AIR TACTICS.

Auckland Star, Volume LXXI, Issue 228, 25 September 1940, Page 8

AIR TACTICS.

MANY CHANGES. Nazi And Royal Air T Strategy. RUGBY, Sept. 24. Air-Marshal Sir Philip Joubert, in a broadcast to the United States, discussed the changes of policy forced on the German Luftwaffe and also the attacks by the Royal Air Force on objectives in enemyoccupied countries. "Early in August, the Luftwaffe attempted to invade this country in daylight," Sir Philip said, "and, by sheer force of numbers, beat down our defences. That effort cost them dear. The enemy then eent over individual bombers, using also covers, to attack vital objectives. The loss of many of these lone raiders made him change again. "His third scheme was to send occasional strong forces to bomb our airfields a.nd communications. One of these attacks lost 20 per cent of its numbers. Then he tried escorting small numbers of bombers with powerful fighter forces to get through to our vital points. In this fighting our losses became heavier, but we still took a greater toll of the German air force, in particular its fighters. "And so Hitler comes to night bombing—a form of attack hard to parry. There is, however, one distinctly hopeful sign. We are beginning to take a reasonable toll of these night birds. "We are getting on well with night interception. I hope to see, during the next few weeks, the figures steadily mounting until the proportion of German casualties by night approaches that by day. The Moral Effect. "In night lighting, once the casualties become severe, the moral effect is larger than by day. Setting off together in large formations in daylight, bombers and fighters give each other courage. At night the single pilot and his crew have no outside source from which to draw additional stores of courage." Turning to the Royal Air Force offensive, Air-Marshal Joubert emphasised the physical disadvantages suffered owing to the fact that, whereae the German bomber force had only a short 20 minutes' flight to reach England, Royal Air Force bombers must fly four or five times that distance to reach Germany. "Naturally we do not wish to bomb targets in France," Air-Marshal Joubert continued, "but certain of these we have to attack, such as the Channel ports, and the fields on which the German air force is disposed. "Against these we can develop the full effect of our bombers' strength, but We are reluctaut to carry the war any further into France, even into the occupied portion of the country. "We would much sooner be hitting the Germane in Germany, and it is this we shall go on doing. Berlin, Stettin, Leipzig, Bremen, Hamburg—all these towns regularly feel the weight of our bomber attacks, and, even if we have to make a long and hard journey to get at them, the effort is worth while. "This is not retaliation. No good soldier, seaman or airman believes in retaliation by itself. The only way to bring the enemy down ie to hit those things which contribute to the maintenance and development of hie armed forces. Our inflexible aim is to pursue this course."