THE FIRE BOMBS

Bay of Plenty Beacon, Volume 3, Issue 258, 15 January 1941, Page 6

THE FIRE BOMBS

CONCENTRATED ATTACK

HITTER LESSONS

The great "lire bomb' 1 raid on London on the night of Sunday, December 29, was the realisation of one of the chief fears of those who, in the anxious later days of peace, tried to work out what aerial Avarfare would bring. A big aeroplane can carry about two tons of droppable load. This can be made up of units of various sizes, high explosive bombs being made in Aveights from 2501b to a ton. But a single, machine can earn' a thousand or more incendiary bombs, and one of these can, Av.it h luck, do as much damage as a ton of high cxplosiA r e. Such a result must depend, of course, upon its starting a lire in such material or in such a place that it cannot be got under control. The anticipated danger of a firebomb attack on a large scale Avas, of course, that so many fires ay cult"! be started that. hoAvever great the fire-fighting organisations, they could not all be dealt AA'ith. This Avas revealed in the German attack, not because of the number of bombs dropped, but because they AA r ere concentrated in a small, densely - built area, in Avhich it Avas extremely difficult to fight the fires. Was it a Trial Run ? It has been reported that the number of incendiary bombs dropped on Bremen AA r as 20',000, Avhich was tAviee as many as the number Avhich the Germans claimed to have used in their attack on the heart of London. Jt is evidently Avithin the capacity of a big raiding force to carry a far greater number of incendiary bombs than were used in either of these attacks.

One comment on the London raid Avas that about 1~)0 aircraft were used,, and that the number of incendiary bombs dropped AA r as smaller than on some previous attacks, the difference being their concentration in the heart of London. This suggests that the German raid, serious as it was, may have been a test-: if so, a satisfactory one.

But, hoAvever satisfactory it may been to the German gentlemen Avho were responsible for it

but who no doubt did not sec it for themselves,, it had a most discouraging sequel Avhich no doubt some of them did see, or at all events appreciated. The R.A.I'. was ready to reply in kind and Avith interest and the repeated attacks on Bremen must have been a terrific shock to the Nazi air strategists. In effect, their purely terroristic effort against London had no military effect on the British Avar effort except to stimul7c it by angering the people, but its sequel had a A'ery grave effect on the German Avar effort by destroying highly important works. The test, if it was one, shoAved the Germans how to destroy architectural heirlooms, anc! shoAved the British how to scorch out the breeding ground of submarines and aircraft. Everybody's Job. It also showed that the fire-fight-ing organisation Avas not nearly efficient enough. It Avas not a matter of fire brigades and fire engines, but of individual effort, of assiduour Avatehing and immediate action to deal with the fire-bombs before they had started a fire. These bombs are quite small* are not explosiAre, and tackled in the right way can be made harmless by

child. The raid Avas folloAvcd by an appeal for "an army of fire-bomb fighters," for Avhich plenty of people AA-ere obviously aA'ailab]e. It was pointed out by London papers that if the oAvners and occupiers had taken proper steps to protect their property by a system of Avatchers. the raid AA'ould haA r e been far less serious in its results. The appeal bad an immediate response, and the effect has already been seen. The Germans made another fire-raising attack on Saturday righf,. but the bombs Avere got as they fell, but few fires AA'ere started. It seems as if the reply to great numbers of incrndin'y bombs--Avithout an - admixture of high explosives—is SMTiply g'-ent numbers of people Avho do not hesitate to run personal risks Avhile doing their protectiA'e AA'ork.