TOO LITTLE – TOO LATE

Bay of Plenty Beacon, Volume 8, Issue 76, 29 May 1945, Page 4

TOO LITTLE - TOO LATE

AS part of that critical last-minute platform pounding m the Hamilton by-election the acting-Prime Minister revealed the proposal to return a large part of the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force (together with ex-prisoners of war the total is estimated at 27,000 men) and while this statement was probably an effective counter to the political capital being made out of the Government's indecision on manpower policy it is not all that it seems at first glance. Perhaps Mr Nash was incautious in making such a declaration, even under provocation, without more emphasis on the major qualification, "... at the earliest moment at which shipping can be made available without interference witt l the deployment of the forces to take up the war against Japan." Demands on shipping at present are exceptionally heavy and with the pressing call on its employment for the transfer of millions of men from Europe to the Pacific war theatre and the critical need for transport of foodstuffs to Britain and Europe, the strain on available tonnage is certain to grow heavier. _ . - While the question of the return of these men is a prime one for this country it is secondary to the larger problems involved in the intensification of the war against Japan. It may be argued that the problem is one; that the return of New Zealand troops will mean an automatic increase in production, this in itself being a vital part in the war m Asia. That would be true were these 27,000 men to return next week, but it is likely to be six months, nine* months, before such a number can be returned. Their rehabilitation will take another three months. So that twelve months from now a percentage of 27,000 men, those skilled in prim ary production, should be available to increase the food production of this country. Readers of the metropolitan press which so optimistically headed Mr Nash's "COMING HOME", may have assumed that the return of these men will be immediate. It is more likely to he the end of the next dairy season before their absorption into primary industry can be effected, and it follows that it must be the latter part of 1946 before numbers can be translated into increased production. Such a conclusion lends again to the regret that the Government did not fully recognise this country's extreme value to the Allied cause in food production but instead pursued a policy of maintaining overseas armed forces greater than warranted by the country's population and resources, and greater, over the last twelve months, than the overall Allied military position demanded. The Washington Conference, stressing the gravity of the food problem facing the world today, states that reduced output is due in part to further withdrawals of manpower from farms into the armed forces. This has been the practice in New Zealand since 1940 and the effects of the policy are acutely visible now. In its belated effort to rectify the position the Government is reminding the country of that old saw which has to do with stable doors and horses bolting.