The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News, The Echo and The Sun. FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1940. FAILURE AT DAKAR.

Auckland Star, Volume LXXI, Issue 230, 27 September 1940, Page 6

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News, The Echo and The Sun.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1940. FAILURE AT DAKAR.

For <ne inuw tAat /aefcs assistance, For fAe wrong that t>eeds resistance, For the future in the distance, And the good that tee can do.

The "operations against Dakar," which if. successful would have given ;i fillip to the British cause everywhere, have been abandoned. Primarily, their failure seems to have been due to a too-optimistic estimate of the prestige of General de Gaulle. It was believed, according to the official explanation, that "a large proportion of the French population

. . . would welcome his arrival." Whether this belief was never justified, or whether, as is now suggested, German and Italian agents were sufficiently strong to stiffen the resistance and prevent the expression of the true feelings of the people, we cannot know. Whatever the truth may be, the British Government's own service of intelligence must have been defective, or inadequate, with the result that presently it became plain that "only a major operation of war could secure the fall of Dakar." The responsibility of undertaking such an operation was declined, "because it has never been Britain's policy to enter into serious military operations against Frenchmen. . . ." This explanation is satisfactory if it is assumed that it does not really matter to Britain whether Dakar remains under the control of the Vichy Government and its masters or joins the movement of "Free France" —in other words, if it is assumed that no vital or important British interest is involved, as was clearly the case at Oran. Judgment on this matter may be divided, but it is fairly clear, from comment both in Britain and the United States before the withdrawal, that the common assumption was that British interests were involved.

The explanation of the decision to withdraw is more likely to be found in the British Government's desire not to provide more fuel for the Nazis' anti-British movement in France. The action at Oran, distasteful but necessary, quite understandably aroused resentment and anger among Frenchmen, and their feelings were the stronger because they were not allowed to learn the whole truth. At present the French people's co-operation with the Nazis is enforced, and it is very much in Britain's interest that they should not be so estranged from their former Ally, whom their Government betrayed, as to become willing helpers of the Nazis, or even become belligerent against Britain. Some such considerations, together with the knowledge that Germany and Italy are striving to bring Spain into the war probably had decisive weight with the British Government. But it is impossible not to feel disquiet! at the fact that though the operation was considered important enough to merit the support of a British naval force it has had to be abandoned. It was the kind of operation which, once undertaken, cannot be abandoned without loss of prestige.