POWER POTENTIALS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Bay of Plenty Beacon, Volume 2, Issue 198, 12 August 1940, Page 4

POWER POTENTIALS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

WHILST the time for the expected attempts to invade Eng-' land becomes nearer and nearer, and whilst the spectre of m • 1 Japan looms more darkly, the importance of the strategical position in the Mediterranean should not be overlooked, for it is likely to influence greatly the policy of Hitler and that of the new Japanese Cabinet. In spite of Mussolini's boast that his plins for the attack upon Britain and France <in the Mediterranean were complete to the last detail, even though now he has only the one adversary, he has achieved practically nothing. It was assumed, for instance, that Malta . would become untenable and that the Pantelaria bottle-neck would enable Mussolini to close the central Medixteranean:, but Malta has not fallen before repeated air raids, and there is evidence that British ships are passing from Eastern and Western. Mediterranean basins. The question of German and Italian expansion,, as well as the effectiveness of the Allied blockade, depends upon Mediteranean. strategy. Part of Hitler's plan is no doubt to immobilise Turkey, hem in Russia beyond the Dardanelles, and then to grasp the oilfields of Iraq and the Persian Gulf, but for this he would require control of the waters of the Levant. It is thus scarcely too much to say that Hitler's Balkan plans and even his relations with Russia are. dependent upon the fate of the British Fleet at Alexandria and while that fleet exists Hitler has to consider the possibility of a flank attack through the Balkans. That fleet also seals the Eastern entrance to the Mediterranean. At the. other end. of the sea, Britain's control of the gateway to the outside world is not invoilable. If Spain should be tempted to abandon her policy of neutrality or should permit the passage of Nazi troops, the heavy guns at Ceuta and the land, threat from La Linea would probably dominate Gibraltar even if tne rock could be defended against a land attack,, its value as a base might be largely offset. And since the fall of France one of Britain's weaknesses is that she has in the Western Mediteranean basin, whilst the Italian air fleet, although limitecl to 5000 planes, many being out of date,, rs in a striking position that lends it an importance over and above its actual strength. In the number of small craft at her disposal Italy finds a potent source of strength—she is believed to have 132 destroyers, a far greater number than Britain is likely to be at>le to spare, for Mediterranean operations out of a gross total of 203 such vessels. Much h;as been made of Italy's submarines,, but owing to the ease of their detection by-aircraft in this clear and shallow sea the Italian losses have: been heavy and their successes few. No doubt the attempted invasion of Britain would be the signal for Italian activity in the Mediterranean, yet so long as there us no land threat to Gibraltar the strategic position of the British Fleet., based on past results, seems sound. In fact, there is reason to believe that a vigorous forward policy may be instituted, perhaps in the vicinity of the Italian's Eastern base, the Dodecanese Islands.