpaso to have much effect. Dr. Sprott then examines the question, what is conscience? It is a single word ..denoting a double fact— the faculty of moral judgment, and tho authority, expressing itself in our inner sense of obligation, which tells us we ought to do what wo have judged to be right. This faculty and this authority are not identical, nor have they the same origin. Tho judgment, tho decision, is a man's own, and it is entitled to respect exactly in proportion to tho amount of pains taken to form it and the quality of the judicial faculty brought to bear. Tho process of right judgment is not easy, and is impeded by "foes in our own household, preju- " dices, passions, self-interests, habits " of inattention, hopes, fears, loves, "hates." The defence of a conscientious objection to assisting in the war is not the easy matter some people suppose, as Dr. Sprott makes clear in his discussion of the tests 'that can be insisted upon. Since the objector is dissenting from the general conscience he must be prepared to show on what ground he assumes himself to be bettor informed than his fellows, or to show that he has good reason, to believe ho is free from those infirmities of judgment which beset other men. Further, wo have a right to remember, in considering him —and he is also bound to remember—how liable one's moral judgment is to be perverted in a matter which arises, not as an abstract question of ethics, but as an intimate and personal question. "How clear of head "and pure of heart," Dr. Sprott says, " he must bo who would deal simply " and honestly with that question. How "he must suspect any solution that " would tell him he need not make the " dread sacrifice, nay, that conscience " forbids him to make it." Tho Bishop also wonders whether the conscientious objector has given full consideration to his indebtedness to the community. This indebtedness includes • much more than shelter, food, and tho means of lirinjr in safety and oomfort, for, as Dr. Sprott points out, a man living in a modern civilised society owes to it also his language, his intellectual supports, his very conscience, and his religious life. Finally, thero is the point thae the honour of conscience is at stake in tho controversy, and genuino conscientious objectors should welcome all regulations of the State which prevent the championshjp of conscience becoming too attractive. When he turns to the attitude that the community should adopt, Dr. Sprott finds it most important to lay stress upon tho importance of maintaining tho integrity of the individual conscience, a point that is indeed stressed again and again by history. He can suggest no completely

satisfactory way out of the difficulty, and offers as a working compromise the placing of the conscientious objector under tho civil authority, which should be empowered to ©xercise the strictest discipline and to enforce the rendering of services of real value to the community. Although Dr. Sprott expressly declares himself unable to find a way out of the dilemma, and offers only a limited mitigation of the difficulty, yet his address is of real value, for it destroys a pernicious fallacy that has hitherto persisted throughout the discussion. That fallacy is tho claim, asserted or implied, that the conscientious objectors have a monopoly of conscience, grievance, and righteousness of opinion. It is well that the public and tho objectors should bo reminded that the community has a grievance, that its conscience is in this quarrel as much affronted as the objectors', and that its claim to righteousness of opinion and action is as sound at least as the coun-tcr-claim.