THE GERMAN ARMY.

Press, Volume L, Issue 15047, 15 August 1914, Page 14

THE GERMAN ARMY.

SERIOUS DEFECTS ALLEGED.

DISREGARD OF FIRE EFFECTS

CONTEMPT FOR OTHERS ARMIES.

It ie interesting to recall now the very unfavourable criticisms passed on the German Army in 1911 by tho military correspondent of ''The Times," after witnessing tho numoruvros of that vcar. This, correspondent's viowß carry groat weight, and tho article caused a sensation. JHSTAKE3 IN HIGHER LEADING.

"The German General Staff is so concerned with tho spectacular success of | Kniscnnanover that it allows encouragement of initiative to sink into the jeocond place, 1 ' he wrote. "On the other hand, it gains what it desires; general actions take place at the ap-} pointed places and hoars; the staff, gains European credit for the- satisfactory co-operation of all arms; and the German reporters go away happy in the belief that all is for the best'in the best of all possible armies. There was j nothing in_ the higher leading at tho manoeuvres of a distinguished character, and mistakes wero committed which tended to shake the confidence of foreign spectators in the reputation of tho command. The staff work, though usually good, was not by any means above suspicion. The infantry lacked dash, displayed no knowledgo of the use of ground, entrenched themselves badly, wore extremely slow in thoir movements, offered vulnerable, targets at medium rait&es-p ignored tho service vt security, performed the approach marches in an old-time. manner, were not trained to understand the connei- ' ion between fire and movement, and ' seemed totally unaware of the effect of I modern fire. The cavalry drilled well and showed some beautifully-trained ' horses, while tho Cavalry of the Guard l was well handled from the Army point of view, but the arm was in many ways exceedingly- old-fashioned, the scouting was bad, and mistakes wore made of winch our Yeomanry would bo ashamed, j The Artillery, with its out-of-date ma- J terial and slow aijd ineffective rnetbocs ! of fire, appeared inferior that it can have no pretensions to measuro itsolf j against the French on anything ap? j proaching level terms. Finally, tho' dirigibles and aeroplanes, presented the fourth arm in a relatively, unfavourable light. TLe German Army, apart from its numbers, confidence in itself, and high state of organisation, does not prefcent any eigne 01 superiority over tho

best foreign modole, and in some wave does not riso above tho levol of the accond-rato ,>■ CONFIDENCE OF THE ARMY. "The confidence of the German Army in itself is in one sensa a source of strength and in another of weaknessIt wQI doubtless enable tho army and the nation to embark upon a war with a firm belief in victory, but all the greater -n-ill be the disillusionment if victory is not speedily obtained. Tho methods by which the Germans sedulously propagate in foreign countries the idea that Gorman arms are invincij ble are useful in their way, for they | enable German diplomacy to secure by peaceful means rosults which would otherwiso only bo obtaiued by great sacrifices in war. There seems no reason to douoc that the Emperor himself firmly believes in the superiority oi J Gorman arms and in tho ability of tho I German Army to crash all opposition. I Tho sharpness' of the German sword and I the weight of the Gcvrman fist are well- ! known figures in Imperial speeches. It is possible that Germany may possess, officers who recognise that the over- ! weening confidence of the German Army lis not wholly warranted by the facts of I tho case, but it seems likely that up I tr> a comparatively recent dato there j were none who cared to risk their ! careers by uttering unpalatable and in(convenient truths. From highest to J lowest the word p.-.sses that everything { military in Germany is superlatively j excellent, and that nothing which takes ] T?lnce in foreign armies is worth troubling about. A STALE ARMY. 'Tho German Army appears to tho, writer to have trained itself stale. Year in. year out, the same ceaseless round of intensive training has reduced the whole army to a machino by whiph individuality, initiative, and freshness have been rigorously crushed out. The effort to create initiative by regulation has not succeedod. The training of the year, always tho same, has become a form of somnambulism. Everybody does tho same thing every hour of every day every year, and officers who have to wait 16 or 17 years for their companies aro spent and tired long before they rise to high command. Tho majority of senior regimental officers do not possess tho physical qualifications necessary for effective service during tho arduous strain of the infantry fight, and until the cadres are rejuvenated these conditions will remain unaltered. Thero are some great thinkers and some hard workers among the officers, hut the impression conveyed is that only a select few really work, that all individuality has been crushed out of the iank and file, and that both absolutely, and still more relatively, the Gorman Army is not so good as its forerunner which achieved the union of the German States. 'A bloody war and a eickly season'—that venerable toast of our port-drinking ancestors—might reinvigorate the army or might destroy it. Failing such extrerao measures, tho best thing to restore new life to tho army would be to disband it for a year jn order to givo everybody, from top to bottom a. muchneeded Test. Tho German Army is still a great and a formidable machine. No one should .entertain any illusion on this subject. In numbers, in organisation, and in the absorption of all the best dements of the State for its own ends, it has few if any equals. But it asserts a claim of superior efficiency, and the proofs which it gave at the Kaiser-manover of 1911 to substantiate this claim were not convincing. A PEACE-BRED ARMY. "Tho Gorman Army iias seen less ot modern war than any other army which stands in the front xa.uk. It practises and carries on from year to year, witn. far too ecaut regard for. modern progress, tho methods which wore good enough in their day, but are 110 longer practicable under the nro of modern arms. Theory may recognise that great aftd even fundamental onangea aro required in tactics and m training to meet tho now conditions with success, but all evidence chows that an army , which has not been tried in the fare is constitutionally unable to profit by the experience of others and to adapt itself to tho ordeal of modern war. Most of all is this true of the German Army, which, supposes itself to bo tho military salt of the earth, and fondly believes that it will havo no difficulty in carrying out military operations which other people and. other armies have discovered to bo impracticable.. For the cause of true progress, no attitude could be more fatal. No other modern army displays such profound contempt for tho effect of modem fire. Were this contempt duo to the proved superiority of German troops over others, there would be something to bo said for it, but the military history of Prussia and the Federal States did not begin, nor will it end. with the war of 1870-71. Viewing military history as a whole, wo do not find that German arm 9 have greater triumphs to their credit than those of Britain and of France. The contempt which the German Army displays for tho effects of, modern fire, and professes to hold for tho armies of rival States, with which it may come in conflict, can only be set down to ignoranco and to nothing else.

DISREGARD OF EFFECT OF FIRE

"Not by any arm, nor by the etatf, is tho effect of modern nre taken into account. Cavalry scout with blissful disregard of it, and trot about within dose, range of * hostile infantry, while regiments bump along a high road into hostile entrenchments as if it wore all in the work, and not the least likely to end in annihilation. Infantry masses are seen in beautiful but vulnerable array exposed to the firo of guns at long and medium ranges, whilo in the closer fire-nght ground is disregarded, firing lines lie out in thick swarms upon tho open, machine-guns seldom seek cover, and mounted otncers ride up and down with dignity as they would in tho shady avenues of the Thiergnrten. The artillery, it is true, has this year for the first time betaken itself to cover, but on tUe first excuse comes up to the forward crest of its position, and slogs away merrily with every gun in view. The huge military escort of Princes, generals, and guests which follow the Emperor stations itself conspicuously in the midst of this gala Army, and appears to cover the whole display with the mantle of Imperial consent. •' IN 1913—N0 CHANGE. The samo correspondent in wrote: —"Broadly speaking,there is no evidence of any marked change in _ the principles which have hitherto guided German military administrators, nor in the strategical use of the great army which has been fashioned with such splendid continuity of purpose during the past forty years."