ORGANISATION OF THE GERMAN ARMY.

Press, Volume L, Issue 15047, 15 August 1914, Page 13

ORGANISATION OF THE GERMAN ARMY.

The first head shows that the German Army will be mobilised in 25 army corps, -with probably 11 cavalry dwidons, or possibly 14. These will be divided into armies of three, four, or five Army corps and two ox three cavalry divisions each, each under so army commander, who is as a rule the Inspector-General in peace of the group ef army corps forming his command in war. There may be formed a cavalry corps of two or three divisions, under

the supreme command, and nob attached to any army. Each army corps, except the Guard in Berlin recruited generally, is.located in peace either in one of the provinces of Prussia, or in the larger of the other States forming the German Empire. The small forces of the smaller States, euch as the three free cities (like Hamburg), or the email principalities and duchies (like Renss pr'Auhalt, or Saxe Weimar or Brunswick) form portions of the neighbooring Prussian corps. Bavana has three corps, Saxony and Wnrtemberg two, and Baden one. There are three corps in Alsace and Lorraine specially prepared-as frontier corps for war. The other 14 corps are provided by Prussia and-the smaller States. The caTalry divisions are not formed tfll mobilisation, except those of the Guard and Saxons kept up in peace. Each army carps district has some cavalry regiments oat .of which the cavalry divisions are formed, the rest being. allotted to the divisions of the Eeveral army corps. . The normal strength of an army corps is two divisions each of two brigades of two regiments of three battalions of infantry. Each division has some cavalry and 72 field guns, and some tmeinoers, besides.its train. .., ~ A cavalry division" normally pomprje.es three brigades of two regiments of four squadrons - each, with two horse artillery . batteries. It is thus half the strength of the British cavalry division of four brigades of three regiments, with two horse artillery brigades each of two batteries.

Besides the above troops forming the army of first.line.there.will be raised in each army corps district two reserve divisions: but it is hardly likely that their mobilisation, can be effected till that cf the first lino army is completed, and they will be weaker in gone. These divisions will be used to reinforce the army in the front, to undertake, sieges, and to guard the lines of coimnnnic»tions, and to occupy conquered territory. They form the army of the second line.

The reserve men not needed in these divisions will be assembled at the' regicental depots *fc home, andean be sent to the front in drafts to replace casualties in their regiments as required. The firpt line army will comprise over a million men. the second line army some 800.000. There will also be a nnmber of troops guarding the rofists and garrisoning the home fortresses. It is likely that at first there will be mobilised 2.500.000 out of the 3,500,000 trained - men in Germany. MOBILISATION. Each army oorp» is practically a sr all army of all arms, self-contained, with its staff and administrative services for supply and transport, and caro of wounded, and providing its own reserve meu who live in its moa, and are readily called up on mobfJisatiotj. These fill up the ranks to war strength, icr only rather more than half the infantry battalions are present in peace. These reserve men have to bo armed, equipped, clothed, and fitted with boots, and distributed to their unite. On mobilisation, too, a number of near staffs have to be formed, and ammunition columns and trains which only exist- in skeleton in peace have to be provided. A great number of additional horeee ore also collected. • • Tho amount of business to be transacted on mobilisation can only be faintly, hinted at, and it is only by elaborate organisation to the minutest detail that the process J>e effected in the few days (under a week) to which it has now been brought in .Germany and France. In 1870 the Germans took il days to mobilise, other countries, , especially Russia, far longer. CONCENTRATION.

When all the units 01 the first line army are complete in men, horses, transport, ex., and fully armed and equipped with acooatrements, harmoss, and saddlery, tueir railway movement to the front can begin, but not till then. The war <rf 1870 showed the folly of the French in hurrying pjrtly-mobilised corps to the fronc without their trains and food supplies, or even, all their reserve men, and the Germans did not move off from their home stations till ready in every detail.

This railway movement is a gigantic operation, and is only possible in the fear or five days allotted, owing to the elaborate detailed arrangements made ii years of peace. The,, trains required, their time-tables, and arrangements for feeding en route, have all. been king laid down. Each army corps baa its own railway, line leading from its district to ito destination on th* frontier.

These railways have been selected so as to avoid crossing or interference vith those of other corps, and the roll-irg-etock is aU. told off to provide the necessary trains of "varyuig composi-

iiMis, which are double'the length of oidinary trains, and movo at a slow rate, drawn by two engines. Each corps keeps its railway to iteelf during the war, for use in passing back its sick and w«junded and bringing up its reinforce■.nmis :n men and horses, and ite supplies and stores. v THE RAILWAY SYSTEM. j The French General Staff hag made a thorough study of the German railways, and gathered from it, wit'a reference to the position of the 'army corps in peace, a fair idea of the deployment of the whole Army or its disposition by army corps on the frontier France. In recent years a number" of railways for' strategic use have been made up to the borders of Franco and Belgium, where no civil traffic called for , them. ' In some cases existing single lines have been doubled to meet military traffic. A number of great stations have been formed close to the frontier/ with many long sidings, and provided ■ with • platforms ; f6r unloading men" and horses. The eidinge allow of several trains discharging at once, and of their being marshalled for their return journoy to bring up more troops. All necessary accessories' are provided—water-cranes, engine-eheds, turn-tables, coaling bays, and repair chops. It will.'be, thus ;ciear v that no change in the locality of a detraining station could' be.made in> a hurry, so that the exact distribution of the troops along the frontier is definitely fixed. .-..■' ROADS AND FORTRESSES. Thorough of. the road* leading from these detraining etatjont into France; and , Belguim has indicated the lines of advance of the concentrated German armies. Each army corps must have a separate road, and these should, be within eight miles of each other, or half a day's march, co that corps can co-operate with their neighbouring troops if called on to fight. The French fortifications, of course, have a great influence .on the lines of operations., but these, being, secret, cannot be well discussed here. GERMAN STRATEGY. The kind of strategy which we may attribute to the Germans is tie most useful factor in forecasting the plan of campaign which they will now adopt. Tho etrategy of past wars is always a good guide to future ones-planned by the same General Staff. This can be seen in a study of the ware waged by Napoleon, Wellington, Lee, and other great generals: The strategy of a iiaV tion on which its officers are brought up is seldom or only gradually," changed. It tends to keep on the same general linee in war after war, as its features are due to national qualities or deficiencies, and become stereotyped, especially when the strategy has been euccesefuL - When we look at the strategy which the Prussians followed in. 1860 against Austria, and against France in 1870 we are struck by the identity of the preliminary disposition of the army and of the plan'of operations. Nor-is the all we have to go on. The Japanese, pupils of the Germans, used identical strategy against the Russians.' ' 'All these wars show first a decided spirit of initiativo and , a determination to eeek out the enemy and attack him. This spirit is borne out by ell German military literature and teaching.- "Wβ may, therefore, count on' the German Army invading France to -ttack the enemy, and 'this will enable them to di-' rect the opening phases of the war. Subsequent events are on the knees of the gods, and cannot be forecast by the most skilled strategist. They depend on the tactical successes in battle, and on the movements, wise or otherwise, of tha enemy. During the war the strategist lives from nand to mouth, making short plane for the next few days only. Napoleon himself said, ''I have never had a plan of campaign." • ' ■

In all the three wars named above we note a disposition of the whole lorco ir. three separate orunea i laced iilong the frontier with Intervals between them, but each concentrated for the combined action of its parte. From the first localities of this strategical deployment, as it is termed, we note im converging advance directed ' on the front and flanks of the enemy by the centre and flank wings of the attacking army. In 1866 and 1870 the centre array was the strongest, and the right army weaker than the left one, and clinging to the centre army, whits the stronger left army made a wide sweep in ite flank attack. In Manchnria the central army was the weaker one, and clung to the strongest, the left army, while tha right one made a wide sweep.

This division into three armies was suitably to the moderate eize of the whole in these wars, but the great numbers now to be engaged will demand *

ttrison into fivo armies, lest each should bo unwieldy. Modern views arc Kβ ?hJ «n ° man can wcU command stro% ini-of German 3 «riH form a SHd for Hi T I tho mos t °P 9r » Concentrated for ©exoneration in battle Tie _ eight corps confposinJ thesotwo ■western and north-central Germinv * ill probabjy bo supported by an army STSSEm- follows in second lino. Their march io tho Met,.*, may be expect to take' fivo

The weak left wing will be formed of nil army of perhaps only three «£]£ and a cavalry division, which will bo concentrated in Sonth 'Alsace SoS! SSw« nd - h »« s a«. "d will operate jiotireen the Vosrcs and the Swiss iI rentier, arpidinfc the strong fortresa of Belrort. wh,ch reserve troops coming up behind will besiege. This army will divert attention and hold down tho French right, while posted so as to repist any offensive movement of tho h rench against the German loffc, which might bo diverted from Belfort into

The Central Gorman mas 3 will probably bo deployed on the frontier between Metz and the Vosges Mountains ■and advance towards Nancy through tho gap in the fortifications between tiio great fortresses of Epinal and Tonl Part of it may emerge from the Gorl man fortified line on the Moselle from Met* to Thionyillo, und attack tho fortifications in front. The Germans havo provided very heavy field motara to attack forte, and light girder bridges to cross their ditches with. This central mass will comprise .two armies of four or -five corps each* drawn from the three in Alsace-Lorraine and the southern German States.' These will be supported by an army of Reserve Divisions in second line.

The centre mass will make a great effort to penetrate the French front •while the right wing is concentrating in the Menso for an attack on tho French left, so as to hold down tho French centre and prevent its reinforcing tho loft by shifting troops north•warti. The Germans nope thus to envelop the French left by simultaneous converging advance of all -their forces, .exactly in the style of the operations of 1866, or those of the Japanese against the Russians at Liao-yang. The total number engaged will depend en the corps which it may be lield essential to retain on the eastern frontier against Russia, which irfll certaiply comprise those quartered in the provinces likely to.be attacked, namely, East Prussia, Posen, and Silesia,

Tho great combined advance cannot begin till the 12tih day after mobilisation was ordered, when the concentration of tho whole first line army will be completed. Tho general battle; can hardly begin till a week later, when the fiank march through Belgium will luvv** Heen made. ■ indicates August 11th for tho first invasion, and the 18th to the 25th for tie great battle, bnt the date and locality of the latter will Jepend on the French movements.