NOTES AND COMMENTS.

Press, Volume LIV, Issue 16252, 1 July 1918, Page 8

NOTES AND COMMENTS.

The intended despatch to Italy of & battalion of American troops has, no doubt, been decided upon more for the moral than the military value of tho reinforcement, which is, of course, too small to possess any material importance. ' The battalion will, however, be living concrete evidence of America's presence in the war, and of her sympatny for Italy, and as Buch its value will be very great. This will be all the greater because, as we mentioned tho other day, there are thousands of men in the Italian Army who have worked in the United States, and many thousands more with relatives living in' America. President Wilson recently told an interesting story in proof of this fact-V When Mr Baker, the American Secretary of War, was lately in Italy, a member of the Italian Government invited him to go up to any troop train .and ask in English how I many of tho men on board had been in America. Mr Baker tried the experiI ment. He went up to a troop train and said, "How many of you boys have been in America?" It seemed to him, I he told the President, that half of 1 them sprang up: "Me from San Francisco; me from New York, and all over," and so on. There was part, of the heart of America in the Italian Army, commented President Wilson — "people who had been knitted to us by association, who had lived among ns, and > worked shoulder to shoulder with us, and now, friends of America, were fighting for their native Italy. Friendship," ho concluded, "is the only cement that will eve* hold the world together." One forecast of the coming. German offensive places it against the American front, between Montdidier and Chateau Thierry, where the enemy have already had a taste of the "Sammies' " quality. So far,.it can bo said that wherever the Germans have met the Americans, the latter have scored, at far less cost than the enemy. The Germans, so Renter's ; correspondent at the front believeSj will ; dislike them as much as they dislike the British colonial troops, and, poss- : ibly, a little more, because tho American Army includes many men of German names and ancestry. A company of Americans, who were marching to the front, on meeting some German prisoners being taken to the rear lines, are 1 said to have assailed them trenchantly and abusively in German for their obe- | dience to the Kaiser, and for making themselves the scum of the earth by their fighting methods, so that their , American brethren had to come four thousand miles to wipe them out. The prisoners were too amazed to reply. A cable message in this issue discusses candidly the cause of the Austrian failure on the Italian front. The l critic, whoever he is, holds that the

Austrians weakened their offensive by attacking on too broad a front. An operation on such a vast scale demanded the employment of a huge number of troops, and though tho enemy may have had anything from a. million and a to a million arid a half of men at his disposal, the nature of the terrain would prevent his making use of more than a part of his force at any one time. Tho wise distribution and rapid handling of the Italian reserves have already been noted as among the most successful features of tho Italian military organisation.

Some of tho fuller reports by correspondents on tho Italian front give incidents of some gallant fighting? A case in point was the relief of a small British detachment which had been left on the crest o£a liill 3000 ft to guard the retirement from ati awkward salient of tho main body. Austrians, outnumbering the defenders by ten to one, tried to overwhelm them, but were held at bay. Then the commander ol a detachment of Alpini near by, decided to relieve tho British, saying to his men, i''Wo would be too late if any but British bulldogs were defending that position, and any but Alpini Chamois were rushing to reach theni." Tho Italians thereupon dashed forward, cheering for England, and wore received bv the British with shouts for Italy. The British commander, leaped out of his trench and ordered a charge in face of which tho Austrians bro'ce and fled. At another time the enemy penetrated to the battalion headquarters on the right of the British line. Tho officer in command, however, collected the cooks :ind camp liands and drove out the enemy, capturing several of his guns.

It is old news that the Italian strategic position throughout the war has been unfavourable. Colonel Repington said as much months ago. As he said, the Allied lino in Italy is not drawn at all as a soldier would have drawn it. It was stated, indeed; soon after the Piave-Asiago line—now held again by Italy—was taken up that General Cadorna, then Commander-in-Chief of the Italian armies, indicated a desire to retire still further, so as to get a better front. He was reported as saying that if he couldtrotire to the Adige the task of defencefsvoul'i be easier and the chances of a? great counter-offensive succeeding would be much greater. To have dono that, however, would have been to leave Venice and other cities of the Venetian Plain to the tender mercies of the enemy, and one can imagine how t'ie Italians would have felt and what the civilised world would have said if that had been done. It was no doubt owing to the threat to Venice that the Italian Government would not permit a further retirement. The present Italian lino, with pll its military defects, is tho price that Italy pays for the ability to defend Venice.

The reason why the line is wrong, it has been explained, is that it forms a blunt angle at Mon Fenera, where the mountain front in the north meets the Piavo 'front in the oast, so that the enemy are in a position to make the enveloping thrusts of which they ace so fond, one against the mountain line and one against tho river. With the defence disposed in such a fashion, if either front gives way the forces on the other must at once retire, and are in danger of being cut off completely. The advance on the Isonzo w;as really a movement across part of the enemy's front, and was therefore full of risk, thongh the eventual catastropho which caused the Italian retreat did not originato, as it might have done, from the flank. But that Italy may oo unable to .exploit her recent victory just now, the value of that victory is very great, if for no other reason for the disintegrating moral effect it must have on Austria-Hungary.