TROUBLE AHEAD

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 70, Issue 106, 17 February 1950, Page 3

TROUBLE AHEAD

SINO-RUSSIAN TREATY CONCESSIONS TO MOSCOW (N.Z.P. A.—Copyright) WASHINGTON, Feb. 15. The United States Secretary of State (Mr Dean Acheson) said to-day that the 30-year treaty signed by Russia and the Chinese Communist Government would mean trouble for the Chinese Communists. Russia had made many such pacts with Eastern European countries, but the agreements had always resulted in long arguments over the goods to be delivered by Russia, with “stalling” and delays which made the Soviet aid relatively ineffective.

Mr Acheson said he knew of no country which had had a happy relationship with Russia under treaties signed since the Second Wqjrld War. He was surprised at the meagreness of the proposed Russian aid of 300,000,000 dollars, spread over five years, to China. A nation which was on the verge of famine, and had economic problems such as China had, would not get very far on that amount of goods, particularly at the Soviet valuation over five years.

The present development was not a happy augury for China, because of what had happened to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other European neighbours of the Soviet, added Mr Acheson. The Pqris correspondent of the “New York Times,” in a dispatch published to-day, said that Communist China had agreed to give Russians key positions in the Peiping .regime. There were specific indications that this was one of the secret codicils to the new treaty signed in Moscow. The correspondent said that the Chinese Communists had also reluctantly decided to send -a large force of .Chinese labourers—possibly 1,000,000—t0 Siberia to work on contracts there. Three hundred thousand Chinese had left Manchuria for the Soviet Union.

Bargaining Points

“It is believed that the Chinese accepted terms giving key positions in their Army, secret 'police, and the Chinese Communist Party, to Russians,” the correspondent continued. “However, the Chinese gained important bargaining points. “According to responsible information, Moscow demanded full control of seven Yellow Sea ports, including Dairen and Port Arthur. It is undertsOod that the Russians compromised by agreeing to return Darien and Port Arthur after the signing of the Japanese peace treaty, or by the end of 1932, but all seven will be placed under Soviet supervision in the event of war.

“It is reliably reported that from the outset of their Moscow talks, the Chinese Communist leader (Mr Mao Tse-tung) and his Foreign Minister (General Chou En-lai) insisted that any bilateral agreements must be acceptable to the Chinese people, who were becoming agitated about their national sovereignty. . The Soviet demands included increased shipments of food to -Russia, and widespread concessions for Russia in the outlying regions of Tibet (still to be con quer.ed), Sinkiang ,and Inner Mongolia. “The strongly urged that a credit of £1,000,000,900 should be placed at their disposal for reconstruction. Whether this sum was eventually agreed upon is not known. “The Kremlin ran into unexpected opposition to its demands for special rights in the western and northern provinces of China. It is likely that these and other territorial questions have been postponed for future settle ment.”

Cutting the Ground

Diplomatic authorities in Washington said that Russia and Communist China had apparently designed their new treaty as a weapon for cutting the ground from under American policy on China. Officials said the treaty would re quire considerable study before its full significance could adequately be understood. They appeared convinced that the document made public did not represent the extent of the agreement reached in the prolonged Moscow talks between Russia and Communist'China. The officials said that the full import of the suspected secret agreements might appear only gradually. Something th£)t might secretly be in eluded was the question of Russian ships and aeroplanes for Communist China.