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PILOT TO BLAME

’PLANE CRASH AT BIG BAY. FINDING OF THE BOA^RD. tPer Press Association.) WELLINGTON, August 3. The conclusion that the Big Bay air tragedy on December 30, 1936, when a passenger was killed and others injured, was due to the negligence of the ’pilot, A. J. Bradshaw, was reached by the Board of Inquiry appointed by the Government to investigate the circumstances. The board consisted of Mr H. A. Young, S.M. (chairman), FlightLieut. J. M. Buckeridge (senior assistant to the Controller of Civil Aviation) and Flight-Lieut. H. B. Burrell, of Christchurch. Proceedings were in camera. 1 The report says that Bradshaw was issued a commercial pilot’s licence in June, 1934. He arranged to take with himself as pilot, four passengers from the Myross Bush aerodrome to Waiho Gorge. A party of trampers was at Big Bay, and one of the four passengers was to be landed there to join this party. When about to land, the machine stalled and fell into the sea 75 or 100 yards from the shore. There was no telephone in or about Big Bay, and it was impossible for him to get exact information as to landing conditions; but lie had flown over the dividing ranges that morning, and observed that the weather on that portion of the West Coast was satisfactory. The pilot said the beach was well •known to him, and when not carrying passengers for hire he had landed there 12 to 18 times. The ’Plane Overloaded. The report said that, according to the evidence, the machine was overloaded 151 b 2oz as to passengers, and 301 b 2oz as to commercial load when it took off, and by the time it readied Big Bay this would have been reduced by approximately 93|lb of petrol and 3Db of oil. Bradshaw did not actually weigh his passengers. He gave instructions that they were to weigh themselves before arriving at the aerodrome. He said that one gave his weight as lOst 71b, whereas three weeks before this passenger, wearing ordinary clothing and an overcoat, was 12st 21b. The pilot also had a loose four-gallon drum of petrol weighing about 361 b. The report, dealing with the actual approach to the landing at Big Bay, finds that the machine stalled through insufficient speed, and finds also that the pilot’s practice of a low-'speed glide approach, with the use of a little engine, to landings left a small margin, even assuming, as the pilot thought, that the air-speed indicator developed no lag. Experienced airmen knew, by air sense, when the speed was such that if it was not increased a stall would occur. The board was satisfied on the evidence that there was no failure ot the indicator. The Aero Club’s pilot instructor, Smith, gave 80 miles an hour as the minimum safe air speed and Bradshaw admitted he was instructed by Smith, who trained him, that with a load of 4201 b he was to glide in at 70 to 75 miles an hour. \ The pilot said the indicator gave 70 at the time of the tragedy; but taking into consideration the rapid deceleration of the aeroplane, it would be quite normal for the actual speed to be 65 when the indicator was showing 70. Smith said that in the machine concerned he always approached landings by means of a. glide, without using the engine, and he so instructed the trainees. Bradshaw, on the other hand, used a. little engine, and reduced the gliding speed. He admitted that in approaching in this fashion the machine “squashed,” and was therefore in a partially stalled condition. This method had always been looked on with disfavour by experienced pilots in singleengined machines. Controls Misused. When at the critical time in approaching Big Bay there was evidence of the machine being in a stalled condition. There would be a tendency to spin, through having a little engiue speed on. The pilot at this stage misused the controls by easing the stick back a fraction. The effect would be to force the machine into and maintain a spin. In the board’s opinion, it would have been possible to avoid a spin, eleven to correct a partially-developed spin, if the pilot had taken the correct action immediately—put tlie stick forward and given the engine full throttle. The report says that to comply with the requirements tlie pilot should have taken up only three passengers. That morning, also, lie had landed at Myross Bush with four passengers, and noticed that the machine did not behave well; but forgot about the incident until after the accident. The incident should, however, have warned him that when gliding in he should have increased the margin of safety. He failed to exercise that care and skill which the circumstances demanded. Because this was the first formal inquiry into an air accident, because the pilot was liable to pay £BOO, the value of the machine, because he was incapacitated for a long time through injuries, and because, although seriously injured and suffering much pain, be by almost superhuman efforts brought three passengers ashore, and so probably saved their lives, no order was made against Bradshaw for the payment of costs, "it was also recommended that -his license be not cancelled, but that it bo endorsed, with the material particulars of the accident. 'Plie view was expressed that in future bo should pay more regard tn the opinions or more experienced pilots, conform to the regulations and directions, and provide a larger margin of safety in bis flights. Board's Recommendations. Tlie Board recommends that no petrol other than that in approved petrol tanks be carried in an aircraft carrying passengers; that a direction be issued to all pilots making crosscountry flights that they send a tele-

phone, telegraph, and wireless message to their destination, notifying the expected time of arrival, and that they should also leave a route card with the responsible officer at the home aerodrome ; that the provisions of section 18 (paragraph 2) of schedule 2 of the regulations governing aircraft employed on a regular line or service or on public air transport be extended to include provision for certification by the pilot that the load is suitably secured ; that aero clubs and companies owning or hiring aircraft bo advised that they should appoint some person who will be responsible for notifying the Controller of Civil Aviation of accidents to their aircraft. STATEMENT BY THE PILOT. STALLING SPEED OF THE ’PLANE INVERCARGILL, August 3. The following statement was made to-night by Mr A. J. Bradshaw, the pilot of the aeroplane which, crashed at Big Bay T : — “In the report of the Board of Inquiry is a finding of negligence against me as the pilot of the machine. Through the inquiry being held in camera, in spite of my objections the full evidence lias not been made available to the public to read, hut reference to parts of it is made in the report. Evidence given by Pilot Clarke and myself that the machine would glide safely at 70 miles an hour is not mentioned. I questioned the accuracy of the evidence given of a stalling speed of 65 miles an hour, and asked that tests be made with a similar machine at present in use in New Zealand. This request has been ignored. “Evidence of a plate screwed in the cockpit of the machine for the information of pilots has also been This plate read as follows: 1 Climb, 65 miles ian hour. Stalling speed, 50 miles an hour on normal load.’ “I cabled the makers, the de Havilland Company, as follows: ‘Re Fox, 2 KADC, the makers’ plate states stalling speed, normal load 50, what would stalling speed be, total weight 20001 b, conditions normal, height above sea level 200 feet? information required in connection with inquiry.’ They replied : ‘ Stalling speed 18001 b, 37.5 miles an hour; 20001 b, 50 miles an hour.’ Tests Not Made. “The finding of negligence by the board is based on evidence that the mabhine would stall at between 60 and 65 miles an hour, which is 10 to 15 miles an hour above the stalling speed given by the makers for full load of 20001 b. Had tests been carried out as I requested, the inaccuracy of the evidence of a stalling speed of between 60 and 65 miles an hour would have been proved. In fairness to myself 1 wish to put the rj.ove facts before the public in order that they may appreciate the evidence on which my reputation as a pilot has been attacked. “I cannot claim space to deal with the other statements in the report, but wish to point out that the total load of the machine at the time of the accident was below that allowed by the certificate of airworthiness for the machine issued by the Aviation Department.”

Permanent link to this item
Hononga pūmau ki tēnei tūemi

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/AG19370804.2.12

Bibliographic details
Ngā taipitopito pukapuka

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 57, Issue 251, 4 August 1937, Page 3

Word count
Tapeke kupu
1,478

PILOT TO BLAME Ashburton Guardian, Volume 57, Issue 251, 4 August 1937, Page 3

PILOT TO BLAME Ashburton Guardian, Volume 57, Issue 251, 4 August 1937, Page 3

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