The Akaroa Mail. FRIDAY, MAY 11, 1877.

Akaroa Mail and Banks Peninsula Advertiser, Volume I, Issue 85, 11 May 1877, Page 2

The Akaroa Mail. FRIDAY, MAY 11, 1877.

There is something..so tremendously appalling in a person scolding in the presence of his fellow-men, and invoking the God of Eternal Truth to witness a lie that we do not marvel that mankind regard perjury as an offence Of' the deepest die against morality. Almost equally as grave is it against society. It is an old saying—-"you can lock from a thief but you cannot cope with a liar:" It is possible for an evil person to give such testimony on oath as may deprive a fellow-citizen, not only of his property, hut of his liberty, nay, even: of his life. Wilful and corrupt perjury is rightly regarded as a very grave offence against' society. It is not, however, with the moral and social aspects of perjury that we purpose now to deal but rather to look at it from .a legal point of view.

Merely hearing testimony to what is found afterwards to be untrue does not constitute perjury in law even though the false testimony was given on oath, for a truthful man might unwittingly give false testimony believing'that what he was saying at the time was the truth. Moreover the law, properly jealous of personal liberty, has so insisted on reasonable proof being adduced on the part of i the prosecution that even for such a heinous crime as perjury, even though there be no moral doubt of the guilt of the accused, it is sometimes difficult to obtain a conviction. Three essentials are requisite in law before a conviction of perjury can take place. First, it must be proved that the oath was administered by a competent tribunal, or by a person duly authorised by law to administer an oath, that ; the deponent if a Christian was duly sworn on the Holy Gospels, or if of/he Jewish faith, on the Old Testament. And here it may be remarked that solemn declarations and affirmations made by those who conscientiously object to being sworn in the usual manner do, if wilfully and falsely ! made, subject those who make them to the same penalties as are awarded to perjury. Secondly, evidence must be adduced to show that the person on his trial for wilful and corrupt perjury knew at the time that he was giving his testimony that it was false. It will be seen that the gravamen of the offence lies in the wilful attempt to deceive, and it is this that is most difficult of proof, especially as it may be and is often urged " what possible motive could the accused have had for giving, wilfully false testimony ? But if it can be shown that, the accused had a direct or even indirect interest, no matter how remote, in giving such testimony, knowing at the time that it was false, then the law presumes that he was influenced by corrupt motives and the proof of the intent to deceive is complete. But ttere is a third element which must be proved before a conviction could be sustained. It must be shown that the matter falsely and corruptly sworn to was relevant to the question at issue. It is quite possible for a person to be called as a witness in a case, and to make statements which were shown to have not the shadow of foundation in truth, and yet if those statements had no bearing whatever on the question at issue between the parties in the case, then no conviction for wilful and corrupt perjury could be sustained, we presume, because of the absence of proof of corrupt motives. Thus a man 'may be morally convicted as a perjured liar, and be branded by his fellow-men as such, but the law will not punish him because of the absence of one element essential to conviction, namely, a corrupt motive.