NORTH SEA COMMISSION.

Auckland Star, Volume XXXVI, Issue 39, 15 February 1905, Page 3

NORTH SEA COMMISSION.

CLOSE OF THE INQUIRY. TEE TWO CASEZ. REPORT TO BE SEAS PXTBUECiY (By Cable—Press Association—CopytigSr.) PARIS, February 14. The conclusions snfamitted to the International Commission by the Russian agents imply that the evidence shows that the circumstances at the Dogger Bank were such as justified a commander in firing; consequently Admiral Roshdestvensky and his subordinates were not responsible for the effect of the shots upon the trawlers. The Russian Government, however, the agents stated, sincerely deplore the injury done to the inaocent victims, and are prepared to indemnify them and to repair damage. The questions of amount of the indemnity and its distribution, they say, should be-referred to The Hague Arbitration Court. The observations of tlie agents supporting the British conclusions show that France, Japan, Germany. Denmark, Holland, Sweden and Norway had formally stated that none of their torpedo-boats were on the Dogger Bank on October 21. It was suggested by the British agents that the Russian officers believed they 3F.w torperlo-boats owing to the alarmist reports they had heard before starting from Libau. These influences were strengthened by the Kaantehatka's mistaken report that she was being attacked, when she fired at the Sontag and the Aldebaran. The British suggestion is that Captain C!ado mistook the Russian warship Aurora's silhouette for torpedoers, and that the searchlights, being unable to illuminate it, the silhouette created a screen, behind which the silhouette disappeared, causing two partially-illumi-nated trawlers to be mistaken for torpedocrs. It is considered significant that Russia did not announce that the Aurora had been struck five times until six weeks after the incident. The Russian case suggested that the fire of the warships sank one of the tor-pedo-boats, and that the other escaped. The British reply.is that that statement exactly meets the eases of the trawlers Crane and Mino. The eonelnsAons submitted by the British agents are that the evidence proved— That there were no torpedo-boats or destroyers among the trawlers or in the neighbourhood of the fleet. That the Russian officers, though mistaken, had not sufficient justification for firing at all, and in any case ought to have avoided injuring the trailers. That the firing continued for an unreasonable time. That the Baltic fleet ought to have assisted the injured fishermen and the damaged vessels. And that no fault is attributable to the trawlers or to their management. Admiral Roshdestveoslcy's two reasons for leaving the trawlers unassisted are contrasted. The first alleged that the trawlers manifested complicity with the torpedoboats; ti>e second, that the trawlers weys nrrmerous enough to help themselves. The Russian case dwells on the superior facilities the Russian officers enjoyed in personally observing what occurred over the busy fishermen in vessels of low elevation and without night glasses or searchlights. It places emphasis on the evidence of the pilot Christiansen, who explained that the fleet did not understand the trawlers' signals, because those signals are not subject to international agreement obligatory on Russia. The admiral was bound to leave the point of attack rapidly since there was no guarantee that the attack would not be repeated. Admiral Founder announced that the Coramis. i ?ioTfs report would be read publicly at a later date.