ENEMY STRATEGY

Auckland Star, Volume LXXIII, Issue 203, 28 August 1942, Page 3

ENEMY STRATEGY

PAPUA LANDING

May "Soften" Area For Larger

Invasion Force

Special Australian Correspondent

Rec. 1.30 p.m. SYDNEY, this day

"The Japanese attempt to take Milne Bay cannot be divorced from the action in the Solomons," says the Sydney Morning Herald war correspondent. "If our forces in the Solomons go on to other successes and recapture the whole group, Milne Bay would be useless to the Japan-es?V?-n£ an y garrison they mignt establish there would be cut off. On the other hand, if they successfully countered our move in the Solomons, possession of Milne Bay would add tremendously to the strength of their grip in the South-west Pacific."

However, it is by no means certain that the enemy will succeed in taking Milne Bay. Even should they gain initial success, they will have difficulty in holding it without strong air protection. There are no topographical obstacles excepting lakes and rivers between Milne Bay and Port Moresby along the southern New Guinea coast.

The scale of land fighting at present taking place at Milne Bav is not known, but it is expected here that the next 48 hours will decide "whether the Japanese have sent a boy to do a man's job." The general picture of the newest enemy expedition suggests that restricted forces landing at Milne Bay might be intended to "soften" the area for a larger invasion force at a later date. The threat to Port Moresby, which is now emphasised, would 'then become grave. The difficulty of dislodging the Japanese once they have landed, is pointed out by the Sydney Daily Telegraph, which says: "Invariably, once they hit the cover of jungle, the Japanese are difficult to root out. They have proved this in the Kokoda area. Their limpet-like regard for even minor gains makes them hard even for a superior force to dislodge." Advantages to Japan The advantages of Milne Bay to the enemy are assessed as being, firstly, a gain in position for the Solomons struggle, which the Japanese must expect to grow in intensity; secondly, to ensure the control of Torres Strait, discounting the protective value of Port Moresby to the Allies; thirdly, to place long-range enemy planes, both land-based and water craft, within close striking distance of the Australian mainland.

"Saving face" is not the least important of Japan's reasons for seeking a quick naval decision in the Solomons and for fresh offensive moves, declares Fielding Eliot, the New York Herald-Tribune military commentator, in analysing Japan's motives for counter-attacking. He says that our successful attack in the Solomons undoubtedly had a great effect on all the Oriental people among whom Japanese propaganda has been busy representing the Japanese as invincibly superior to all Westerners. Further, Japanese needs in other theatres, such as the contemplated attack on Russia and India, may call for a quick reversal of the situation in the Solomons.

"The Japanese may feel that our lodgment in the Solomons is obviously only the first step of the offensive directed against the enemy bases in New Guinea and New Britain, and must be eliminated before they have a free hand for a major effort elsewhere. Thev may have reason to believe that the relative naval situation in the Solomons is more favourable to them now than it will be later. If the Japanese navy decides to risk the whole or a major part of its fleet in an attempt to recover lost ground in the Solomons, thendecision has been reached after carefully weighing all the factors.'