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SUPREME COURT.—Civil Sittings.

MONDAY, JANUARY 9

TBefore His Honor Sir G. A. Arney, Knight, Chief Justice, and a Special Juriy.]

His Honor took his scat on the bench at 11 o'clock.

Mom Mangakahia a-. Thomas Craig — His Honor proceeded to sum up the evidence in this cause. He (the plaintiff) sought to recover from the defendant damages; first, for trespass by entering upon his land and committing certain^wrongful acts, set outinthe declaration, and second, for taking and carrying away certain timber logs, which the plaintiff claimed as his property. To the declaration it was pleaded by the defendant that the plaintiff was not possessed of the land, and further that the plaintiff knew of, and esced in the various acts alleged being done, and that the defendant had the plaintiff's leave and license to cuter Upon the land and cut the timber. To the pleadings the plaintiff replied that he never acquiesced, that he had not full knowledge of defendant's proceedings, that plaintiff was in possession of the land under a crown grant. His Honor directed the jury that burthen of proof as to possession was thrown on the plaintiff, and further whether the property in the logs belonged to the plaintiff, for if they belonged to the plaintiff it was clear, even though it should be found the plaintiff was not in possession of the land, that the defendant could exercise no act of ownership over them, and if he did, it could only be to the prejudice of the plaintiff. This would be of course prima facie proof, subject only to the case which the defend' ant should make out in his evidence. The jury had heard the evidence of the plaintiff, they had an opportunity ol judging of his demeanour, and they had also heard the searching cross-examination to which he had been subjected by the counsel. The jury would consider whether a witness in such circumstances would be likely to come through such on ordeal, with so little of inconsistency between the several parts of his testimony. He appeared to be a calm and thoughtful person, and to give his answers with a due degree of caution. It was mentioned incidentally, though not with specific object, that tins was a matter in which the Court had no jurisdiction—the land being land belonging to natives, over which, at the time of some of these transactions, tho native title had not been extinguished. But in the Native Rights Act (I860) there are three very important sections, the first of which provides that every native " shall be taken to be, and be deemed to have the same rights as a natural born subject of Her Majesty" ; and, in the next place, gives to the Supreme Court the power to deal with the property, " real or personal," of natives, as in like cases they would have to decide in respect of the property of British subjects. Therefore, the Court is of opinion there is some evidence to show that the plaintiff was possessed of this land, and that the property in these timber logs were, prima facie, in the plaintiff. That is, in effect, the case for the plaintiff. But the defendant's case was that the plaintiff gave him full permission to come upon the laud and cut timber, by virtue of a previous contract. But this defence contained an important admission, that the property in the land and timber belonged to the plaintiff ; for if it did not, he could not give permission or license. He says, though the plaintiff may have been possessed of the land, yet up to the 3rd of May he had given plaintiff express permission to go upon tho land and cut the timber. The permission was alleged to be given by parole, as distinguished from a permission in writing or by deed. No right could be conveyed except by deed, but the defendant relied upon the parole license as showing that having given permission, even though by parole only, the plaintiff could not come forward and sue for damage for acts which he knew of and acquiesced in. The question then suggested itself when? where? how was tins permission given ? The defendant answered, at various times, and brought forward evidence of conversations with various persons, and various times and places, at the time of cutting the timber, on the ground, and at Coroinandel, and on divers occasions and dates, (fits Honor read portions of the evidence at considerable length).

Left sitting.)

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/AS18710109.2.14

Bibliographic details

Auckland Star, Volume II, Issue 312, 9 January 1871, Page 2

Word Count
748

SUPREME COURT.—Civil Sittings. Auckland Star, Volume II, Issue 312, 9 January 1871, Page 2

SUPREME COURT.—Civil Sittings. Auckland Star, Volume II, Issue 312, 9 January 1871, Page 2

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